Donna Young v. United States
2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 19980
9th Cir.2014Background
- Donna Young fell ~12 feet into a snow cavity above a buried transformer near Mount Rainier’s Jackson Visitor Center (JVC) and suffered severe injuries; the transformer emitted heat that melted snow and created a hidden cavity.
- The transformer was ~150 feet from the JVC in an accessible snowfield that the NPS did not develop or actively maintain; there were no warning signs at the transformer site.
- Plaintiffs sued under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), alleging NPS negligently failed to warn of a latent hazard the agency knew of and created.
- The government moved to dismiss under the FTCA’s discretionary function exception (28 U.S.C. § 2680(a)), arguing the no-warning decision was policy-driven (balancing safety, access, preservation).
- The district court dismissed for lack of jurisdiction; the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding the no-warning decision was not the kind of policy-driven discretionary decision protected by the exception and remanded for further proceedings.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the FTCA discretionary function exception bars this suit | The NPS failed to warn of a specific, known, latent hazard it created; such a failure is not protected by the exception. | The decision not to post warnings is discretionary and grounded in NPS policy balancing safety, access, and preservation, so it is protected. | The Court held the exception does not apply because the alleged failure was to warn of a specific hazard the NPS knew of and created, not a policy-driven park-management judgment. |
| Proper characterization of the alleged wrongdoing for the Berkovitz test | Focus on NPS’s failure to warn of a known, agency-created hazard (narrow, specific act). | Characterize broadly as garden-variety NPS hazard-identification/maintenance decisions (policy-laden). | The Court adopted Plaintiffs’ narrower characterization—specific failure to warn of a known, created hazard—which controls the discretionary-function analysis. |
| Whether the decision was grounded in social, economic, or political policy (Berkovitz step two) | The decision to leave an obvious, agency-created hazard unmarked is not susceptible to higher-order policy analysis. | NPS points to Organic Act, Management Policies, and Director’s Order to show warning decisions implicate policy tradeoffs. | The Court found the cited policies do not reasonably cover a decision not to warn of a buried transformer next to the main visitor center; the decision was "totally divorced" from the asserted policy concerns. |
Key Cases Cited
- Berkovitz v. United States, 486 U.S. 531 (defines the two-step discretionary-function test)
- Gaubert v. United States, 499 U.S. 315 (FTCA discretionary-function principles and deference)
- Terbush v. United States, 516 F.3d 1125 (Ninth Circuit discussion of NPS balancing of access and preservation)
- Whisnant v. United States, 400 F.3d 1177 (importance of particularizing alleged agency wrongdoing)
- Summers v. United States, 905 F.2d 1212 (failure to post warning not protected where no record that nonposting reflected policy)
- Sutton v. Earles, 26 F.3d 903 (agency failure not to warn of a known, agency-created hazard is not protected)
- Childers v. United States, 40 F.3d 973 (NPS decisions about trail warnings implicate policy when linked to access/preservation)
- Valdez v. United States, 56 F.3d 1177 (no-warning decisions about natural features linked to policy)
- Blackburn v. United States, 100 F.3d 1426 (warning decisions tied to visitor enjoyment and preservation can be discretionary)
- Oberson v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 514 F.3d 989 (government must show policy basis in record for the discretionary-function shield)
