843 F.3d 1127
6th Cir.2016Background
- In 1987 Donald Middlebrooks (white) was convicted in Tennessee of kidnapping and murdering 14‑year‑old Kerrick Majors (black); a jury sentenced him to death after finding aggravating circumstances including torture/depravity. Middlebrooks admitted involvement in a videotaped statement but described a lesser role than co‑defendant Roger Brewington.
- The Tennessee Supreme Court vacated the original death sentence, ordered a resentencing, and the jury again returned death; the conviction and sentence were affirmed on direct appeal.
- Middlebrooks pursued state post‑conviction relief (denied), then federal habeas relief; the district court denied habeas and this Court affirmed in 2010. The U.S. Supreme Court vacated and remanded in light of Martinez v. Ryan.
- On remand the district court (and now this Court) considered whether Martinez/Trevino permit curing procedural defaults of many ineffective‑assistance‑of‑trial‑counsel claims and whether any of those claims are "substantial." The district court denied relief; Middlebrooks appealed.
- The Sixth Circuit affirms: it holds Martinez/Trevino do not warrant relief because (a) many claims were defaulted at the post‑conviction appellate stage (to which Martinez does not apply), (b) several were adjudicated on the merits at initial post‑conviction review or earlier, (c) some claims were abandoned on appeal, and (d) AEDPA deference bars relief where state courts reasonably applied federal law.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Applicability of Martinez/Trevino to excuse procedural defaults | Middlebrooks: Martinez/Trevino excuse defaults caused by ineffective post‑conviction counsel for 26 trial‑IAC claims, entitling him to an evidentiary hearing | State: Martinez/Trevino apply narrowly and do not cover errors on post‑conviction appeal or claims already decided on the merits | Held: Martinez/Trevino do not provide relief because many claims were defaulted on post‑conviction appeal (Martinez inapplicable), or were adjudicated on the merits, or abandoned on appeal |
| Standard for a claim to be "substantial" under Martinez | Middlebrooks: district court applied wrong standard; claims should be evaluated as having "some merit" (Miller‑El) | State: many claims duplicate ones defaulted or decided on the merits so substantiality is irrelevant | Held: Court agrees district court misapplied the test but affirms on alternative grounds — Martinez/Trevino still do not change outcome for these claims |
| IAC claims alleging failure to investigate/ present mitigation (brain damage, abuse, co‑defendant culpability, expert prep, juror objections) | Middlebrooks: counsel were ineffective on numerous discrete failures; many claims justify further proceedings | State: many claims are duplicative of previously defaulted or adjudicated claims, or were abandoned; AEDPA bars relitigation | Held: Claims are either cumulative/duplicative, defaulted on appeal, abandoned, or reasonably rejected on the merits — no habeas relief |
| Eighth Amendment / Booth‑Payne challenge to prosecutor's sentencing argument invoking victim's mother's wishes | Middlebrooks: prosecutor arguable violated Booth/Payne by urging death based on victim's mother's wishes | State: prosecutor's remarks fell short of Booth violation; Darden due‑process review applies and state court reasonably applied it | Held: No Eighth Amendment relief; the court applied Darden and concluded state court's decision was not an unreasonable application of federal law |
Key Cases Cited
- Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 1309 (2012) (creates narrow exception to Coleman for cause to excuse procedural defaults when initial‑review collateral counsel was ineffective)
- Trevino v. Thaler, 133 S. Ct. 1911 (2013) (extends Martinez where state procedural framework makes raising IAC on direct appeal highly unlikely)
- Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722 (1991) (general rule that attorney error in post‑conviction proceedings does not establish cause for procedural default)
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (standard for ineffective assistance of counsel — deficient performance and prejudice)
- Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168 (1986) (Due Process standard for prosecutorial misconduct during closing argument)
- Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 497 (1987) (Eighth Amendment rule on victim impact evidence, later limited by Payne)
- Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808 (1991) (permits victim impact evidence subject to due‑process limits)
- Miller‑El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322 (2003) (standard for showing that an IAC claim is "substantial"—has some merit)
- Parker v. Matthews, 132 S. Ct. 2148 (2012) (reiterates Darden standard for evaluating prosecutorial comments)