Doyle v. Hogan, 411 F.Supp.3d 337

Background

Plaintiff Christopher Doyle, a licensed mental-health practitioner, sued Maryland officials challenging Md. Code § 1-212.1, which bans licensed mental health or child-care practitioners from providing conversion therapy to minors.
Doyle asserted federal First Amendment claims (free speech and free exercise), a vagueness challenge, and Maryland constitutional claims; he sought preliminary and permanent injunctions and damages.
Defendants moved to dismiss; after briefing and a hearing the court denied the preliminary injunction as moot and resolved the motion to dismiss.
The court treated the statute as a regulation of professional conduct (speech incidental), applied intermediate scrutiny, and concluded the statute survives that review because it materially advances the State’s interest in protecting minors and is sufficiently tailored.
The free exercise claim was dismissed because the statute is neutral and generally applicable; the vagueness challenge failed on an as-applied basis; the court declined supplemental jurisdiction over the Maryland constitutional claims and dismissed them without prejudice.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Free Speech — does § 1-212.1 violate the First Amendment?	Doyle: counseling is speech; the law is content- and viewpoint-based and therefore subject to strict scrutiny.	State: the statute targets professional conduct (treatment), not protected speech; at most incidental speech burdened, so intermediate/rational basis applies and survives.	The statute regulates conduct with incidental speech; intermediate scrutiny applies and § 1-212.1 survives because it advances a substantial interest and is sufficiently tailored.
Free Exercise — does the statute impermissibly burden religiously motivated counseling?	Doyle: the ban targets his sincerely held religious beliefs and evidences hostility; religiously motivated therapy is being burdened.	State: the statute is neutral and generally applicable; it does not target religion and need only satisfy rational basis.	Claim dismissed: § 1-212.1 is neutral and generally applicable and does not state a plausible free-exercise violation.
Vagueness — is § 1-212.1 unconstitutionally vague?	Doyle: statute is vague as to therapy types, change goals (orientation vs. identity), voluntary vs. forced treatment, and goals originated by the client.	State: the statute clearly defines conversion therapy and a reasonable professional can understand prohibited conduct.	As-applied vagueness challenge fails: statute provides sufficient notice about the prohibited professional conduct; speculative hypotheticals do not warrant invalidation.
Maryland constitutional claims / pendent jurisdiction	Doyle: state-law rights asserted; asks federal court to decide Maryland constitutional claims.	State: with federal claims dismissed, court should decline supplemental jurisdiction.	Court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) and dismissed the state-law claims without prejudice.

Key Cases Cited

National Institute for Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361 (2018) (professional speech is not a freestanding category; limits on speech by professionals must be evaluated under ordinary First Amendment doctrines)
Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552 (2011) (distinguishes regulations of speech from regulations of nonexpressive conduct)
Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490 (1949) (government may prohibit conduct even if it is initiated or carried out by means of language)
Stuart v. Camnitz, 774 F.3d 238 (4th Cir. 2014) (First Amendment rights of professionals lie on a continuum between public dialogue and regulation of professional conduct)
Pickup v. Brown, 740 F.3d 1208 (9th Cir. 2014) (upholding bans on certain mental-health treatments for minors as regulation of professional conduct)
King v. Governor of N.J., 767 F.3d 216 (3d Cir. 2014) (analysis whether verbal communications become conduct when used in treatment)
Otto v. City of Boca Raton, 353 F. Supp. 3d 1237 (S.D. Fla. 2019) (upholding a conversion-therapy ban under intermediate scrutiny)
Greater Baltimore Ctr. for Pregnancy Concerns, Inc. v. Mayor of Baltimore, 879 F.3d 101 (4th Cir. 2018) (government may regulate professional practices even when they entail speech)
Capital Associated Indus., Inc. v. Stein, 922 F.3d 198 (4th Cir. 2019) (distinguishing regulation of the practice of a profession from restrictions on communicative aspects)
McCullen v. Coakley, 573 U.S. 464 (2014) (intermediate scrutiny requires statute not burden substantially more speech than necessary)