Doornbos v. City of Chicago
2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 15696
7th Cir.2017Background
- On Feb. 15, 2013, plainclothes Officer Williamson approached Joseph Doornbos at a Chicago train station; a physical confrontation followed and Doornbos was restrained by Williamson and two other plainclothes officers.
- Officers testified Williamson announced “Chicago police, officer,” displayed badge/gear, and reached to frisk Doornbos; Doornbos says he was grabbed without clear identification and thought he was being robbed; bystanders called 911 reporting an assault.
- Officers found a small amount of marijuana in Doornbos’s pocket after the altercation; officers also described a beer can the court later found inconsistently reported.
- Doornbos was acquitted of resisting arrest in state court, then sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for excessive force and failure to intervene; he also alleged malicious prosecution under state law.
- At the civil trial the district court admitted evidence of the marijuana (over Doornbos’s Rule 402/403 objection), instructed the jury on investigatory stops but refused a separate frisk (pat‑down) instruction, and answered a jury question by stating plainclothes officers need not identify themselves to conduct a stop.
- Jury verdict favored defendants; on appeal the Seventh Circuit affirmed admission of the marijuana but vacated and remanded for a new trial because jury instructions on frisks and the court’s answer about officer identification were legally erroneous and prejudicial.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Admissibility of marijuana found after the arrest | Marijuana was irrelevant to whether force was reasonable because officers did not know about it when force was used; unfairly prejudicial | Marijuana was relevant to corroborate officers’ story (motive to flee/resist) and prejudice was minimal | Admission affirmed: relevant for impeachment/corroboration; limiting instruction sufficed |
| Jury instruction on frisks (pat‑downs) | Court should have instructed that a frisk requires reasonable suspicion the person is armed and dangerous | Instruction on investigatory stops alone was sufficient; frisk standard not necessary | Error to omit frisk instruction because Williamson’s testimony indicated he reached to frisk and no reasonable suspicion he was armed existed |
| Whether plainclothes officers must identify themselves when initiating a stop | Plainclothes officers generally must identify themselves; failure to do so makes seizure more likely to be perceived as an assault and is unreasonable absent unusual danger | Officers need not identify themselves to conduct an investigatory stop | Court erred in telling jurors identification is not required; holding: generally yes — plainclothes officers must identify themselves before a stop except in rare circumstances where identification would increase danger |
| Prejudice / Need for new trial | Instructional errors could have affected the credibility contest and the jury’s assessment of reasonableness | Evidence impeached plaintiff; errors harmless | Errors were not harmless given mixed credibility and jury question; vacated judgment and remanded for new trial |
Key Cases Cited
- Sherrod v. Berry, 856 F.2d 802 (7th Cir. 1988) (excessive‑force analysis focuses on information known to officer at time, but impeachment by contradiction may admit later‑discovered facts)
- Common v. City of Chicago, 661 F.3d 940 (7th Cir. 2011) (permitting post‑incident evidence that bolsters officer version for impeachment/corroboration)
- Wilson v. City of Chicago, 758 F.3d 875 (7th Cir. 2014) (upholding admission of weapon evidence unknown to officer where it supported officer’s account)
- Estate of Escobedo v. Martin, 702 F.3d 388 (7th Cir. 2012) (post‑incident evidence unknown to officer admissible when it makes officer’s version more likely)
- Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (establishing investigatory stop and frisk framework: stop requires reasonable suspicion of crime; frisk requires reasonable suspicion the person is armed and dangerous)
- Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323 (2009) (reiterating separate reasonable‑suspicion standards for stops and frisks)
- United States v. Williams, 731 F.3d 678 (7th Cir. 2013) (frisk requires specific articulable facts suggesting the person is armed)
- Catlin v. City of Wheaton, 574 F.3d 361 (7th Cir. 2009) (plainclothes officers’ failure to identify may be reasonable in rare, dangerous circumstances; generally risky tactic)
- County of Los Angeles v. Mendez, 137 S. Ct. 1539 (2017) (excessive‑force claims assessed under totality of circumstances and information available at the time)