Double R Ranch Trust v. Nedd, 284 F. Supp. 3d 21

Background

Plaintiffs (landowner Double R Ranch Trust and two trade associations) sued the Acting Director of the BLM and the Secretary of the Interior to vacate the Medford District’s finding that a 63.2‑mile segment of the Rogue River is suitable for Wild and Scenic Rivers Act (WSRA) designation.
The BLM study process has two phases: eligibility (free‑flowing + outstanding values) and suitability (whether designation should protect values given other uses, costs/benefits, and nonfederal commitment). Only Congress can finally designate a river.
The Medford District concluded the Proposed Segment was eligible and suitable in 2016; that recommendation remained under review within the BLM and would require further approval by agency officials, the Secretary, and then Congress and the President before designation.
Plaintiffs alleged harms from lost permits (Army Corps), water‑right restrictions, lost grazing and mining permits, and reduced property value, claiming the suitability finding would trigger protective management or lead to designation that would cause these harms.
Defendants moved to dismiss for lack of standing (and alternatively for nonfinal agency action and ripeness); the court dismissed for lack of Article III standing, holding Plaintiffs failed to allege an injury‑in‑fact fairly traceable to the suitability determination.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Standing — injury‑in‑fact	Plaintiffs will suffer specific future economic and regulatory harms (lost permits, water rights, grazing/mining authorizations, property value) from the Bureau’s suitability finding and consequent protective management or designation.	Plaintiffs’ alleged harms stem from a speculative chain culminating in congressional designation and third‑party actions; no concrete, imminent injury traceable to the suitability determination itself.	Dismissed for lack of standing: alleged harms are speculative, arise only upon (uncertain) designation, and are not fairly traceable to the suitability decision.
Causation/Traceability	Suitability determination begins a process that will lead to designation and thus to Plaintiffs’ injuries.	The causal chain depends on independent third parties (state/national directors, Secretary, Congress, President, permitting agencies); Plaintiffs must show likelihood of each link.	Plaintiffs failed to demonstrate traceability; the chain is too attenuated and speculative.
Imminence (injury timing)	Future denials/limitations on permits and rights are sufficiently likely to be imminent.	Future harms are conjectural and not "certainly impending"; Plaintiffs have no pending applications or concrete plans.	Plaintiffs did not meet the imminence requirement for future injuries; declarations were speculative.
Suitability decision as final agency action	Suitability is a reviewable agency determination affecting management; Plaintiffs can challenge it now.	Even if reviewable, Plaintiffs lack standing; final‑action and ripeness defenses also raised but unnecessary to decide.	Court did not decide final‑action/ripeness due to standing dismissal; noted that a plaintiff could challenge suitability if it alleges a concrete injury arising from the suitability decision itself.

Key Cases Cited

Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540 (U.S. 2016) (standing requires concrete and particularized injury)
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (U.S. 1992) (traceability and redressability requirements for standing)
Food & Water Watch, Inc. v. Vilsack, 808 F.3d 905 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (standing at motion‑to‑dismiss stage; pleadings standard)
Arpaio v. Obama, 797 F.3d 11 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (court accepts well‑pleaded facts but not legal conclusions on standing)
Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. U.S. Dep't of Interior, 563 F.3d 466 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (plaintiff must show likelihood of third‑party choices to establish causation)
Swanson Group Mfg. LLC v. Jewell, 790 F.3d 235 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (speculative claims about third‑party actions insufficient for standing)
Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149 (U.S. 1990) (future injuries must be "certainly impending")
Chamber of Commerce v. EPA, 642 F.3d 192 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (shift from conjectural to imminent requires substantial probability)
Fla. Audubon Soc'y v. Bentsen, 94 F.3d 658 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (attenuated causation across multiple speculative links undermines standing)
Nat'l Parks Conservation Ass'n v. Jewell, 965 F. Supp. 2d 67 (D.D.C. 2013) (example of permits granted despite wild and scenic status)
Coal. for Canyon Preservation, Inc. v. Hazen, 788 F. Supp. 1522 (D. Mont. 1990) (Corps permits granted despite wild and scenic designation)
Nat'l Mining Ass'n v. Slater, 167 F. Supp. 2d 265 (D.D.C. 2001) (contrast where plaintiffs alleged specific projects halted by regulation)