Dorothy Johnson v. Memphis Light Gas & Water Div.
695 F. App'x 131
| 6th Cir. | 2017Background
- Decedent J. Dean Johnson died in his apartment in August 2011; investigators measured the indoor temperature at 93.2°F with 63% humidity and the body showed signs consistent with heat-related dehydration.
- Plaintiffs (wife and sister) sued MLGW under § 1983 and Tennessee tort/wrongful-death law after MLGW denied utility service for lack of photo ID; case was removed to federal court and previously remanded by this Court on statute-of-limitations grounds.
- Plaintiffs disclosed Dr. Miguel A. Laboy (forensic pathologist and medical examiner) as their sole expert; his autopsy and later death certificate listed "probable heat stroke" as cause of death after autopsy, toxicology, vitreous electrolytes, and review of medical records and weather data.
- MLGW moved to exclude Dr. Laboy under Fed. R. Evid. 702, arguing his opinion was speculative (not stated to required certainty), would not assist the jury, and employed unreliable methodology by failing to rule out alternatives (e.g., sudden cardiac death) and purportedly relying on incomplete medical records.
- The district court excluded Dr. Laboy's testimony, denied Plaintiffs' request to revisit the ruling (faulting an affidavit as untimely under local rules), and granted summary judgment to MLGW because Plaintiffs conceded they could not prove causation without the excluded expert.
- The Sixth Circuit reversed: it held Dr. Laboy's use of the term "probable" satisfied the preponderance/probability standard and his differential-diagnosis methodology (autopsy, toxicology, vitreous panel, records, and environmental data) was sufficiently reliable for admission; summary judgment therefore was improper.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Admissibility — degree of certainty required for medical causation testimony | Laboy’s term "probable" means "more likely than not" and his deposition confirms he intended that standard | "Probable" is equivocal and did not express the requisite medical certainty; ipse dixit insufficient | Court: "probable" here conveyed >50% probability; experts need not recite magic words; admissible if expressed as probability rather than mere possibility |
| Reliability — differential diagnosis methodology under Daubert/Best | Laboy performed standard autopsy, toxicology, vitreous electrolyte tests, reviewed records and weather data, and ruled in heat stroke after ruling out other causes | Laboy presupposed heat stroke from scene conditions and failed to reliably rule out alternatives (e.g., sudden cardiac death) | Court: Method was reliable — environmental facts properly considered; Laboy ruled in and ruled out alternatives sufficiently for admissibility; challenges go to weight at trial |
| Completeness of records / ruling out cardiac causes | Plaintiffs: Laboy reviewed medical records (received Aug 9) and confirmed diagnosis only after reviewing them and lab results | Defendant/district court: Laboy failed to meaningfully consider full medical history and explain why cardiac etiologies were excluded | Court: District court misread record — Laboy considered records and autopsy findings that made cardiac etiologies unlikely; exclusion for this reason was erroneous |
| Effect of exclusion on summary judgment | With Laboy excluded, Plaintiffs concede no causation proof; court should not grant summary judgment if expert admissible | MLGW: exclusion left Plaintiffs with no evidence of causation, supporting summary judgment | Court: Because Laboy’s testimony is admissible, a genuine dispute of material fact exists and summary judgment was improper |
Key Cases Cited
- Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., 509 U.S. 579 (expert testimony must rest on reliable foundation and be relevant)
- Best v. Lowe's Home Ctrs., 563 F.3d 171 (6th Cir.) (diagnosis/differential-diagnosis admissibility framework)
- Tamraz v. Lincoln Elec. Co., 620 F.3d 665 (6th Cir.) (expert ipse dixit not dispositive; methodology controls)
- Johnson v. Memphis Light Gas & Water Div., 777 F.3d 838 (6th Cir.) (prior panel decision in same case addressing statute of limitations)
- Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136 (expert conclusions must be grounded in reliable methodology)
- Bailey v. United States, 115 F. Supp. 3d 882 (N.D. Ohio) (contrast: unreliable differential diagnosis where critical testing/autopsy absent)