Douglas Echols v. Spencer Lawton
913 F.3d 1313
| 11th Cir. | 2019Background
- Douglas Echols was convicted of kidnapping and rape, served seven years, then DNA testing excluded him; his convictions were vacated and the state entered nolle prosequi and the indictment was dismissed.
- Echols sought legislative compensation; after the Claims Advisory Board recommended payment, a Georgia legislator introduced a $1.6 million compensation bill.
- Chatham County District Attorney Spencer Lawton sent a letter/memorandum to legislators opposing the bill, allegedly stating falsely that Echols remained under indictment for the crimes.
- Legislators blocked the bill and told Echols Lawton’s correspondence prevented it from reaching the floor; Echols sued Lawton under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging First and Fourteenth Amendment violations (retaliation and due process).
- The district court dismissed for failure to state a claim and on qualified immunity; the Eleventh Circuit panel held Echols stated a First Amendment retaliation claim (based on libel per se) but affirmed dismissal on qualified immunity grounds because the right was not clearly established; the court also rejected a substantive due process route for the claim.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Lawton’s written statements to legislators constituted First Amendment retaliation for Echols’s protected petition/speech | Echols: Lawton’s false written statement that Echols remained under indictment was libel per se and was retaliatory, likely to deter a person of ordinary firmness | Lawton: His communications were within prosecutorial discretionary duties and were protected speech; even if defamatory, they did not constitute actionable retaliation absent threat/coercion | Court: Echols pleaded actionable retaliation — alleged libel per se would likely deter ordinary firmness; claim survives pleading stage |
| Whether Lawton’s alleged defamation is protected by the First Amendment (actual malice requirement) | Echols: Lawton knew the indictment had been dismissed, so statement was false and made with actual malice | Lawton: (implicitly) First Amendment protects his speech, especially as a prosecutor on matters of public concern | Court: If statement was made with actual malice (as alleged), it is unprotected by the First Amendment and could be the basis for retaliation claim |
| Whether Echols may proceed under substantive due process rather than the First Amendment | Echols: alleged deprivation of presumption of innocence and injury to reputation support substantive due process claim | Lawton: (and district court) claims properly analyzed under First Amendment, not substantive due process | Court: Due Process Clause cannot supplant the specific First Amendment standard; claim must be analyzed under First Amendment doctrine |
| Whether Lawton is entitled to qualified immunity | Echols: existing law clearly prohibits retaliation including by defamatory speech; Lawton should have known his conduct was unconstitutional | Lawton: He was performing discretionary prosecutorial duties and did not have fair notice that defamatory communications to legislators constituted a constitutional violation | Court: Qualified immunity applies — although a constitutional violation was pleaded, the law was not "clearly established" that defamatory speech by a public official in this context constituted actionable First Amendment retaliation |
Key Cases Cited
- New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (actual malice governs defamation claims involving public officials or matters of public concern)
- Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974) (distinguishes standards for private figures and public figures in defamation law)
- County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833 (1998) (where a specific constitutional amendment applies, substantive due process is not the proper vehicle)
- Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266 (1994) (plurality) (limits substantive due process when a specific constitutional provision applies)
- Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731 (2011) (qualified-immunity standard: right must be clearly established)
- Bailey v. Wheeler, 843 F.3d 473 (11th Cir. 2016) (elements and qualified-immunity framework for First Amendment retaliation claims in this circuit)
- Suarez Corp. Indus. v. McGraw, 202 F.3d 676 (4th Cir. 2000) (discusses when an official’s speech may be actionable as retaliation; holds defamatory speech alone does not amount to actionable retaliation absent threat/coercion)
- Cottrell v. Smith, 299 Ga. 517 (2016) (Georgia Supreme Court: libel per se and statements imputing criminal conduct are actionable irrespective of special harm)