The Missouri Department of Transportation (hereinafter, “Employer”) appeals from the Labor and Industrial Relations Commission’s (hereinafter, “the Commission”) decision awarding Linda Mantia (hereinafter, “Employee”) workers’ compensation benefits representing 50 percent permanent partial disability of the body as a whole and the right to .future medical care for her .work-related mental ..injury. Employer claims the Commission misapplied the law and its award was not supported by sufficient, competent, and substantial evidence.
This Court has jurisdiction under article V, section 10, of the Missouri Constitution, because it granted transfer after opinion by the court of appeals. The Commission’s decision is vacated and the cause is remanded because the Commission failed to apply the applicable and clear statutory standards.
Procedural and Factual Background
Employee worked for Employer for more than twenty years. Employee beсame a crew leader and, eventually, a supervisor. Her duties included providing traffic control and assistance at motor vehicle accident scenes on Missouri highways. Early in her career, Employee observed accident scenes as often as four times per week. In the 1990s, motorist assist workеrs responded to the less serious accidents; yet, Employee and her crew responded to the more serious accidents, which often included fatalities.
In February 2008, Employee’s primary care physician diagnosed her with depression and referred her to Dr. Asif Habib (hereinafter, “Dr. Habib”). Employee reрorted conflicting
Employee then began counseling with Dr. Timothy Jovick (hereinafter, “Dr. Jov-ick”) from August 2008 until early 2013. Employеe talked with Dr. Jovick about her experiences and psychiatric symptoms. Employee described her belief that her motivation and self-image as.a supervisor had declined, she became angry at motorists who sped in construction zones, and she “stopped doing things.” Dr. Jovick encouraged Employee to drive by the , areas she sought to avoid. Employee stopped seeing Dr. Jovick because she felt speaking with him only caused her to relive her traumatic experiences.
In October 2008, Employee filed a workers’ compensation claim seeking benefits for mental injuries and disability arising from her wоrk. Employee presented her claims in a hearing before an administrative law judge (hereinafter, “ALJ”). Both Employee and Employer presented medical expert testimony.
Employee presented Dr. Jovick as her expert. Dr. Jovick testified he relied only upon the medical history Employee prоvided and did not review any other medical records. Dr. Jovick concluded Employee suffered work-related depression and her condition represented major depressive disorder. Dr. Jovick also believed Employee suffered from post-traumátic stress disorder caused by her work. However, Dr. Jovick conceded that a “more comprehensive assessment” of Employee, including an independent psychological and neurop-sychological evaluation, may be warranted
Employer presented Dr. Wayne Stillings (hereinafter, “Dr. Stillings”) as its expert. Dr. Stillings testified he treated Employer’s workers, Illinois Department of Transportation workers, and workers from private companies who work on highway scenes. Dr. Stillings explained it is not unusual or extraordinary for highway workers to witness human tragedy at highway scenes. Dr. Stillings concluded Employee suffered a depressive disorder and the prevailing cause was her employmеnt. Dr. Stillings opined Employee’s work-related depressive disorder resulted in permanent partial disability.
The ALJ denied Employee’s claim for compensation because she failed to prove she suffered extraordinary and unusual work-related stress as required by section 287.120.8.
The Commission reversed the ALJ’s decision. The Commission awarded Employee benefits based on 50 percent permanent partial disability as a result of her mental injury and ordered Employer to pay for future medical care to treat her mental injury. Employer appeals.
Standard of Review
This Court may modify, reverse, remand, or set aside the Commission’s decision only when: (1) thе Commission acted ultra vires; (2) the decision was procured fraudulently; (8) the facts found by the Commission do not support the award; (4) there was not sufficient competent evidence to support the award. Greer v. SYSCO Food Servs.,
The whole record must be examined in order to determine whether there is sufficient and competent evidence to support the Commission’s decision. Hampton v. Big Boy Steel Erection,
Discussion
Employer raises three points on appeal, alleging the Commission erred because there was insufficient comрetent, substantial, and objective evidence: (1) to support the award; (2) to conclude Employee suffered a permanent partial disability of 50 percent of the body; and (3) to support awarding Employee future medical care. This Court need only address Employer’s first point on appeal; thе resolution of that point renders the remaining points moot.
Under the Missouri Workers’ Compensation Law (hereinafter, “the Act”), an employer is liable to provide compensation pursuant to the terms of the Act for an employee’s personal injuries. Section 287.120.1. Section 287.120.8 provides the framework for determining when a mental injury is compensable under the Act. A “[mjental injury resulting from work-related stress does not arise out of and in the course of the employment, unless it is demonstrated that the stress is work related and was extraordinary and unusual. The amount of work stress shall be measured by objective standards and actual еvents.” Id.
This Court presumes evеry word, sentence, or clause in a statute has effect, and the legislature did not insert superfluous language. Wehrenberg, Inc. v. Dir. of Revenue,
To recover under section' 287.120.8, a claimant must demonstrate “by objective standards and actual events” the amount of work stress endured was both “work related and was extraordinary and unusual.” The claimant must also demonstrate that based on this work-related stress, he or she suffered a mental injury. Id. The Commission recognized section 287.120.8 required Employee to meet an objective standard for recovery, but it failed to apply the legal meaning of “objective.”
An objеctive standard is “[a] legal standard that is based on conduct and perceptions external to a particular person.” Black’s Law Dictionary 1624 (10th ed. 2014). An objective standard contrasts with a subjective standard, which is defined as, “A legal standard that is peculiar to a particular person and based on the person’s individual views and experiences.” Id.
Here, Employee’s testimony and her doctors’ testimony regarding, her work-related stress was relevant to show she sustained an injury and its cause. Yet, this testimony was insufficient to meet the statutorily required objective standard of proving Employee’s stress was extraordinary and unusual. Section 287.120 “does not clearly set forth what objective standards should be used to discern the extraordinary and unusual nature of an emplpyee’s work-related psychological injury.” 37 Mo. Prae., Employment Law & Practice sec. 10:16. However, it is clear that objective standards are well defined in our cаse law.
This Court long has held in tort cases, “ ‘The standard of conduct exacted by the law is an external and objective standard * * and not the personal, individual, subjective standard of the actor involved.” Hodges v. Am. Bakeries, Co.,
-Further, in cases involving unusual plaintiffs with specialized standards of care, the MAI provides additional guidance. MAI 11.04 states that when the plaintiff is a minor, the jury should be told, “The term ‘negligent’ or ‘negligence’ as used in this [these] instruction^] with respect to [plaintiff] ... means the failure to use that degree of care which an ordinarily careful [boy] [girl] of the same age, capacity and experience would use under the same or similar circumstances.” Our cases apply this same standard in judging the standard of care for children as compared to other similarly situated children. See, e.g., Lester v. Sayles,
Accordingly, the objective standard for determining whether Employee’s stress was compensable is whether the same or similar actual work evеnts would cause a reasonable highway worker extraordinary and unusual stress. Such evidence might be introduced, through the testimony of other highway workers as to the circumstances that are experienced as part of the job in general, but individualized, subjective reactions to those circumstances arе irrelevant. Employee need not show the subjective experiences of her fellow workers were not as severe as her experiences, but rather, she must demonstrate the actual events she experienced were such that • a reasonable highway worker would experience extrаordinary and unusual stress.
There may be multiple approaches to meet this objective standard, which may vary from case' to case. Most commonly, a claimant will meet this standard by comparing the claimant’s level of stress with the level of stress faced by other employees in the same professiоn. See Schaffer v. Litton Interconnect Tech.,
The evidence submitted showed actual work events Employee experienced exposed her to stress. Yet, Employee also ■needed to- present evidence the actual work events comprising the “same or similar-conditions” would have caused extraordinary and unusual stress to a reasonable highway worker. It was then up to the Commission to evaluate this evidence.
There was no evidence presented -in this case that Employee’s work-related stress was-objectively “extraordinary
Conclusion
The Commission failed to apply the proper objective standard when reviewing Employee’s claim. Accordingly, the Commission’s award is vacated, and the cause is remanded for a proper review of Employee’s claim.
Notes
. All statutory references herein are to RSMo Supp. 2005, unless otherwise noted.
. An examination of section 287,120 in its . entirety further supports this result. Section 287.120.10 provides, "The ability of a firefighter to receive benefits for psychological stress under section 287.067 shall not be di« . minished, by the provisions of subsections 8 and 9 of this section.” See Byous v. Mo. Local Gov't Emps. Ret. Sys. Bd. of Trustees,