Donnie R. Clayton v. State
07-15-00312-CR
| Tex. App. | Nov 4, 2016Background
- Appellant Donnie R. Clayton was arrested in a motel room on an outstanding arrest warrant; when he opened the door nude he held what appeared to be a crack pipe and officers observed suspected cocaine in plain view on the bed and nightstand.
- Forensic analysis (stipulated by appellant) showed the substance weighed 1.70 grams and contained cocaine; appellant did not testify at trial.
- Appellant’s mother had rented the room and testified she left appellant with a few dollars; another occupant, Kristi Rayburn, was in the room when the mother left.
- Trial counsel advanced a theory that the drugs belonged to Rayburn and cross-examined police about observable items (e.g., ashtray, cigarettes) and lack of money on appellant.
- At punishment the State proved two prior felony convictions (enhancement) via a fingerprint examiner offered as an expert; appellant presented no witnesses at punishment.
- Appellant appealed, arguing ineffective assistance of counsel (IAC) during guilt-innocence (failure to challenge entry/seizure; poor legal strategy re: joint possession) and punishment (failure to object to exhibits/fingerprint expert; failure to call mitigation witnesses); the appellate court affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Appellant) | Defendant's Argument (State) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1. IAC at guilt-innocence — failure to challenge officers’ entry/seizure | Officers forced entry without a warrant for the room and failed proper identification; counsel was ineffective for not moving to suppress | Officers were executing a valid arrest warrant for appellant, identified him by photo and tattoos; cocaine was in plain view when they entered to clothe/secure him | Court: No IAC. Warrant and identification justified seizure; suppression motion would not have succeeded |
| 2. IAC at guilt-innocence — theory that drugs belonged to Rayburn (possession strategy) | Counsel’s strategy showed ignorance of law on joint possession and was unreasonable | Record is silent as to counsel’s trial strategy; absent a hearing, presumption of reasonable professional judgment stands | Court: No IAC. Record does not rebut presumption that counsel’s theory was a reasonable strategy |
| 3. IAC at punishment — failure to object to prior-conviction exhibits and fingerprint expert | Counsel waived or failed to preserve objections to exhibits and did not challenge expert qualifications | Counsel made foundational objections which were cured; expert had ample qualifications and record gives no basis for objection | Court: No IAC. Exhibits properly admitted after foundation; no evidence counsel’s failure was unreasonable |
| 4. IAC at punishment — failure to call mitigating witnesses | Counsel’s failure to call witnesses deprived appellant of mitigation evidence | No showing who witnesses would be, their availability, or what helpful testimony they would give | Court: No IAC. Appellant failed to show available witnesses or that their testimony would have helped |
Key Cases Cited
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (constitutional standard for ineffective assistance of counsel)
- Walter v. State, 28 S.W.3d 538 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000) (plain view doctrine in Texas)
- Lopez v. State, 343 S.W.3d 137 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) (burden in IAC claims)
- Poindexter v. State, 153 S.W.3d 402 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (joint possession concept)
- Robertson v. State, 187 S.W.3d 475 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) (deference to trial strategy; isolated errors do not establish IAC)
- Goodspeed v. State, 187 S.W.3d 390 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (IAC claims must be firmly rooted in record)
- Rylander v. State, 101 S.W.3d 107 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003) (need for record or hearing to rebut presumption of reasonable strategy)