439 P.3d 1199
Ariz. Ct. App.2019Background
- Claudia Duff sued for personal injuries (filed May 2018) in Pima County seeking ≤ $50,000; she certified the case was subject to compulsory arbitration under A.R.S. § 12-133 and Pima Local Rule 4.2(a) (then showing $50,000 limit).
- The Arizona Supreme Court implemented a three‑year FASTAR pilot (Fast Trial and Alternative Resolution) in Pima County effective November 1, 2017, and, to implement it, set the § 12‑133 arbitration jurisdictional limit at $1,000 for the pilot.
- FASTAR replaces § 12‑133 compulsory arbitration in Pima County during the pilot, offers a short‑trial track preserving jury trial and appeal rights, and an alternative (binding) arbitration track requiring a plaintiff’s express waiver of trial/appeal rights.
- Duff objected, arguing FASTAR did not apply to her because the then‑effective local rule required § 12‑133 arbitration up to $50,000, and contending FASTAR is prohibited by § 12‑133 and unconstitutional as applied.
- The trial judge denied Duff’s motion to compel § 12‑133 arbitration; this special action challenges that interlocutory ruling. The court accepted jurisdiction and addressed FASTAR’s validity and its applicability to Duff’s pending case.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Duff) | Defendant/Respondent Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether FASTAR applies to Duff’s case | FASTAR does not apply because Pima Local Rule 4.2(a) (effective when she filed) required compulsory § 12‑133 arbitration up to $50,000 | FASTAR and the admin order lowered the arbitration limit to $1,000 for the pilot and thus displaced § 12‑133 in Pima County | FASTAR applied to Duff’s case; the administrative order effective Nov 1, 2017 implemented the change and was properly within the Supreme Court’s rulemaking/administrative authority |
| Whether § 12‑133 prohibits FASTAR | § 12‑133 mandates each superior court adopt mandatory arbitration and thus precludes a rule that effectively eliminates compulsory arbitration in a county | The supreme court’s rulemaking authority covers procedural matters; § 12‑133 is procedural and can be modified by court rule where inconsistent | § 12‑133 is procedural; FASTAR and the lowered arbitration limit are procedural rule changes within the supreme court’s authority and therefore valid for the Pima pilot |
| Whether FASTAR’s required waiver of trial/appeal rights is unconstitutional | FASTAR’s binding arbitration option forces waiver of trial de novo and appeal, violating constitutional rights and the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions | FASTAR preserves jury/appeal rights via the short‑trial option and permits defendants de novo trials after binding ADR; the right to civil appeal is statutory and subject to procedural conditioning | Waiver is voluntary for plaintiffs choosing binding ADR; FASTAR preserves adequate remedies and does not unconstitutionally eliminate jury or appellate rights |
| Whether the administrative order lowering the limit was effective pre‑July 1, 2018 local‑rule adoption | Duff argues she vested a right to § 12‑133 arbitration under the then‑published $50,000 local rule when she filed | The Supreme Court has constitutional authority to promulgate statewide procedural rules and to implement FASTAR by administrative order; the order properly established the lower limit for the pilot starting Nov 1, 2017 | The administrative order was a valid exercise of the Supreme Court’s rulemaking/supervisory authority and effective as of Nov 1, 2017, so it governed Duff’s pending case |
Key Cases Cited
- Scheehle v. Justices of the Supreme Court of Arizona, 211 Ariz. 282 (2005) (interprets § 12‑133 as requiring superior courts to adopt mandatory arbitration programs and recognizes Court’s rulemaking power over procedures)
- Graf v. Whitaker, 192 Ariz. 403 (1998) (treats right to appeal from arbitration as statutorily created substantive right but upholds procedural rules conditioning that right)
- Seisinger v. Siebel, 220 Ariz. 85 (2009) (rules and statutes should be harmonized; where irreconcilable, rule prevails as to procedural matters)
- Ballinger (State ex rel. Romley) v. Ballinger, 209 Ariz. 1 (2004) (local administrative orders that function as court rules require Supreme Court approval)
- Birmingham v. State, 96 Ariz. 109 (1964) (distinguishes substantive rights from procedural rules; procedural matters fall under court rulemaking)
- Ray v. Rambaud, 103 Ariz. 186 (1968) (no vested right in a particular procedure so long as a substantial and efficient remedy is provided)
- Fisher v. Edgerton, 236 Ariz. 71 (App. 2014) (state may set reasonable prerequisites to exercise the right to a jury trial; affirms Graf’s approach to procedural conditioning)