986 F. Supp. 2d 1249
W.D. Okla.2013Background
- Plaintiff, an African-American tenured associate professor at Cameron University, alleges racial discrimination and retaliation under Title VII and constitutional violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 after the University imposed a "severe sanction" on August 8, 2012 (removal from regular duties and restricted campus access).
- Plaintiff filed an EEOC charge on May 27, 2012 and received a right-to-sue notice on June 4, 2012; he did not file a new or amended EEOC charge relating to the August 8 sanction.
- § 1983 claims are asserted against three individuals (University president Ross, provost McArthur, and EEO officer Russell) for alleged First Amendment retaliation and denial of procedural due process; a state-law breach of contract claim alleges breach of an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
- Defendants moved to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) (Title VII jurisdictional exhaustion) and 12(b)(6) (§ 1983 and contract pleading deficiencies and qualified immunity).
- The court held Title VII claims are dismissed for failure to exhaust EEOC remedies; the First Amendment § 1983 claim survives the motion to dismiss; the § 1983 due process claim and the breach of contract claim are dismissed for failure to state a claim, with leave to amend the contract claim.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Title VII jurisdiction (exhaustion) | EEOC charge timely and supports Title VII suit | Plaintiff failed to exhaust administrative remedies for the August 8 sanction because EEOC charge predates it | Dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction (no exhaustion) |
| First Amendment retaliation (§ 1983) | Speech concerned racial discrimination and hiring practices — matter of public concern, not part of official duties | Speech was within official duties or not protected; qualified immunity | Claim sufficiently pleaded; survives dismissal; qualified immunity rejected at this stage |
| Procedural due process (§ 1983) | Tenured status entitles plaintiff to process for disciplinary actions short of discharge | Sanction did not affect employment status, pay, tenure, or benefits — no protected property interest | Dismissed for failure to state a due process claim (no deprivation of protected property interest) |
| Breach of contract (state claim) | Implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing was breached | Complaint fails to identify any breached express contractual provision | Dismissed for failure to state a claim, but plaintiff given leave to amend |
Key Cases Cited
- Shikles v. Sprint/United Mgmt. Co., 426 F.3d 1304 (10th Cir. 2005) (Title VII requires administrative exhaustion)
- National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101 (U.S. 2002) (each discrete act starts a new charge-filing clock)
- Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (U.S. 2009) (complaint must plead facts showing plausible entitlement to relief)
- Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (U.S. 2007) (plausibility standard for pleadings)
- Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (U.S. 2006) (public-employee speech doctrine)
- Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (U.S. 1983) (public concern test for employee speech)
- Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563 (U.S. 1968) (balancing public interest and employer interest in speech cases)
- Rohrbough v. Univ. of Colo. Hosp. Auth., 596 F.3d 741 (10th Cir. 2010) (analysis of whether speech is pursuant to official duties)
- Hulen v. Yates, 322 F.3d 1229 (10th Cir. 2003) (property interest in specific employment status/assignment)
- Teigen v. Renfrow, 511 F.3d 1072 (10th Cir. 2007) (discipline that does not change rank or compensation may not implicate a property right)