Doud v. Yellow Cab of Reno, Inc.
3:13-cv-00664
D. Nev.Sep 18, 2015Background
- Plaintiffs James and Melodie Doud sued Yellow Cab under the ADA; Yellow Cab asserted as its 25th affirmative defense that James Doud was an independent contractor, not an employee, barring ADA recovery.
- The Douds moved for partial summary judgment on that affirmative defense; briefing occurred in 2014.
- On March 30, 2015 the court granted summary judgment for the Douds on the 25th affirmative defense, finding Doud was an employee under applicable law.
- Nearly six months later, Yellow Cab filed a motion for reconsideration arguing the court should have applied Nevada law to the employment status question and that the issue should have been left to a jury.
- The court treated the motion as one for reconsideration of an interlocutory order and evaluated whether there was newly discovered evidence, clear error, manifest injustice, or intervening change in controlling law.
- The court denied reconsideration, holding (1) federal common-law agency principles govern the employee/independent-contractor determination under the ADA and (2) no genuine dispute of material fact existed that would require sending the issue to a jury.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Governing law for employee vs. independent contractor determination | Federal law applies because ADA defines "employee" and federal common-law agency governs that definition | Nevada contract law should control because the parties executed a Nevada contract labeling Doud an independent contractor | Federal common-law agency principles govern the inquiry; applying them was correct |
| Whether the contractual label controls employment status | Contract language suggesting independent-contractor status is a factor but not dispositive under federal agency law | The signed agreement labeling Doud an independent contractor should be determinative under state contract law | The contract was a factor favoring contractor status but other federal-agency factors tipped toward employee status; contract label not dispositive |
| Whether determination must be reserved for a jury | The court could decide as a matter of law because no material facts were genuinely disputed | The question is typically one of fact and should go to a jury | Court found no genuine factual dispute on the material factors and properly resolved status as a matter of law |
| Basis for reconsideration | N/A (plaintiffs opposed reconsideration implicitly) | Reconsideration warranted due to alleged legal error in choice of law and need for jury resolution | Motion for reconsideration denied; no showing of clear error, new evidence, or change in controlling law |
Key Cases Cited
- City of Los Angeles, Harbor Div. v. Santa Monica Baykeeper, 254 F.3d 882 (9th Cir. 2001) (district court's inherent power to reconsider interlocutory orders)
- Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318 (Sup. Ct.) (federal common-law agency principles applied to determine ERISA "employee")
- Clackamas Gastroenterology Assocs. v. Wells, 538 U.S. 440 (Sup. Ct.) (applying federal agency-law framework to determine "employee" under ADA context)
- Murray v. Principal Fin. Group, Inc., 613 F.3d 943 (9th Cir.) (application of federal agency analysis in employment-status contexts)
- N.L.R.B. v. Friendly Cab Co., Inc., 512 F.3d 1090 (9th Cir.) (applied federal common-law agency factors to taxi drivers despite contracts labeling them independent contractors)
- Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730 (Sup. Ct.) (use of agency principles to determine employment relationship under federal law)
