642 F. App'x 152
3rd Cir.2016Background
- Burgess was hired by Dollar Tree in Dec. 2010 and became assistant manager; Randi Freeman became her supervisor in Jan. 2012.
- Burgess alleged Freeman made several offensive remarks and gestures: refused to sell religious "testimonial gum," threatened to "rip" Burgess’s cross off her neck, touched/complimented Burgess’s hair, and made a vague sexual remark.
- Burgess claimed Freeman tried to set her up to be fired and that other employees complained about Freeman to corporate; Freeman also fired a friend of Burgess.
- Burgess sued under Title VII and the PHRA for hostile work environment, sexual and religious discrimination, and retaliation; case removed to federal court.
- District Court dismissed the discrimination and related claims for failure to state a claim; Burgess appealed only the hostile work environment dismissal.
- The Third Circuit reviewed the dismissal de novo, accepting complaint facts as true, and affirmed, holding the alleged conduct was not sufficiently severe or pervasive to state a Title VII/PHRA hostile work environment claim.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Burgess alleged a hostile work environment based on sex/religion under Title VII/PHRA | Freeman’s comments, touching, threats, and isolated incidents collectively created a sexually and religiously hostile, abusive workplace | Alleged incidents were isolated, not frequent or severe enough to alter terms/conditions of employment | Court held allegations were not severe or pervasive enough to state a plausible hostile work environment claim |
| Whether the complaint met the Twombly/Iqbal plausibility standard at the motion-to-dismiss stage | Complaint’s factual allegations suffice to make claim plausible | Allegations are conclusory or too isolated to be plausible under Rule 12(b)(6) | Court applied Twombly standard and found the facts insufficient to survive dismissal |
Key Cases Cited
- Kaymark v. Bank of Am., N.A., 783 F.3d 168 (3d Cir. 2015) (standard of review on motion to dismiss accepting complaint allegations as true)
- Morrow v. Balaski, 719 F.3d 160 (3d Cir. 2013) (court need not accept unsupported conclusions at motion to dismiss)
- Fleisher v. Standard Ins. Co., 679 F.3d 116 (3d Cir. 2012) (Twombly plausibility standard applied at motion to dismiss)
- Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) (complaint must state a plausible claim for relief)
- Huston v. Procter & Gamble Paper Prods. Corp., 568 F.3d 100 (3d Cir. 2009) (elements of hostile work environment under Title VII/PHRA)
- Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17 (1993) (hostile work environment requires workplace permeated with discriminatory intimidation or insult)
- Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998) (factors for assessing severity and pervasiveness of harassment)
- Weston v. Pennsylvania, 251 F.3d 420 (3d Cir. 2001) (PHRA claims analyzed like Title VII claims)
- In re Fosamax (Alendronate Sodium) Products Liab. Litig. (No. II), 751 F.3d 150 (3d Cir. 2014) (issues not raised in opening brief are waived)