Downingtown Area SD v. Chester County Board of Assessment Appeals Appeal of: Marchwood Associates, Downingtown Area SD v. Chester County Board of Assessment Appeals Appeal of: Marchwood Associates

Background

Marchwood Associates owns a 504-unit apartment complex (two parcels) in Downingtown Area School District; assessed in 1996-97 at $19,385,200. The School District, using consultant Keystone, identified under-assessed nonresidential properties and appealed assessments including Marchwood's for tax years 2013–2016.
The Chester County Assessment Board initially made no change; the School District appealed to the Court of Common Pleas. Marchwood intervened, raising equal protection and Pennsylvania uniformity-clause challenges to the School District’s selective appeal policy. Parties stipulated to key facts about the School District’s policy.
The trial court authorized use of the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure for discovery and case management; both judges and parties proceeded under those Rules through pleadings, discovery, scheduling, and dispositive motion practice. A second judge later took the case before trial.
At trial the parties submitted competing FMV expert testimony; the trial court issued June 1, 2016 orders setting assessed values based on the School District’s FMV figures and the common level ratio but did not address Marchwood’s uniformity/equal protection claims.
Marchwood filed post-trial motions under Pa. R.C.P. Nos. 227.1 and 227.2 within 30 days; the School District moved to strike, arguing post-trial motions are not permitted in tax assessment (statutory) appeals absent explicit court invitation. On August 9, 2016 the trial court granted the motion to strike. Marchwood appealed; the trial court treated the June 1 orders as final and quashed the appeal as untimely.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Marchwood’s appeals from the June 1, 2016 orders were timely given its filing of post-trial motions	Trial court’s long use of the Rules implicitly invited post-trial motions; Marchwood reasonably relied on that practice	Statutory assessment appeals generally do not permit post-trial motions unless court explicitly allows; no explicit invitation occurred	Appeal from June 1 orders was untimely; post-trial motions were properly struck because there was no explicit court invitation
Whether the court should hear the appeal nunc pro tunc due to alleged court-induced reliance/misleading conduct	Court’s prior practice and late striking of motions caused prejudice; counsel’s reliance was non-negligent, warranting equitable relief	Nunc pro tunc requires extraordinary circumstances (fraud or court breakdown); no such showing here	Nunc pro tunc relief denied; Marchwood failed to show extraordinary circumstances or court breakdown
Whether the trial court erred by applying the Rules during litigation but later disclaiming them for post-trial relief	Marchwood: inconsistent application misled parties and prejudiced appeal rights	Court: trial courts may use Rules for case management but statutory appeals do not permit post-trial motions absent explicit direction	Trial court did not abuse discretion; parties cannot assume implicit invitation to file post-trial motions in statutory appeals
Merits of Marchwood’s uniformity/equal protection claims	Marchwood argued School District’s selective appeal policy constituted unconstitutional spot assessment and discrimination	School District relied on procedural grounds and presented competing FMV evidence; court did not rule on constitutional claims after striking post-trial motions	Merits were not reached because the appeal was quashed as untimely and procedural bars applied

Key Cases Cited

Westinghouse Electric Corporation v. Board of Property Assessment, Appeals and Review of Allegheny County, 652 A.2d 1306 (Pa. 1995) (standard of review in tax assessment appeals)
In Re: Appeal of P–Ville Associates, 87 A.3d 898 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2014) (questions of law reviewed de novo; scope of appellate review)
In re Appeal of the Borough of Churchill, 575 A.2d 550 (Pa. 1990) (trial courts may invite post-trial motions but must do so explicitly)
Shapiro v. Center Township, Butler County, 632 A.2d 994 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1993) (post-trial motions are not permitted in statutory appeals absent explicit court direction)
Eachus v. Chester County Tax Claim Bureau, 612 A.2d 586 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1992) (trial court may invite post-trial relief only if done explicitly and clearly)
Union Electric Corp. v. Board of Property Assessment, 746 A.2d 581 (Pa. 2000) (nunc pro tunc relief requires extraordinary circumstances such as fraud or court breakdown)
Connor v. Westmoreland County Board of Assessment Appeal, 598 A.2d 610 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1991) (examples of what constitutes negligent/improper acts amounting to court/board breakdown)
Western Pennsylvania Water Company v. Board of Property Assessment, Appeals and Review, 555 A.2d 1357 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1989) (nunc pro tunc granted where administrative body failed to follow court orders)
Moore v. Pennsylvania, Board of Probation and Parole, 503 A.2d 1099 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1986) (administrative misdirection can constitute negligence supporting nunc pro tunc relief)
Flynn v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 159 A.2d 579 (Pa. Super. 1960) (appeal nunc pro tunc where an innocent party was misled by an official)