Donald Gravelet-Blondin v. Jeff Shelton, 665 F. App'x 603

Blondin approached officers responding to an active 911 report of an armed suicidal individual and positioned himself near the scene while officers protected the suicidal person behind a ballistic shield.
Officers gave multiple commands (up to twelve) over about thirty seconds warning Blondin he would be tased and arrested; Blondin did not comply, came within about ten feet, and adopted a “bladed stance.”
Sergeant Shelton deployed a taser and arrested Blondin; Blondin sued Shelton and the City alleging Fourth Amendment excessive force and unlawful arrest (obstruction).
The district court granted summary judgment for defendants; this court reversed on summary judgment review, finding triable issues and denying qualified immunity. See Gravelet-Blondin v. Shelton (prior appeal).
On remand, a two-week jury trial returned a verdict for Shelton and the City. Blondin moved for judgment as a matter of law and challenged jury instructions; the district court denied relief. Blondin appealed.
The Ninth Circuit reviewed the trial record in the defendants’ favor and affirmed, finding substantial evidence supporting reasonableness of the taser use, probable cause for obstruction, and no instructional error.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Excessive force — taser use	Shelton used excessive, unreasonable force in tasing Blondin (Fourth Amendment).	Use of taser was reasonable given Blondin’s proximity, stance, failure to comply, warnings, and danger from an unsecured firearm/suicide-in-progress.	Affirmed: Jury verdict for defendants supported by substantial evidence that force was reasonable.
Unlawful arrest / probable cause for obstruction	Mere noncompliance cannot support probable cause to arrest for obstruction.	Blondin’s close approach, ignoring many commands, and distracting officers from the suicidal subject created at least a fair probability of obstruction.	Affirmed: Trial evidence permitted a jury finding of probable cause for obstruction.
Effect of prior appellate reversal	Prior panel’s view that triable issues existed should control.	Prior opinion reviewed a different record (summary judgment stage); the jury trial record is different and must be construed for defendants.	Held that prior reversal does not control; trial record governs and supports verdict.
Jury instructions	Proposed instructions narrowing "active resistance" and limiting noncompliance as basis for probable cause were required.	Modified model instructions correctly stated law, fit the evidence, and were not misleading; court did not abuse discretion in rejecting plaintiff’s proposed instructions.	Affirmed: District court did not err in instructing the jury.

Mattos v. Agarano, 661 F.3d 433 (9th Cir. 2011) (framework for analyzing taser use and excessive force)
Lacey v. Maricopa County, 693 F.3d 896 (9th Cir. 2012) (probable cause standard for obstruction and related arrests)
Gravelet-Blondin v. Shelton, 728 F.3d 1086 (9th Cir. 2013) (prior appeal reversing summary judgment and denying qualified immunity)
Horphag Research Ltd. v. Pellegrini, 337 F.3d 1036 (9th Cir. 2003) (standard for reviewing jury verdicts vs. summary judgment records)
Johnson v. Paradise Valley Unified Sch. Dist., 251 F.3d 1222 (9th Cir. 2001) (jury-verdict review and substantial-evidence standard)
Peralta v. Dillard, 744 F.3d 1076 (9th Cir. 2014) (jury instruction standards)
Brewer v. City of Napa, 210 F.3d 1093 (9th Cir. 2000) (district court discretion over jury instructions)