Downard v. Rumpke of Ohio, Inc.
2013 Ohio 4760
Ohio Ct. App.2013Background
- Scott Johnson, a temporary employee at Rumpke's tire-shredding facility, was operating/inspecting a tire shredder after Rumpke had removed or bypassed multiple safety features (hinged hood, interlock switch, observation platform, jib crane). Johnson became entangled in the cutter box; he later died from injuries. The estate received workers’ compensation benefits and sued under Ohio’s employer intentional-tort statute, R.C. 2745.01.
- Downard (administratrix) alleged Rumpke deliberately removed equipment safety guards, triggering the statutory rebuttable presumption of intent to injure under R.C. 2745.01(C).
- At trial the court granted directed verdicts for Rumpke twice: (1) at the close of plaintiff’s case-in-chief, excluding the jib crane, observation platform, and interlock switch from the statutory definition of “equipment safety guard” (it did find the hinged hood was a guard); and (2) at the close of all evidence, finding Rumpke had rebutted the presumption as a matter of law.
- On appeal the Twelfth District affirmed in part and reversed in part: it upheld exclusion of the jib crane and observation platform as ‘‘equipment safety guards,’’ but held the interlock switch qualified as an equipment safety guard (because it functioned with the hinged hood) and that the trial court erred in finding the presumption rebutted as a matter of law.
- The court remanded for further proceedings so the jury may decide credibility and whether Rumpke rebutted the presumption (the only direct rebuttal evidence at trial was testimony by Rumpke’s foreman explaining a productivity-based rationale for bypassing guards).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the jib crane, observation platform, and interlock switch are "equipment safety guards" under R.C. 2745.01(C) | The removed items were equipment safety guards whose deliberate removal triggers the statutory presumption of intent to injure | Only the hinged hood was an equipment safety guard; the other items are generic safety devices or part of a safety system and not within the statutory definition | Jib crane and observation platform are not equipment safety guards; the interlock switch is an equipment safety guard (it operates with the hinged hood) |
| Whether the presumption under R.C. 2745.01(C) (deliberate removal → presumed intent) was properly rebutted as a matter of law | Presumption arose and defendant failed to introduce uncontradicted, hard evidence to rebut; credibility of defendant’s sole witness is for the jury | Defendant introduced evidence (foreman testimony) showing the guard was removed/disabled for a productive operational reason (piggybacking) and denied intent to injure; thus presumption was rebutted | Trial court erred: whether the presumption was rebutted turns on credibility/weight of evidence and may be decided as a matter of law only where rebuttal evidence is hard, uncontroverted; here credibility issues required submission to the jury |
Key Cases Cited
- Hewitt v. L.E. Myers Co., 134 Ohio St.3d 199 (Ohio 2012) (defines “equipment safety guard” narrowly: device designed to shield operator from a dangerous aspect of equipment)
- Beyer v. Rieter Automotive N. Am., Inc., 134 Ohio St.3d 379 (Ohio 2012) (confirms free-standing PPE are not equipment safety guards)
- Houdek v. ThyssenKrupp Materials N.A., Inc., 134 Ohio St.3d 491 (Ohio 2012) (clarifies items like cones, vests, lighting not equipment safety guards)
- Kaminski v. Metal Wire Prods. Co., 125 Ohio St.3d 250 (Ohio 2010) (employer intentional-tort requires specific intent to injure)
- Talik v. Fed. Marine Terminals, Inc., 117 Ohio St.3d 496 (Ohio 2008) (clarifies “substantially certain” standard — more than negligence or recklessness)
- Ayers v. Wood, 166 Ohio St. 138 (Ohio 1957) (rebuttable presumption disappears when opposing party adduces substantial contrary evidence)
- Rudisill v. Ford Motor Co., 709 F.3d 595 (6th Cir. 2013) (presumption may be rebutted as a matter of law if defendant produces hard, uncontroverted evidence; otherwise credibility creates a jury question)