968 F.3d 1286
11th Cir.2020Background
- Plaintiff Drew Adams, a transgender male who socially and medically transitioned (including updated legal documents), was barred from using the boys’ multi-stall restrooms at Nease High School and offered only the girls’ restrooms or a single‑stall gender‑neutral bathroom.
- The St. Johns County School District enforces an unwritten policy assigning restroom use based on sex recorded on enrollment documents (treated as "biological sex").
- Adams sued the School Board asserting violations of the Equal Protection Clause and Title IX; the district court granted declaratory, injunctive, and monetary relief after a bench trial.
- On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit reviewed de novo the legal conclusions and affirmed the district court, holding the bathroom policy unconstitutional as applied to Adams under the Fourteenth Amendment and unlawful sex discrimination under Title IX.
- The court found the policy arbitrary in administration (relying on enrollment paperwork), not supported by demonstrable privacy harms, and based on impermissible gender‑stereotyping as applied to transgender students.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the bathroom policy violated Equal Protection (heightened scrutiny) | Policy singles out transgender students for differential treatment because it bars Adams from boys’ restrooms based on birth‑assigned sex and enforces gender stereotypes | Policy is a sex‑based classification that furthers important privacy interests in sex‑separated restrooms and is justified and substantially related to that interest | Policy failed heightened scrutiny: administration was arbitrary, privacy justification was hypothetical/unsupported, and policy relied on impermissible gender stereotypes; Equal Protection violation affirmed |
| Whether excluding Adams from boys’ restrooms was substantially related to student privacy | Exclusion does not materially protect privacy; Adams used stalls discreetly and school lacked incidents showing privacy harms | Presence of physiological differences justifies sex‑separated facilities and schools may prioritize privacy and safety | Court held no demonstrable privacy harm tied to Adams’s restroom use; asserted privacy interest insufficient to justify exclusion |
| Whether the policy was arbitrary in application | Policy treats transgender students differently depending on which sex is listed on original enrollment paperwork, producing inconsistent results | Using enrollment records is a practical, acceptable means to determine restroom assignment | Court found the enrollment‑document rule arbitrary because it failed to treat similarly situated transgender students alike, undermining the asserted justification |
| Whether Title IX forbids the School Board’s exclusion of Adams and whether 34 C.F.R. §106.33 shields the Board | Bostock and Title VII principles mean discrimination against transgender people is discrimination on the basis of sex; the District’s policy treated Adams worse than non‑transgender boys, causing harm | §106.33 permits separate facilities “on the basis of sex,” which the Board interprets as biological sex; regulatory and agency guidance do not compel Adams’s view | Court held Title IX covers discrimination against transgender students (guided by Bostock); the policy as applied to Adams violated Title IX; §106.33 does not mandate the Board’s interpretation or shield the discriminatory application |
Key Cases Cited
- City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432 (U.S. 1985) (principles on scrutiny for certain classifications)
- United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (U.S. 1996) (heightened scrutiny for sex classifications)
- Glenn v. Brumby, 663 F.3d 1312 (11th Cir. 2011) (discrimination against transgender individuals as sex/gender‑nonconformity discrimination)
- Bostock v. Clayton County, 140 S. Ct. 1731 (U.S. 2020) (employment discrimination against transgender persons is discrimination because of sex)
- Whitaker ex rel. Whitaker v. Kenosha Unified Sch. Dist. No.1 Bd. of Educ., 858 F.3d 1034 (7th Cir. 2017) (school restroom access for transgender student under equal protection/Title IX frameworks)
- Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (U.S. 1976) (arbitrariness defeats sex‑based classifications)
- Doe v. Boyertown Area Sch. Dist., 897 F.3d 518 (3d Cir. 2018) (allowing transgender students to use restrooms consistent with gender identity did not violate other students’ privacy)
- G.G. ex rel. Grimm v. Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd., 822 F.3d 709 (4th Cir. 2016) (analysis of school restroom policies for transgender students)
- Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (U.S. 1973) (rejecting arbitrary sex classifications)
- Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53 (U.S. 2001) (limits on hypothesized justifications under heightened scrutiny)