Donald Lee Lampkin v. State
11-14-00038-CR
| Tex. App. | Aug 6, 2015Background
- Donald Lee Lampkin pleaded guilty in 1984 to burglary of a habitation with intent to commit sexual assault; convicted on that plea.
- In 2011 Lampkin sought postconviction DNA testing; the trial court granted testing of evidence (victim’s panties) located by the State.
- DNA testing excluded Lampkin as a contributor to the sample recovered from the victim’s panties.
- The victim testified (in affidavits) she awoke to a nude Black male by her bed, recognized his voice as her neighbor’s, and described attempted sexual penetration; she had sex with her boyfriend 6–8 hours earlier and was unsure whether she put the same panties back on.
- Trial court held a hearing under Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 64.04 to determine whether DNA results created a reasonable probability that Lampkin would not have been convicted.
- Trial court found the exclusionary DNA results did not demonstrate a reasonable probability of innocence in light of other evidence; Lampkin appealed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether postconviction DNA exclusion creates a reasonable probability that Lampkin would not have been convicted | Lampkin: exclusion of his DNA from victim’s panties means he would not have pleaded guilty or been convicted | State: absence of DNA alone, given other evidence (victim ID, voice recognition, facts of assault), does not show reasonable probability of innocence | Court affirmed: exclusion alone does not undermine confidence in outcome; trial court’s unfavorable finding upheld |
Key Cases Cited
- Guzman v. State, 955 S.W.2d 85 (Tex. Crim. App.) (defers to trial court on historical facts and credibility)
- Rivera v. State, 89 S.W.3d 55 (Tex. Crim. App.) (absence of DNA, without more, does not indicate innocence; standard for postconviction DNA proceedings)
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (U.S. 1984) (reasonable probability defined as sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome)
- Thompson v. State, 9 S.W.3d 808 (Tex. Crim. App.) (cites Strickland’s reasonable probability standard)
- Prible v. State, 245 S.W.3d 466 (Tex. Crim. App.) (absence of defendant’s DNA at crime scene, without more, not evidence of innocence)
- Bell v. State, 90 S.W.3d 301 (Tex. Crim. App.) (same principle regarding absence of DNA)