Dubose, R. v. Willowcrest Nur. Home, Aplts.
22 EAP 2016
| Pa. | Nov 22, 2017Background
- This is a dissent by Chief Justice Saylor in a Pennsylvania Supreme Court case addressing the effect of 40 P.S. §1303.513(d) (MCARE Act) on survival actions in medical professional liability cases.
- Prior Pennsylvania precedent (notably Pastierik) held the discovery rule does not extend the accrual of a survival cause of action beyond death; death was treated as a definite event for accrual/repose purposes.
- The Superior Court and some later decisions treated fraudulent concealment as a tolling exception for survival actions despite Pastierik.
- Section 513(d) was enacted in reform legislation addressing repose/limitations in medical malpractice and contains a heading using the term "Statute of repose" and an express tolling provision for fraud/concealment.
- The majority treats §513(d) as a statute of limitations that effectively makes a survival action accrue only at death, displacing common-law accrual principles and the ordinary limitations framework.
- Chief Justice Saylor argues in dissent that §513(d) merely codifies existing case law about the outer limits of accrual and tolling for survival actions and does not intend to fundamentally alter accrual or displace other statutes of limitations.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Does §513(d) of the MCARE Act convert the survival action accrual rule so that accrual occurs only at death (thereby displacing common-law accrual and ordinary statute of limitations)? | §Dubose: Survival actions accrue at the decedent's injury; §513(d) should not change common-law accrual or the applicability of ordinary limitations. | Appellants: §513(d) operates as a statute of limitations/repose in malpractice context and accrual is measured by death under that provision. | Dissent (Saylor): §513(d) codifies existing law on outer accrual limits and tolling; it does not evidence intent to fundamentally alter accrual or displace the ordinary statute of limitations. |
| Does the presence of an express tolling provision for fraudulent concealment in §513(d) mean the provision must be read as a statute of limitations rather than a statute of repose? | §Dubose: Tolling language does not transform a repose provision; fraud tolling has been recognized in repose contexts. | Appellants: Tolling language supports treating §513(d) as a limitations statute. | Dissent: The tolling clause is consistent with statutes of repose that allow exceptions for wrongful conduct; it does not compel recharacterization as a pure limitations statute. |
| Did Matharu v. Muir and inaction by the Legislature ratify the Superior Court's view that §513(d) is a statute of limitations? | §Dubose: Matharu misread the relationship between §513(d) and existing Judicial Code limitations; subsequent legislative silence is not controlling under governing canons. | Appellants: Matharu held §513(d) is a limitations provision and Legislature's inaction implies acquiescence. | Dissent: The statutory-construction principle invoked by the majority (legislative inaction) does not apply here; Matharu rests on flawed premises about coterminous limitations. |
| Does the majority's reading create disharmony with statutory construction principles requiring related statutes be construed together? | §Dubose: Majority's approach displaces common-law accrual and conflicts with the Judicial Code and related statutes. | Appellants: Majority contends §513(d) governs in the malpractice/repose context independently. | Dissent: Majority's recharacterization causes statutory disharmony; §513(d) should be read in conjunction with existing accrual/limitations law. |
Key Cases Cited
- Pastierik v. Duquesne Light Co., 514 Pa. 517 (Pa. 1987) (held discovery rule does not extend accrual of survival cause of action past death; treated death as a definite accrual event)
- Anthony v. Koppers Co., 496 Pa. 119 (Pa. 1981) (discusses accrual concepts and the role of a definite event in limiting accrual)
- Matharu v. Muir, 86 A.3d 250 (Pa. Super. 2014) (en banc) (held §513(d) functions as a statute of limitations in the malpractice context)
- Kaskie v. Wright, 403 Pa. Super. 334 (Pa. Super. 1991) (Superior Court treated fraudulent concealment as a tolling exception for survival actions post-Pastierik)
- Krapf v. St. Luke's Hosp., 4 A.3d 642 (Pa. Super. 2010) (recognized fraudulent concealment as a tolling doctrine in survival action context)
- Morrison Informatics, Inc. v. Members 1st FCU, 635 Pa. 636 (Pa. 2016) (explains holdings of judicial decisions are to be read against their facts and not overbroadly)
- Oliver v. City of Pittsburgh, 608 Pa. 386 (Pa. 2011) (same canon regarding reading judicial holdings in light of their facts)