258 F. Supp. 3d 207
D. Mass.2017Background
- Plaintiff Amy Drachman, a former Director of Employment Policy and Compliance at Boston Scientific Corporation (BSC), alleges disability, failure to accommodate, and termination after medical leave; she previously filed a first amended complaint asserting several federal and state claims.
- Drachman moved for leave to file a second amended complaint to add a Rehabilitation Act (29 U.S.C. § 794) claim against BSC, supported by new factual allegations.
- Defendants opposed amendment as futile; the court considered the motion under the Rule 12(b)(6) plausibility standard because discovery and dispositive motions had not concluded.
- Drachman alleged BSC received $174,150 in federal grant funding in FY2013 and argued BSC is a federally funded entity either because it received general federal assistance or because it is principally engaged in providing health care.
- The court found the federal-grant allegation (receipt of funds by BSC “as a whole”) sufficiently pleaded to survive futility review, but held allegations that BSC is "principally engaged" in health care were inadequate because BSC does not provide direct treatment or services to patients as in typical covered health-care entities.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Should leave to amend be allowed or is the Rehabilitation Act claim futile? | Drachman: proposed facts plausibly state a §504 claim; discovery will develop details. | Defendants: allegations are conclusory; amendment would be futile and prejudicial. | Allowed in part; claim limited and tested under Rule 12(b)(6) plausibility. |
| Did Drachman sufficiently allege BSC received federal financial assistance “as a whole”? | Alleged BSC received $174,150 in federal grant funding in FY2013 (specific amount and year). | Defendants: plaintiff failed to allege nature/purpose of the grant or verify receipt. | Plaintiff’s allegation is sufficient at pleading stage; claim based on direct receipt survives. |
| Is BSC “principally engaged in the business of providing health care” under §794(b)(3)(A)(ii)? | Drachman: BSC’s mission statement and its role as a medical-device company show engagement in health care. | Defendants: BSC is a manufacturer, not a health-care provider; mission statements are insufficient. | Denied as to this theory; mission-statement and device-manufacturer status insufficient to show BSC provides direct health-care services. |
| Can plaintiff bring a private action under §503 of the Rehabilitation Act? | (Implicit) Plaintiff attempted or referenced §503. | Defendants: no private right of action exists under §503. | Denied: no private right of action under §503. |
Key Cases Cited
- Hatch v. Dep’t for Children, Youth & Their Families, 274 F.3d 12 (1st Cir. 2001) (futility is a basis to deny leave to amend and context-specific standard)
- Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) (plausibility pleading standard)
- Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) (courts need not accept legal conclusions as factual allegations)
- Lesley v. Hee Man Chie, 250 F.3d 47 (1st Cir. 2001) (elements of a Rehabilitation Act §504 claim)
- Doe v. Salvation Army in U.S., 685 F.3d 564 (6th Cir. 2012) (discussion of what it means to be "principally engaged" in covered businesses)
- Glanz v. Vernick, 756 F. Supp. 632 (D. Mass. 1991) (examples of covered health-care providers such as doctors and hospitals)