Donna Soltis v. J.C. Penney Corporation, Inc., 635 F. App'x 245

Donna Soltis worked for J.C. Penney, was terminated in April 2012, and filed worker’s compensation and later discrimination suits (ADEA, Title VII, and Michigan Elliott-Larsen Act).
Soltis settled her worker’s compensation claim and signed a written Release in exchange for $10,000; the Release expressly released “any and all claims…known or unknown…arising out of or in connection with my employment…including…[the ADEA]…[and] Title VII.”
The Release gave Soltis 21 days to review and, specifically for the ADEA, seven days after signing to revoke.
Despite the Release, Soltis sued J.C. Penney and her supervisor on federal and state discrimination claims; the district court granted summary judgment for J.C. Penney, finding the Release valid and controlling.
On appeal the Sixth Circuit reviewed de novo, applying Michigan law to state-law release issues and federal common law (Nicklin) to releases of federal claims.
The Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding the Release unambiguous, supported by consideration, and knowingly and voluntarily executed, thereby barring Soltis’s claims.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Release is ambiguous	Soltis: wording (e.g., “will resign”) conflicts with her already being terminated; extrinsic evidence should be allowed	J.C. Penney: Release language is clear and broad; no ambiguity	Release is unambiguous; no extrinsic evidence considered; releases federal and state claims
Whether Release had consideration	Soltis: $10,000 was only for workers’ comp/medical, not consideration for broader release	J.C. Penney: Settlement of disputed claim is adequate consideration and Release expressly ties $10,000 to settlement and release	Consideration exists; settlement amount supports the Release
Whether waiver of federal claims was knowing and voluntary	Soltis: relied on counsel who told her the Release would not affect this suit; lacked prior experience with releases	J.C. Penney: Soltis was reasonably educated, managerial, had counsel, 21 days to consider, and 7-day ADEA revocation period	Under the totality test, waiver was knowing and voluntary
Scope of Release as to pending claims	Soltis: Release did not mention the pending suit; intent was not to release these claims	J.C. Penney: Broad “any and all” language covers known or unknown claims arising from employment, regardless of pendency	Broad language barred the pending ADEA, Title VII, and state claims

Nicklin v. Henderson, 352 F.3d 1077 (6th Cir. 2003) (federal common law governs validity of release of federal claims and articulates balancing/totality approach)
Seawright v. Am. Gen. Fin. Servs., Inc., 507 F.3d 967 (6th Cir. 2007) (sets totality-of-circumstances test for knowing and voluntary waivers)
Gascho v. Scheurer Hosp., [citation="400 F. App'x 978"] (6th Cir. 2010) (upheld waiver where employee had managerial background, review period, and revocation window)
Adams v. Philip Morris, Inc., 67 F.3d 580 (6th Cir. 1995) (ordinary contract principles govern validity of releases of federal claims)
Kellogg Co. v. Sabhlok, 471 F.3d 629 (6th Cir. 2006) (broad release language can bar claims arising from termination)