Donald Snowden v. Jeremy Henning, 72 F.4th 237

Snowden, indicted on methamphetamine charges, was arrested in a hotel lobby after a front-desk clerk summoned him; DEA Special Agent Jeremy Henning allegedly shoved and punched Snowden, causing facial injuries.
Snowden sued Henning pro se in federal court while in pretrial detention, alleging a Fourth Amendment excessive-force claim (Bivens) and an Illinois battery claim; other defendants were dismissed at screening under the PLRA.
Henning moved to dismiss the Bivens claim as presenting a "new context" that counselled against extending Bivens and argued the FTCA provided an alternative remedy for state-law claims; the government certified Henning acted within scope of employment.
The district court dismissed the Bivens claim, identifying factual differences from Bivens (location, presence of a warrant, number of officers) and citing FTCA/other remedial considerations as special factors; it dismissed the state-law claim without prejudice.
The Seventh Circuit analyzed only the first step of the Bivens framework (whether Snowden’s claim arises in a new context) and reversed, holding the excessive-force claim is not meaningfully different from Bivens.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Snowden's Fourth Amendment excessive-force claim arises in a "new Bivens context"	Snowden: claim parallels Bivens — a line-level narcotics officer used unreasonable force during an arrest, so no meaningful difference from Bivens	Henning: factual/legal differences (hotel vs. home; arrest warrant; single officer) make the context new	Held: Not a new context — differences are trivial and do not implicate separation-of-powers concerns; Bivens claim may proceed
Whether "special factors" (including availability of FTCA) bar a Bivens remedy	Snowden: not reached if first-step fails; Bivens remains good law in search-and-seizure/excessive-force context	Henning: FTCA and remedial scheme counsel against implying Bivens here	Held: Court did not reach special-factors step because claim is not a new context; thus no bar applied

Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (recognized implied damages remedy for Fourth Amendment warrantless home search/arrest)
Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228 (extended implied remedy to Fifth Amendment employment discrimination by a member of Congress)
Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14 (recognized implied Eighth Amendment remedy for inadequate prison medical care)
Ziglar v. Abbasi, 582 U.S. 120 (established two-step test: new-context inquiry and special-factors analysis; warned against judicial creation of new Bivens claims)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (addressed standards for implying causes of action and limits on judicially created remedies)
Hernandez v. Mesa, 140 S. Ct. 735 (refused Bivens extension for cross-border shooting; emphasized separation-of-powers/foreign-relations concerns)
Minneci v. Pollard, 565 U.S. 118 (declined Bivens for private-prison employees where state-law remedies were available)
Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61 (addressed availability of Bivens against private firms and scope of implied remedies)
Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (governs objective-reasonableness excessive-force analysis under the Fourth Amendment)