Douglas Cosby v. Treasurer of the State of Missouri as Custodian of the Second Injury Fund
579 S.W.3d 202
Mo.
2019

Background

  • In January 2014 Douglas Cosby injured his left knee at work and later filed a workers’ compensation claim against his employer and the Missouri Second Injury Fund seeking PTD or, alternatively, PPD benefits based on that injury combined with multiple preexisting disabilities.
  • Cosby had four preexisting conditions (including a 1974 knee injury and bilateral shoulder injuries) that predated January 1, 2014; he testified and submitted expert opinions assigning PPD percentages for each condition.
  • The ALJ found Cosby not entitled to PTD (he continued working) and concluded Cosby could not recover PPD from the Fund because his knee injury occurred after January 1, 2014; the Labor and Industrial Relations Commission affirmed.
  • Cosby appealed to the Missouri Supreme Court, arguing the commission misapplied section 287.220, and alternatively that enforcing section 287.220.3(2) violated Missouri’s open courts provision, due process, and equal protection.
  • The court interpreted the statutory definition of “injury” (arising out of and in the course of employment) and concluded section 287.220.3(2) bars PPD claims against the Fund for injuries that occurred after January 1, 2014, including Cosby’s 2014 knee injury.
  • The court rejected Cosby’s constitutional challenges (open courts, due process, equal protection), finding the statute eliminated a cause of action but was neither unconstitutionally vague nor wholly irrational given the Fund’s insolvency when the legislature amended the law.

Issues

Issue Cosby’s Argument Fund/State’s Argument Held
Whether section 287.220.2 allows PPD from the Fund when preexisting disabilities occurred before Jan. 1, 2014 but the subsequent compensable injury occurred after that date 287.220.2 governs because Cosby’s preexisting disabilities occurred before Jan. 1, 2014, so he should be eligible for PPD under subsection 2 Section 287.220.3(2) controls because “injury” is statutorily defined as an injury arising out of employment; Cosby’s compensable injury occurred after Jan. 1, 2014, so subsection 3(2) bars PPD claims The court held 287.220.3(2) applies and bars PPD claims for injuries occurring after Jan. 1, 2014; Cosby’s claim is barred
Whether section 287.220.3(2) violates the Missouri open courts provision by eliminating the right to file PPD claims against the Fund The provision abolishes the ability to file PPD claims and thus denies access to courts despite an existing substantive entitlement The statute eliminates the cause of action; legislature may remove causes of action without violating open courts The court held no open courts violation; legislature validly eliminated the statutory cause of action
Whether section 287.220 is unconstitutionally vague and violates due process The statute is unclear and different actors may apply it inconsistently, depriving injured workers fair notice The contention mistakes ambiguity for unconstitutional vagueness; statutory terms bear common meaning and courts can construe ambiguous statutes The court held no due process violation; statute is not unconstitutionally vague
Whether section 287.220.3(2) violates equal protection by treating claimants differently based on injury date and PPD vs PTD status No rational basis for distinguishing claimants or between PPD and PTD claimants The Fund was insolvent when the legislature amended the law; limiting eligibility is rationally related to legitimate fiscal aims The court held the statute satisfies rational-basis review and does not violate equal protection

Key Cases Cited

  • Mantia v. Mo. Dep’t of Transp., 529 S.W.3d 804 (Mo. banc 2017) (statutory interpretation and de novo review of legal questions)
  • Treasurer of Mo.‑Custodian of the Second Injury Fund v. Witte, 414 S.W.3d 455 (Mo. banc 2013) (strict construction of workers’ compensation statutes)
  • State ex rel. Jackson v. Dolan, 398 S.W.3d 472 (Mo. banc 2013) (legislative statutory definitions govern over dictionary meaning)
  • Ambers‑Phillips v. SSM DePaul Health Ctr., 459 S.W.3d 901 (Mo. banc 2015) (open courts provision protects the ability to pursue causes of action recognized by substantive law)
  • Blaske v. Smith & Entzeroth, 821 S.W.2d 822 (Mo. banc 1991) (legislature may eliminate causes of action without violating open courts)
  • Amick v. Dir. of Revenue, 428 S.W.3d 638 (Mo. banc 2014) (rational-basis review standard for equal protection challenges)
  • Gassen v. Lienbengood, 134 S.W.3d 75 (Mo. App. 2004) (tests for second‑injury fund liability when preexisting PPD combines with subsequent injury)
Read the full case