Drushal
2014 Ohio 3088
Ohio Ct. App.2014Background
- At ~2:20 a.m. on April 20, 2013, Officer Laskowski stopped John Drushal for an alleged violation of Wooster Codified Ordinance 331.19 after observing that Drushal “failed to stop before the clearly marked stop bar.”
- Officer smelled alcohol, observed bloodshot/watery eyes and slurred speech, administered field sobriety tests, cited Drushal for OVI and the stop-sign/stop-line violation, and arrested him.
- Drushal moved to suppress, arguing the officer lacked reasonable, articulable suspicion to stop him and lacked probable cause to arrest.
- The municipal court granted the suppression motion, concluding Drushal had stopped at the stop line (as the ordinance requires to stop “at” the line) and the officer’s stop was premised on a mistake of law.
- The State appealed, challenging the legality of the stop, the trial court’s legal standard, and its interpretation of Wooster Ord. 331.19(a).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the traffic stop was supported by reasonable, articulable suspicion | Officer had reasonable suspicion because vehicle failed to stop before the stop bar | Drushal: the ordinance requires stopping “at” the stop line; he stopped at the line, so no violation | Stop was unlawful; officer’s belief that one must stop before the line was a mistake of law, so no reasonable suspicion |
| Whether the trial court applied correct legal standard | State contended court misapplied law and should not suppress evidence | Drushal argued exclusion appropriate where stop based on officer’s legal mistake | Court applied correct Fourth Amendment analysis and suppressed evidence |
| Interpretation of Wooster Ord. 331.19(a): means of “stop at a clearly marked stop line” | State argued officer reasonably interpreted ordinance to require stopping before the line | Drushal argued plain language requires stopping at (in/on/near) the stop line, which he did | Court held “at” plainly means in/on/near the stop line; ordinance does not require stopping before the line |
| Application of exclusionary rule for officer’s mistake of law | State urged stop should be upheld despite officer’s mistake | Drushal relied on precedent holding stops based on legal mistakes must be suppressed | Court followed authority refusing to permit stops founded on officer’s mistake of law and suppressed evidence |
Key Cases Cited
- Burnside v. State, 100 Ohio St.3d 152 (appellate review of motion to suppress is mixed question of law and fact)
- Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (investigative stop requires specific and articulable facts supporting reasonable suspicion)
- Maumee v. Weisner, 87 Ohio St.3d 295 (1999) (application of Terry/ reasonable suspicion standard in Ohio)
- State v. Bobo, 37 Ohio St.3d 177 (1988) (totality of circumstances viewed through eyes of a reasonable, cautious officer)
- Roxane Laboratories, Inc. v. Tracy, 75 Ohio St.3d 125 (statutory language must be given its plain, unambiguous meaning)
- State ex rel. Celebrezze v. Allen Cty. Bd. of Commrs., 32 Ohio St.3d 24 (statute interpretation limited to ambiguous text)
- Bowling Green v. Godwin, 110 Ohio St.3d 58 (2006) (distinguishing officer mistakes of fact from issues relevant to exclusionary rule)
- Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (exclusionary rule bars evidence obtained in violation of Fourth Amendment)
- United States v. Lopez-Soto, 205 F.3d 1101 (9th Cir. 2000) (allowing stops based on legal mistake would defeat purpose of exclusionary rule)