This is an appeal from an order granting appellees’ motion for summary judgment in a wrongful death and survival action predicated on medical malpractice.
On July 2, 1981, appellants’ decedent, their minor son, was severely injured when he was struck by an automobile driven by an intoxicated driver. The child was taken to appellee Geisinger Medical Center and delivered to the care of Dr. David Rees Stewart, who along with Drs. James Wright and Lawrеnce Sherman performed surgery. On July 4 the boy’s brain ceased to function as the result of a reduction in intracranial blood flow; on July 10, he suffered cardiac arrest and died.
Appellants’ commenced the instant wrongful death and survival action on June 10, 1987. The complaint averred that their son had died as the result of negligence on the part of Dr. Stewart 1 and sought damages therefor. Appellants also claimed that informed consent was lacking, as they had not been told prior to permitting the operation on their son that Dr. Stewart was an alcoholic and unlicensed to practice medicine in Pennsylvania. Their ignorance of these matters, of whiсh they claim only to have become aware through newspaper coverage of an unrelated case, is proffered in explanation of their delay in instituting suit.
Appellees moved for summary judgment on the basis thаt the action is barred by the two year statute of limitations applicable to wrongful death and survival actions, 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 5524(2). The trial court agreed, and this appeal followed.
*337 Appellants sole claim on appeal is that the statute of limitations is tolled by what is characterized as appellees’ fraudulent concealment of Dr. Stewart’s addiction and licensure status at the time of the decedent’s death.
In reviewing an order granting summary judgment our function is to determine whether issues of triable fact exist. Bobb v. Kraybill,354 Pa.Super. 361 ,511 A.2d 1379 (1986). Summary judgment is proper only in cases free and clear from doubt, and for our review we accept as true all well-pleaded facts, giving the plaintiff the benefit of all reasonable inferences from the facts. Roland v. Kravco, Inc.,355 Pa.Super. 493 ,513 A.2d 1029 (1986).
Zackhery v. Crystal Cave Company,
There is no dispute here that the action was commenced beyond the two year limitations period set by 42 Pa.S.C.A. 5524(2). Moreover, as appelleеs point out, the discovery rule, which extends periods of limitation where the existence of a cause of action cannot reasonably be discovered within the time prescribed by the applicable statutе, does not apply to wrongful death and survival actions in Pennsylvania.
Pastierik v. Duquesne Light Company,
Appellants correctly rely upon
Molineux v. Reed,
*338 Where, “through fraud or concealment, the defendant causes the plaintiff to relax his vigilance оr deviate from his right of inquiry,” the defendant is estopped from invoking the bar of the statute of limitations. Schaffer v. Larzelere,410 Pa. 402 , 405,189 A.2d 267 , 269 (1963). Moreover, defendant’s conduct need not rise to fraud or concealment in the strictest sense, that is, with an intent to decеive; unintentional fraud or concealment is sufficient. Walters v. Ditzler,424 Pa. 445 ,227 A.2d 833 (1967); Nesbitt v. Erie Coach Company,416 Pa. 89 ,204 A.2d 473 (1964). Mere mistake, misunderstanding or lack of knowledge is insufficient, however, Schaffer v. Larzelere, supra; and the burden of proving such fraud or concealment, by evidence which is clear, precise and convincing, is upon the asserting party. Nesbitt v. Erie Coach Company, supra.
Id.,
In general, to qualify as grounds on which a claim that an action is time barred may be equitably estopped, the conduct complained of must be
“something amounting to an affirmative inducement
to plaintiff to delay bringing the action.”
Gravinese v. Johns-Manville Corp.,
The trial court, in examining the casе before it, determined that:
The alleged medical negligence of Dr. Stewart which caused the death was or should have been apparent when the minor decedent expired in July, 1981. If officials of defendant affirmatively concealed facts which related to that negligence, then the two year statute might be tolled, but, even if they concealed Dr. Stewart’s alcoholism and non-licensure, there has been demonstrated no causal connection between those facts and the death of the minor.
Trial Court Opinion at 4.
Insofar as negligence is concerned, we are constrained to agree with the trial court’s assessment. Although appel
*339
lants argue that thе nexus between the doctor’s shortcomings and the child’s death was demonstrated in their complaint and affidavit, and bourne out by deposition testimony given in the companion case whose revelations gave rise to the instant action, our review of those documents yield no such connection. What is proffered as cause and effect in the complaint and affidavit is merely the same conclusory language which might appear in any claim of medical malpractice. The depositions are not included in the official record on this case and are not before us.
Ritter v. Ritter,
359 Pa.Super, 12,
Since, as
Molineux
makes clеar, mere lack of information is not sufficient to make out a case for fraudulent concealment, the line between bare information and material facts must be drawn where the missing data is directly germane to the delay in advancing the claim. As this court ruled in
Levenson v. Souser,
*340
When examining the assertion of lack of informed consent, however, our inquiry alters: the question becomes whether the patient was made aware of all material risks which are collateral to a given procedure, including, at least, “the nature of the operation to be performed, thе seriousness of it, the organs of the body involved, the disease or incapacity sought to be cured, and the possible results.”
Gray v. Grunnagle,
Obviously, traditional analysis is somewhat removed from the facts at hand, as it is not the particular procedure performed upon the decedent which is at issue at here, but rather some alleged characteristics of the person performing it. The question then becomes whether the doctrine of informed consent can be expanded to include information other than that which concerns medical treatment by surgical procedure.
Appellant has supplied no precedential basis for expansion. To the contrary, where the suggestion has been made that the informed consent doctrine should subsume other aspects of medical treatment, this court has ruled otherwise. In
Boyer v. Smith,
Although the instant cаse does involve a “touching,” it fails to meet the more critical aspect of the Boyer criteria: there is no allegation here that appellants were uninformed about the particular procedures their sоn underwent irrespective of the surgeon performing them. Like the court in Boyer, we too refuse to expand the informed consent doctrine to include matters not specifically germane to surgical or operativе treatment. To do so, where the absent information consists of facts personal to the treating physician, extends the doctrine into realms well beyond its original boundaries. Nor are limitations easily definable. Are pаtients to be informed of every fact which might conceivably affect performance in the surgical suite? Moreover, here, no clear nexus has even been established between injury and lack of knowledge.
Matters such as personal weaknesses and professional credentials of those who provide health care are the responsibility of the hospitals employing them, the professional corporations who offer their services, or the associations which are charged with oversight. Their failure to fulfil their obligations in this regard becomes a matter of negligence, and it is from them that recovery must be sought.
Given our determination thаt appellants have stated no legal basis for recovery, we find that the trial court proper *342 ly granted summary judgment as to the informed consent claim.
Judgment affirmed.
Notes
. Dr. Stewart died during the pendency of the action. By agreement of the parties the proceedings against him and his estate for malpractice were severed.
. Appellants credit the trial court with having ruled in their favor as to the existence of fraudulent representation. A careful reading of the trial court’s Opinion proves otherwise.
. There are also letters attached as exhibits to appellant’s brief which are purportedly from physicians involved with the companion case in some capacity. By Order of October 17, 1990, these materials have been stricken as dehors the record.