Dudley Bryant, Jr. v. Warden, FCC Coleman - Medium
2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 25606
| 11th Cir. | 2013Background
- Dudley Bryant pled guilty in 2001 to being a felon in possession of a firearm (18 U.S.C. § 922(g)) and was sentenced in 2002 to 235 months after the district court applied the ACCA enhancement (18 U.S.C. § 924(e)) based on three prior Florida convictions (two drug offenses and a concealed-firearm conviction).
- At sentencing the government conceded there were at most three qualifying predicates and never relied on Bryant’s 1988 burglary conviction; the district court and parties treated the concealed-firearm conviction as a § 924(e) “violent felony” under Eleventh Circuit precedent (Hall).
- Bryant’s first § 2255 motion (2005) was denied as time-barred; a 2008 successive § 2255 application based on Begay was denied for lack of authorization.
- After Begay (Supreme Court) and this Circuit’s Archer and Canty decisions undermined Hall as to Florida’s concealed-firearm offense, Bryant filed a § 2241 petition invoking the § 2255(e) savings clause, arguing his 235-month sentence exceeded the 10-year statutory maximum of § 924(a)(2) absent the ACCA enhancement.
- The district court dismissed the § 2241 petition; the Eleventh Circuit (majority) holds Bryant satisfied the savings-clause prerequisites, Begay’s rule is substantive and retroactive, Bryant’s sentence exceeds the statutory maximum, and the § 2241 petition may proceed — the court instructs reduction of Bryant’s sentence to the 10-year statutory maximum.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether § 2255(e) savings clause permits a § 2241 petition challenging an ACCA enhancement that resulted in a sentence exceeding the statutory maximum | Bryant: savings clause applies because circuit precedent (Hall) foreclosed his claim earlier and Begay/Archer/Canty later overruled that precedent, so his prior § 2255 was inadequate | Government: savings clause is jurisdictional; relief should not bypass § 2255(h) limits and government urged substituting burglary predicate to preserve ACCA enhancement | Held: savings clause permits § 2241 where (1) circuit precedent squarely foreclosed the claim at trial/appeal/first § 2255, (2) Supreme Court decision later overruled that precedent as applied, (3) the rule is retroactive, and (4) the sentence exceeds statutory maximum; Bryant satisfied these elements. |
| Whether Begay announced a substantive rule that applies retroactively on collateral review | Bryant: Begay narrowed the class of offenses qualifying as ACCA violent felonies and thus is substantive and retroactive | Amicus/Gov: Begay is procedural/analytic and should not be treated as retroactive to reopen collateral sentences | Held: Begay is substantive (narrows the scope of the statute) and applies retroactively for collateral review in this context. |
| Whether circuit foreclosure must be shown at trial, on direct appeal, and in first § 2255 to invoke savings clause | Bryant: foreclosure existed because Hall controlled through sentencing and first § 2255; he had no genuine opportunity to raise the claim earlier | Some positions (and partial concurrence/dissent concerns): foreclosure timing/measure should be narrower or measured only at the time of the first § 2255 | Held: foreclosure must have existed during sentencing, direct appeal, and the first § 2255; Williams and Wofford framework adopted. |
| Appropriate remedy when § 2241 succeeds on pure Begay/ACCA-error claim | Bryant: vacate and remand for resentencing without ACCA enhancement; sentence capped at 10 years | Government asked to substitute an alternative predicate (burglary) to preserve ACCA; amicus argued limiting relief is inappropriate | Held: the court may correct the statutory-max error by reducing the sentence to the 10-year statutory maximum; substitution of a new predicate was disallowed because the government waived reliance at sentencing. |
Key Cases Cited
- Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137 (2008) (narrowed the residual clause of ACCA by requiring crimes be similar in kind to enumerated offenses)
- United States v. Archer, 531 F.3d 1347 (11th Cir. 2008) (applied Begay to hold carrying a concealed weapon under Florida law is not a "crime of violence" for guideline/ACCA purposes)
- United States v. Canty, 570 F.3d 1251 (11th Cir. 2009) (held carrying a concealed weapon in Florida is not a violent felony under ACCA)
- Wofford v. Scott, 177 F.3d 1236 (11th Cir. 1999) (explained savings-clause circumstances, including conviction of a nonexistent offense and limited sentencing defects)
- Gilbert v. United States (Gilbert II), 640 F.3d 1293 (11th Cir. 2011) (en banc) (held savings clause does not reach guideline misapplication when sentence remains within statutory maximum; left open pure ACCA/Begay claims)
- Williams v. Warden, 713 F.3d 1332 (11th Cir. 2013) (clarified that to use the savings clause for sentencing claims the petitioner must rely on a retroactive Supreme Court decision that overruled circuit precedent which had squarely foreclosed the claim)
- United States v. Hall, 77 F.3d 398 (11th Cir. 1996) (pre-Begay precedent treating Florida concealed-firearm offense as an ACCA violent felony)
- Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348 (2004) (explained that new substantive rules apply retroactively on collateral review)
- United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005) (distinguished guidelines errors from statutory maximums; guidelines do not displace statutory ceilings)