¶ 1 Appellant Susan M. Fisher appeals the superior court’s award of attorneys’ fees, expert witness fees, and taxable costs pursuant to Arizona Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 77(f) against Fisher in favor of her eo-defen-dant, Appellee Amy L. Edgerton. For the following reasons, we affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
¶2 After a three-car, rear-end accident, the plaintiff alleged that Fisher and Edger-ton, who were driving separate vehicles behind her, were at fault. After compulsory arbitration proceedings, the arbitrator determined Fisher was 100% at fault and awarded plaintiff $29,653.70 and taxable costs in the amount of $499 against Fisher.
¶ 3 Fisher filed a notice of appeal seeking trial de novo in the superior court naming both the plaintiff and Edgerton. See Ariz. R. Civ. P. 77(a), (c). After a four-day trial, a jury determined Fisher was entirely at fault for the accident, but awarded the plaintiff only $20,000 in damages against Fisher.
¶ 4 Pursuant to Rules 77(f) and 54(g), Edg-erton applied for attorneys’ fees and costs against Fisher. Fisher opposed the motion, arguing that Edgerton’s remedy was against the plaintiff because “Edgerton was brought into this case by the Plaintiff ____ [and] alleged to be comparatively at fault by the Plaintiff.” Relying upon Valler v. Lee,
¶ 5 The superior court awarded Edgerton nearly $16,000 against Fisher, including approximately $12,160 in attorneys’ fees, $1942 in expert witness fees, and $1223 in taxable costs. Fisher timely appealed. We have jurisdiction pursuant to Arizona Revised Statutes (“A.R.S.”) section 12-2101(A)(1) (Supp. 2013).
DISCUSSION
I. Issues and Standard of Review
¶ 6 Fisher first contends the award violates the language and spirit of Rule 77. More specifically, she argues she is not subject to an award of fees and costs because she did more than 23% better on appeal based on the lower amount of damages awarded the plaintiff. Alternatively, she argues she had to appeal from the entire arbitration award, and if anyone is liable for fees and costs, it should be the plaintiff who filed an unwarranted claim against Edgerton and did not seek to dismiss her claims against Edgerton at trial. Second, Fisher argues awarding fees here violates several constitutional rights. The award allegedly violates due process because she did not have fair notice about the amount of fees she might face by appealing the arbitration award. Additionally, the award allegedly violates equal protection because there is no rational basis to award attorneys’ fees against someone who only causes minor damage and is subject to Rule 77 arbitration compared to someone who causes more damage and is not subject to Rule 77 arbitration and such an award. She also argues the award chills her fundamental right to appeal and have a jury trial.
¶ 7 We review issues of statutory or rule construction de novo. State ex rel. Montgomery v. Mathis,
II. Rule 77(f) and A.R.S. § 12-133
¶8 Rule 77 is derived from AR.S. § 12-133 (Supp.2013) and governs the right of appeal from compulsory arbitration proceedings. As relevant here, Rule 77(f) provides, “If the judgment on the trial de novo is not more favorable by at least twenty-three percent (23%) than the monetary relief, or more favorable than the other relief, granted by the arbitration award ... the court shall order ... that the appellant pay” the appellee’s taxable costs and reasonable attorneys’ fees and expert witness fees. See also AR.S. § 12-133(1).
¶ 10 Although Fisher is correct she could only appeal from the entire award, including the arbitrator’s finding Edgerton was not liable, this does not preclude an award of attorneys’ fees and costs against Fisher, who actively and unsuccessfully litigated in the superior court that Edgerton was liable. When there are allegations that multiple defendants may be comparatively at fault and the arbitrator finds one defendant entirely at fault, any appeal from that award by the unsuccessful defendant is from the entire award unless the parties stipulate the successful co-defendant can be dismissed from the action on appeal. The purpose of this approach is to have the entire case, including the comparative fault contentions, tried together in the superior court. Valler,
¶ 11 We disagree with Fisher that Rule 77 exempts an appealing defendant from having to pay a successful co-defendant’s reasonable attorneys’ fees when the appealing defendant unsuccessfully attempts to shift fault to the co-defendant. We reject Fisher’s argument that because Rule 77(f) only refers to an appellant (Fisher) obtaining a^23% more favorable judgment at the trial de novo, the express language of Rule 77(f) bars an award of fees to a co-defendant (Edgerton). Fisher ignores that Rule 77(f) also provides that fees shall be awarded if the judgment after the trial de novo is not “more favorable than the other relief, granted by the arbitration award.” Because only monetary claims are subject to compulsory arbitration, Ariz. R. Civ. P. 72(b), we interpret the term “other relief’ in Rule 77(f) to include comparative fault determinations between or among multiple defendants when the appealing defendant unsuccessfully seeks to shift a percentage of fault in the award to a co-defendant. In eases such as this, where Fisher actively sought to reduce her allocation of fault by shifting fault to Edgerton, the two co-defendants are adverse parties regarding comparative fault and, if the appealing defendant cannot shift at least 23% more of the liability to her co-defendant, Rule 77(f) expressly requires an award of reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs.
¶ 12 Fisher does not dispute Edgerton’s assertion that Fisher actively sought to shift fault to Edgerton both in the arbitration and at the trial de novo. This is confirmed by the parties’ pre-trial statement. As a result, from Edgerton’s perspective, Fisher was an adverse party as to liability and Edgerton was successful at the trial de novo because the jury found Fisher completely at fault. Thus, Fisher’s failed effort to shift some percentage of the liability to Edgerton entitled Edgerton to a Rule 77(f) award of fees and costs. Fisher’s argument may have more force when an appealing defendant does not seek to shift liability to a co-defendant, but that is not the issue before us.
¶ 13 Fisher’s argument that no fees can be awarded to Edgerton if the judgment at the trial de novo awards at least 23% less relief to the plaintiff also leads to absurd results. Assume a plaintiff sues two defendants and the arbitration award is $10,000 against Defendant 1 and $10,000 against Defendant 2. Plaintiff then appeals and obtains a judgment of $30,000 against Defendant 1, but zero against Defendant 2. By Fisher’s theory, because there is only one judgment and the plaintiff did at least 23% better against Defendant 1, Defendant 2 cannot obtain an award of Rule 77(f) fees against the plaintiff despite Defendant 2 obtaining a more favorable judgment. This undercuts the purpose of Rule 77(f) — to deter marginal appeals— and leaves Defendant 2 without any remedy from the marginal appeal taken against her.
¶ 14 Fisher contends that if Edgerton is entitled to a Rule 77 award, it should be imposed against the plaintiff for naming Edgerton in the complaint when there was no basis for Edgerton’s liability and not offering to stipulate to dismiss the claims against Edgerton at the trial de novo. As Fisher construes it, her appeal from the arbitration award was really a de facto appeal by the plaintiff.
¶ 15 We do not find this argument persuasive. There was only one appeal, that brought by Fisher. Plaintiff had no duty to appeal the arbitrator’s award nor did she have a duty to stipulate to dismiss Edgerton in the trial de novo. Fisher’s argument “overlooks the fact that, by not appealing, [Pjlaintiff signaled [her] willingness to abide by the arbitration award in its entirety.” Valler,
¶ 16 Fisher also argues that but for our decision in Valler she could have filed a notice of appeal against the plaintiff only and designated Edgerton as a non-party at fault. She contends “[a]ll issues of law and fact could have been resolved without Edgerton appearing, including the allocation of fault between the parties and non-parties.” This ignores that the plaintiff named Edgerton as a defendant, Edgerton participated in the arbitration, and Edgerton did not settle with the plaintiff before the trial de novo. See, e.g., A.R.S. § 12-2506(B) (“In assessing percentages of fault the trier of fact shall consider the fault of all persons who contributed to the alleged injury ... regardless of whether the person was, or could have been, named as a party to the suit____ [Fjault of a non-party may be considered if the plaintiff entered into a settlement agreement with the nonparty or if the defending party gives notice before trial, in accordance with ... court rule____”). As a named party and.participant in the arbitration proceedings, Edger-ton had a right, like Fisher, to defend herself against the plaintiff and Fisher at a trial de novo. See A.R.S. § 12-133(H) (“Any party to the arbitration proceeding may appeal from the arbitration award____”); Ariz. R. Civ. P. 77(a) (“Any party who appears and participates in the arbitration proceedings may appeal from the award or other final disposition____”).
¶ 17 Nor can we agree with Fisher that awarding Edgerton’s fees violates the spirit and purpose of the Rule. The intent of Rule 77(f) “is to discourage parties from pursuing marginal appeals of arbitration awards, as an appeal effectively defeats the purpose behind compulsory arbitration.” Poulson v. Ofack,
III. Constitutional Claims
A. Fair Notice and Due Process
¶ 18 Fisher argues that awards under Rule 77 “are not subject to any constitutional limit” and violate due process because “neither [Rule 77(f) ] nor the case law gave [her] ‘fair notice’ of the extent of her punishment if she did not do at least 23% better against [Edgerton] as well as against [Pjlaintiff.” Although Fisher did not present this argument to the superior court, and we normally consider unpreserved arguments waived, McDowell Mountain Ranch,
¶ 19 Fisher’s argument fails. First, Rule 77(f) clearly states an unsuccessful appellant will pay an appellee’s reasonable fees and costs. Fisher had fair notice that Edgerton, as a non-appealing party to the arbitration, was an appellee at the trial de novo, and as
¶ 20 Nor can we accept Fisher’s analogy to punitive damages cases discussing a due process right to fair notice. Unlike punitive damages, the Rule and corresponding statute notify parties that an unsuccessful appellant at a trial de novo will be liable for an appellee’s reasonable costs and fees. Ariz. R. Civ. P. 77(f)(2), (3); A.R.S. § 12-133(I)(2), (3); Poulson,
¶ 21 Moreover, as discussed in a companion opinion issued this same date, Granville v. Howard, 1 CA-CV 13-0370,
¶ 22 Thus, the concerns stemming from the “imprecise manner in which punitive damages systems are administered,” State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell,
[P]unitive damages pose an acute danger of arbitrary deprivation of property. Jury instructions typically leave the jury with wide discretion in choosing amounts, and the presentation of evidence of a defendant’s net worth creates the potential that juries will use their verdicts to express biases against big businesses, particularly those without strong local presences____ Our concerns are heightened when the de-cisionmaker is presented ... with evidence that has little bearing as to the amount of punitive damages that should be awarded.
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.,
¶23 Finally, the constitutional underpinnings for limiting punitive damage awards do not exist in the context of Rule 77
¶ 24 In litigating the ease, Fisher had knowledge of the existence of Rule 77(f) and some sense of how much the defense might cost and, to the extent Edgerton’s fees might have been out of line with that cost, Fisher was entitled to argue the fees should be denied or limited to a reasonable amount. Fisher does not contend the award of fees and costs here was unreasonable or that the costs and fees were unrelated to Edgerton’s expenses in rebutting Fisher’s attempts to shift liability to Edgerton. This is unlike punitive damage awards which, absent constitutional protections, are not subject to any limits and left to the jury’s discretion. It was that unlimited discretion which triggered due process concerns of arbitrary deprivations of property and necessitated imposition of constitutional limits. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.,
B. Equal Protection and Right to Trial de Novo
¶ 25 In the superior court, Fisher argued a Rule 77(f) award against her in favor of Edgerton would “place a chilling effect” upon her right to a jury trial and “would amount to a sanction which would effectively prohibit [Fisher] from obtaining a trial by jury.” On appeal she maintains both that Rule 77 fee awards violate equal protection on a rational basis theory and that they should be subject to higher scrutiny because they chill her fundamental right to a jury trial. As we understand her latter argument, it is that “[i]f sanctions in favor of every other party involved in the lawsuit are a realistic possibility, it would have a chilling, if not freezing, effect on any litigant’s right to a trial to a jury on the merits.” Although Fisher did not preserve the first of her appellate arguments below, given the constitutional issue at stake, we address the merits of that issue and conclude her arguments fail on the merits.
¶26 Fisher’s argument is that because the damage amount in this case was less than $50,000, she was treated differently than parties where the claim is greater than $50,000 and thus not subject to mandatory arbitration. We disagree. “To establish an equal protection violation, a party must____ show that it was treated differently than other people in the same ‘similarly situated’ class.” Aegis of Ariz., L.L.C. v. Town of Marana,
¶ 27 In any event, putting aside that Fisher would have to show the Rule and statute are facially unconstitutional under all cireum-stances,
¶ 28 Discouraging appeals of reasonable arbitration awards in relatively low dollar cases is a legitimate governmental interest. Although Rule 77(f)’s “fit” may be imperfect, it is nevertheless rationally related to achieving a legitimate governmental goal. See Heller v. Doe,
¶ 29 We find support for our conclusion in Richardson v. Sport Shinko (Waikiki Corp.),
¶30 Similarly, in Kimbrough v. Holiday Inn, the federal district court determined a pilot program requiring compulsory arbitration for claims for damages under $50,000 did not violate the Seventh Amendment to the United States Constitution,
¶ 31 We apply a similar presumption to the constitutionality of state law and require the plaintiff to rebut that presumption beyond a
¶ 32 Fisher also argues the prospect of having to pay an opposing party’s attorneys’ fees would chill her fundamental right to a jury trial because she would fear being held liable for such fees. We disagree. First, although Fisher argues that the fee award provision violates the right to a jury trial as guaranteed in the Seventh Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 2, Section 23, of the Arizona Constitution, the Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial does not apply to the states. See McDonald v. City of Chicago,
¶ 33 Nonetheless we interpret Arizona’s constitutional provisions protecting the right to a jury trial consistent with the Seventh Amendment. Orme Sch. v. Reeves,
¶ 34 Although the right to a jury trial is constitutionally protected, it is also subject to reasonable regulation. Under Arizona law, the state has the power to set reasonable prerequisites to exercise the right to a jury trial, provided the right is not eliminated. See Graf v. Whitaker,
¶ 35 With that, we conclude that the possibility of fee awards on appeal from an arbitration award does not violate the constitutional right to a jury trial. Our conclusion is supported by Richardson,
¶36 The possibility of a fee award here does not act as an unreasonable or significant burden impairing the right to a jury trial. Rule 77 and A.R.S. § 12-133(1) both provide safeguards to ensure that the right to have a jury decide ultimate issues is not significantly burdened or impaired. The superior court is limited to awarding reasonable attorneys’ fees and expert fees, and may decline to award such fees if it would create a significant economic hardship on the appellant. As addressed above, and in Granville v. Howard, 1 CA-CV 13-0370,
¶ 37 Fisher contends, however, that if she “had any idea that she would do $10,000 better against the plaintiff but be ordered to pay $15,000 in sanctions to [Edgerton], she never would have appealed.” As discussed above, the rule and statute gave fair notice that Fisher could be required to pay Edger-ton’s reasonable costs and fees if Fisher was not sufficiently successful in shifting liability to Edgerton, and this is precisely the type of cost-benefit analysis Rule 77(f) demands before a litigant decides to appeal an arbitration award. See Poulson,
¶38 We recognize that in upholding Hawaii’s arbitration appeal fee award provision, the Hawaii Supreme Court noted the award was limited to $5000, Richardson,
IV. Attorneys’ Fees and Costs on Appeal
¶ 39 Edgerton requests her attorneys’ fees pursuant to Rule 77(f). See also A.R.S. § 12-133(1). Fisher argues that Rule 77(f) is inapplicable in this Court. We agree for the reasons stated in Granville, 1 CA-CV 13-0370,
¶ 40 However, because Edgerton is the prevailing party on appeal she is entitled to her costs pursuant to A.R.S. § 12-341 (2003) upon her compliance with Arizona Rule of Civil Appellate Procedure 21.
CONCLUSION
¶ 41 For the reasons stated, we affirm the superior court’s award of Rule 77(f) fees and costs to Edgerton.
Notes
. For purposes of convenience, we will refer to Rule 77 alone, given that the same relevant provisions also appear in A.R.S. § 12-133. Section 12-133(A) provides in pertinent part that the "superior court, by rule of court, shall ... 1. Establish jurisdictional limits of not to exceed sixty-five thousand dollars for submission of disputes to arbitration. 2. Require arbitration in all cases which are filed in superior court in which the court finds or the parties agree that the amount in controversy does not exceed the jurisdictional limit." Pursuant to A.R.S. § 12-133(1), if the judgment at a trial de novo on appeal from an arbitration award is "not at least twenty-three per cent more favorable than the monetary relief or other type of relief granted by the arbitration award, the court ... shall order ... the appellant pay ... [to the appellee, taxable costs, reasonable attorney fees necessitated by the appeal, and reasonable expert witness fees incurred by the appellee in connection with the appeal] unless the court finds ... that the imposition of the costs and fees would create such a substantial economic hardship as not to be in the interest of justice.”
. Fisher argues for the first time in her reply brief that because Edgerton did not assert a cross-claim or obtain an arbitration award against her, "Rule 77(f) did not even apply.” We will not consider this argument because it was raised neither in the superior court nor in the opening brief. We generally do not consider arguments made for the first time in a reply brief. Dawson v. Withycombe,
. An exception applies when joinder of all parties is not necessary, such as when multiple plaintiffs bring an action against a defendant, each plaintiff’s claims can be separately litigated, and the unsuccessful defendant only names one of the plaintiffs in the appeal from the award. Orlando,
. In a supplemental filing, Fisher relies on Farmers Insurance Co. v. Tallsalt,
. It is unclear whether the superior court awarded all of Edgerton's attorneys’ fees, even to the extent those fees were not incurred in defending against claims of Edgerton’s comparative fault. However, Fisher does not argue the amount of fees was unreasonable on this basis.
. Fisher argues that Rule 77(f) refers to appellant and appellee in the singular. However, Arizona’s rules of statutory construction provide that ”[w]ords in the singular number include the plural, and words in the plural number include the singular.” A.R.S. § 1 — 214(B) (2002); see also N. Valley Emergency Specialists, L.L.C. v. Santana,
. We consider Fisher’s state and federal constitutional challenges together because the respective due process and equal protection clauses protect the same interests. See Vong v. Aune,