Donald Phillips v. Randy White, 851 F.3d 567

Donald Phillips was convicted of two counts of first-degree murder in Kentucky; jury was death-qualified and recommended life without parole for 25 years (the least severe aggravated sentence); judge imposed that sentence.
Defense counsel Stephan Charles admitted he had no death-penalty experience, was unprepared at sentencing, made no opening statement or mitigation presentation, called no witnesses, and did not clarify available lesser-sentence options.
Phillips sought state post-conviction relief alleging ineffective assistance at sentencing in 2002; the state trial judge found counsel "completely unprepared," requested additional evidence in 2008, but never resolved the claim; no state court adjudicated the claim on the merits.
Phillips filed a federal habeas petition; the district court dismissed it applying AEDPA deference and held Phillips failed to show Strickland prejudice because he avoided death and received a relatively favorable sentence.
The Sixth Circuit concluded AEDPA did not apply (no state-court merits ruling), found counsel's failure to mount any sentencing defense constituted nonperformance, presumed prejudice under Cronic, and also found Strickland prejudice; it granted a conditional writ ordering resentencing within 90 days or release.

Issue	Phillips' Argument	Commonwealth's Argument	Held
Whether AEDPA deference applies	No—state courts never adjudicated the claim on the merits	AEDPA applies because claims were "adjudicated" by state proceedings	AEDPA does not apply; no state merits decision, so federal review is de novo
Whether counsel's sentencing performance was constitutionally deficient	Charles entirely failed to investigate or present mitigation, declined to advocate, and conceded unpreparedness	Conduct was strategic or coordinated with Phillips; outcome was favorable (no death)	Performance was deficient: nonperformance/abdication, not reasonable strategy
Whether prejudice is presumed under United States v. Cronic	Yes—constructive absence throughout sentencing warrants presumed prejudice	No—this is like Bell v. Cone where counsel did perform at points; no presumption	Presumed prejudice under Cronic: counsel constructively deprived Phillips of adversarial testing throughout sentencing
Whether there is actual prejudice under Strickland	There is a reasonable probability of a lesser sentence (life with parole eligibility or 20–50 years) if mitigation/options had been presented	No prejudice because Phillips received one of the most favorable aggravated outcomes and avoided death	Struck prejudice satisfied: both Cronic presumption and independent Strickland showing that outcome was unreliable

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (standard for ineffective assistance of counsel)
United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648 (prejudice may be presumed when counsel is absent or constructive absence at a critical stage)
Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (failure to investigate/present mitigation at capital sentencing can be deficient)
Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685 (distinguishing nonrepresentation from isolated lapses; Strickland vs. Cronic analysis)
Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510 (prejudice analysis focuses on potential influence of mitigation on moral culpability)
Glover v. United States, 531 U.S. 198 (prejudice may be shown by reasonable probability of even minimal additional time avoided)
Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154 (context on special considerations for capital defendants)
Hamblin v. Mitchell, 354 F.3d 482 (counsel unprepared for capital sentencing can be ineffective)
Harries v. Bell, 417 F.3d 631 (counsel's inadequate mitigation investigation can be deficient)