Donald Delade v. John Cargan, 972 F.3d 207

A sniper attacked Pennsylvania troopers; a manhunt led officers to identify Donald DeLade walking with a rifle near the scene.
Trooper Cargan ran DeLade’s criminal-history record and found an Escambia County, Florida warrant marked “no extradition.”
Cargan called the Escambia County Sheriff’s Office and requested the warrant status be changed to “full extradition,” and the sheriff complied.
DeLade was arrested and detained five days awaiting an extradition hearing (his first court appearance); the Commonwealth later dropped the extradition-based charge when Florida declined to extradite.
DeLade sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging Cargan fabricated evidence and violated the Fourth Amendment and the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause; the district court granted summary judgment to Cargan on Fourth Amendment claims but denied summary judgment/qualified immunity on the Fourteenth Amendment claim.
On appeal, the Third Circuit considered whether a pre–first-appearance unlawful-arrest/pretrial-detention claim is cognizable under the Fourteenth Amendment or is governed exclusively by the Fourth Amendment, and reversed the denial of qualified immunity.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether an unlawful arrest and pretrial detention that occurs before the detainee’s first court appearance is cognizable under the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause	DeLade: Cargan fabricated evidence (changed extradition status) causing unlawful arrest and detention, so Due Process claim is available	Cargan: Such claims are governed by the Fourth Amendment; not a Fourteenth Amendment due-process claim	The Fourth Amendment governs unlawful arrest and pretrial detention occurring prior to the first appearance; Fourteenth Amendment claim not cognizable
Whether the court has appellate jurisdiction to review denial of qualified immunity	DeLade: parties disputed jurisdiction	Cargan: denial is reviewable because the appeal raises a purely legal question	Third Circuit has jurisdiction under the collateral-order doctrine because the appeal presents a purely legal question

Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975) (Fourth Amendment standards govern arrest and pretrial detention; probable-cause determination required for significant pretrial restraint)
Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266 (1994) (refused to recognize a substantive due-process right against prosecution without probable cause; Fourth Amendment is the proper vehicle)
Manuel v. City of Joliet, 137 S. Ct. 911 (2017) (Fourth Amendment governs challenges to pretrial confinement unsupported by probable cause, even after start of legal process)
Bailey v. United States, 568 U.S. 186 (2013) (Fourth Amendment seizures reasonable only if based on probable cause)
United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259 (1997) (more-specific-provision rule: claims covered by a specific constitutional provision must be analyzed under that provision)
Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2009) (qualified immunity framework)
Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989) (claims arising from seizures are analyzed under Fourth Amendment reasonableness, not substantive due process)
Cordova v. City of Albuquerque, 816 F.3d 645 (10th Cir. 2016) (discussion of the Fourth Amendment’s original public meaning and focus on police action prior to judicial process)