Dubrosky v. Boehringer Ingelheim Corp., 145 Conn. App. 261

Plaintiff Dubrosky sustained a January 9, 2009 knee injury after slipping, filed a Form 30C February 18, 2009, and sought treatment beginning February 27, 2009.
Defendant Boehringer Ingelheim initially accepted that an incident occurred but contested certain aspects, filing a Form 436 October 20, 2009.
A January 3–31, 2011 hearing addressed compensability, causation, notice, and preclusion; the commissioner ultimately granted preclusion against contesting the extent of disability.
The commissioner found timely Form 30C, but that no medical bills were generated within 28 days, yet argued Form 43 could have been filed to preserve rights; the board affirmed.
This case centers on whether strict compliance with § 31-294c(b) is excused when payment within 28 days is otherwise impossible, leading to a reversal and remand for further proceedings consistent with the opinion.
The court recognizes the distinction between contesting liability (Form 43) and contesting the extent of disability, and concludes the circumstances here do not fit the strict‑compliance model.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether § 31-294c(b) precludes contest of disability when payment within 28 days was impossible	Dubrosky—preclusion applies if timely notice was given and pay‑within‑28 days is possible; here it was not.	Boehringer—strictly, failure to file form 43 or commence payment within 28 days precludes contest of liability and extent.	Preclusion does not apply; impossibility excuses strict compliance.
Whether Form 43 could preserve the employer’s right if payment within 28 days is not feasible	Dubrosky—Form 43 was appropriate but not available due to timing.	Boehringer—Form 43 is for liability contest, not for preserving extent challenges when payment is possible.	Form 43 could not have salvaged an extent‑only challenge in this scenario; impractical to require strict compliance.
Whether the court should construe strict notice provisions to avoid absurd results	Dubrosky—strict compliance should not create incentive to delay treatment to defeat preclusion.	Boehringer—notice requirements must be strictly construed.	Strict compliance not required where impossible to provide notice; decision reversed.

Harpaz v. Laidlaw Transit, Inc., 286 Conn. 102 (Conn. 2008) (explains § 31-294c(b) structure and preservation of rights; conclusive presumption rules)
Lamar v. Boehringer Ingelheim Corp., 138 Conn. App. 826 (Conn. App. 2012) (discusses notice and forms (Form 43) to preserve liability/extent challenges)
Adzima v. UAC/Norden Division, 177 Conn. 107 (Conn. 1979) (distinguishes liability vs. extent of disability in employer defenses)
Soares v. Max Services, Inc., 42 Conn. App. 147 (Conn. App. 1996) (strict construction of notice provisions; favors reasonable compliance)
Vaillancourt v. New Britain Machine/Litton, 224 Conn. 382 (Conn. 1993) (notes that life may require flexible interpretation of notice when impossible to give)