DOUBLE QUICK, INC. v. Moore
2011 Miss. LEXIS 533
| Miss. | 2011Background
- Shooting occurred in the parking lot of a Double Quick store in Shelby, Mississippi; Mario Moore died from gunshot wound after intervening in an altercation.
- Dorothy Moore, as administrator of Mario's estate, sued Double Quick for failure to protect Mario on its premises.
- Double Quick moved for summary judgment, arguing premises-liability principles require foreseeability under Corley v. Evans and no evidence of a violent atmosphere or knowledge of danger.
- Moore argued Jackson and Double Quick were negligent for failing to call police or separate the parties after learning of the dispute.
- Trial court denied both sides' motions for summary judgment, concluding Corley did not apply, treating the claim more like basic negligence against an employee.
- Mississippi Supreme Court granted interlocutory appeal to determine whether premises-liability law applies and if Double Quick is entitled to summary judgment.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether premises-liability law applies to this injury | Moore: premises-liability governs injuries from on-site activity. | Double Quick: Corley foreseeability governs; may not be premises-liability here. | Premises-liability applies; case is within premises-liability framework. |
| Whether Moore proved foreseeable harm under Corley | Moore: foreseeability shown by potential violence on premises and failure to act. | Double Quick: no actual/constructive knowledge of violent intent or atmosphere. | Foreseeability not proven; no proximate cause from Jackson's actions. |
| Whether Jackson's actions can be proximate cause | Moore: Jackson’s failure to act contributed to Mario's injury after learning of dispute. | Double Quick: no link between Jackson's conduct and Mario's death; intervening criminal act breaks causation. | No proximate causation established; trial court should grant summary judgment for Double Quick. |
| Whether the injury was the result of an atmosphere of violence or knowledge of violence on premises | Moore: evidence of a violent atmosphere or knowledge not shown by record. | Double Quick: no evidence of atmosphere or knowledge of violence at store. | Absence of a violent atmosphere; Corley knowledge requirement not satisfied. |
| Whether the trial court's ruling on summary judgment was correct | Moore: should deny summary judgment and proceed to trial. | Double Quick: should grant summary judgment. | Trials court erred; on appeal, reversed and rendered in favor of Double Quick. |
Key Cases Cited
- Corley v. Evans, 835 So.2d 30 (Miss. 2003) (foreseeability test in premises liability)
- Gatewood v. Sampson, 812 So.2d 212 (Miss. 2002) (premises-violence atmosphere considerations)
- Leffler v. Sharp, 891 So.2d 152 (Miss. 2004) (duty distinctions for invitee, licensee, trespasser)
- Delahoussaye v. Mary Mahoney's, Inc., 783 So.2d 666 (Miss. 2001) (definition of proximate cause in premises cases)
- O'Cain v. Harvey Freeman & Sons, Inc., 603 So.2d 824 (Miss. 1991) (intervening criminal acts and foreseeability)
- Touche Ross v. Commercial Union Ins., 514 So.2d 315 (Miss. 1987) (causation and foreseeability principles in negligence)
- Robinson v. Howard Bros. of Jackson, Inc., 372 So.2d 1074 (Miss. 1979) (causation principles in premises-related injuries)
- Doe v. Jameson Inn, Inc., 56 So.3d 549 (Miss. 2011) (premises liability framework and status of plaintiff)