Donald Gravelet-Blondin v. Sgt Jeff Shelton
2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 18595
| 9th Cir. | 2013Background
- May 4, 2008 officers responded to suicide-in-progress call involving suspect Jack Hawes; Blondin bystander questioned police actions, was tased in dart mode by Sgt. Shelton from ~30–37 feet away; Blondin was not actively resisting and posed no clear threat; district court granted summary judgment on all claims; appellate panel addresses excessive force, unlawful arrest, and common law claims.
- Issues include whether tasing Blondin in this context violated the Fourth Amendment, whether there was probable cause for Blondin’s obstruction arrest, and whether Monell municipal liability and common law claims survive on remand.
- Role of qualified immunity for Sgt. Shelton given whether the right was clearly established before 2008; whether precedent before 2008 clearly established that tasing a passive bystander could be excessive force; whether policy or ratification exposes municipal liability.
- Procedural posture includes cross-motions for summary judgment; the panel reverses in part and remands for further proceedings on unlawful arrest and Monell liability; the dissent argues the majority misapplies the clearly established standard and factual context.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Excessive force for tasing Blondin | Blondin—bystander, passive; tasing violated Fourth Amendment | Shelton/City claim force reasonable given scene | Yes, excessive force clearly established pre-2008; qualified immunity denied |
| Probable cause for Blondin’s obstruction arrest | Bl Blondin’s conduct did not obstruct officers | There was probable cause under RCW 9A.76.020(1) | Issue of probable cause for arrest contested; remanded for unlawful arrest consideration |
| Municipal liability (Monell) based on taser policy or ratification | Policy/ratification caused unconstitutional taser use | Policy evidence insufficient or not causative | Remand to consider Monell liability and ratification |
| Common law outrage claim by Ms. Blondin | Observation of tasing caused extreme distress; knowledge of susceptibility | Conduct not extreme enough; no liability | Remanded; majority’s dismissal reversed to allow jury assessment |
Key Cases Cited
- Graham v. Connor, 490 F.3d 386 (U.S. 1989) (objective reasonableness in Fourth Amendment excessive force)
- Nelson v. City of Davis, 685 F.3d 867 (9th Cir. 2012) (clear establishment of rights regarding non-trivial force on passive resistance)
- Deorle v. Rutherford, 272 F.3d 1272 (9th Cir. 2001) (warning and proportionality in use of force; beanbag case)
- Headwaters Forest Def. v. Cnty. of Humboldt, 276 F.3d 1125 (9th Cir. 2002) (pre-1997 clarity that force against protesters was excessive)
- Casey v. City of Fed. Heights, 509 F.3d 1278 (10th Cir. 2007) (tasers used without adequate justification violated clearly established law)
- Mottos v. Agarano, 661 F.3d 433 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc; clarifies clearly established law for taser use pre-2010)
- Bryan v. MacPherson, 630 F.3d 805 (9th Cir. 2010) (early taser usage; lack of clearly established standard prior to 2010)
- Mattos v. Agarano, 661 F.3d 433 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc; analysis of taser use in context of resistance)
- Lassiter v. City of Bremerton, 556 F.3d 1049 (9th Cir. 2009) (elements of obstruction arrest and probable cause)
- Lalonde, 665 P.2d 421 (Wash. App. 1983) (state obstruction mens rea; context for probable cause relevance)