Donald Austen v. County of Los Angeles, 2:15-cv-07372

Background

Plaintiff Donald Austen, founder of a charity, was detained under Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 5150 after a DPSS employee called 911 reporting suicidal/threatening statements; Austen denies making those statements.
Police responded with a mental-health unit; Austen was taken to Mission Community Hospital (MCH) and held for ~72 hours for evaluation and released days later.
Austen sued County and City actors and MCH, alleging constitutional violations (Fourth/Fourteenth Amendments via 42 U.S.C. § 1983), state-law claims, and—against MCH—Monell liability for deficient policies on handling § 5150 admissions.
The court previously allowed amendment limited to Monell claims against MCH based on the contention that MCH’s procedures did not require an in‑person assessment before admission as § 5151 requires.
MCH moved to strike portions of the Third Amended Complaint (TAC) as beyond the scope of the stipulated amendment and to dismiss the Monell claims; the TAC quoted deposition testimony (Ruiz) about MCH policy and alleged no in‑person assessment at admission.
The court granted in part and denied in part the motion to strike, and denied the motion to dismiss; plaintiff was ordered to file a Fourth Amended Complaint consistent with the order.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether portions of the TAC exceed the scope of the parties' stipulation / should be struck under Rule 12(f)	Austen argues allegations about MCH practice, admissions paperwork, testimony, and statutory context are material to stating a Monell claim	MCH contends 39 paragraphs (or parts) are immaterial, redundant, scandalous, or beyond the stipulated scope and should be stricken	Court struck certain paragraphs as immaterial or redundant (e.g., subjective observations, a chair footnote, unrelated testimony) but denied striking allegations material to Monell (policy, admissions practice, testimony, state‑actor allegations)
Whether the TAC states a Monell claim against MCH (private hospital acting under color of state law)	Austen alleges MCH (contracted as an LPS receiving facility) maintained policies/practices that did not require an in‑person § 5151 assessment prior to admission, and that this policy caused the constitutional deprivation	MCH argues Ruiz’s deposition shows MCH policy required the admitting RN to perform an in‑person assessment (and one occurred), and that Plaintiff misunderstands MCH policy; moves to dismiss Monell claims	Court denied motion to dismiss; factual disputes about timing and whether an in‑person assessment occurred at admission preclude dismissal at pleading stage
Whether the court may consider deposition excerpts on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion	Austen quoted Ruiz's deposition in TAC; authenticity not disputed	MCH submitted excerpts and asked court to rely on them to show policy and that assessment occurred	Court may consider undisputed documents quoted in complaint without converting to summary judgment, but does not credit defense version over complaint; used excerpts only to assess consistency
Whether allegations that MCH collaborated/acted as state actor are properly pleaded for Monell purposes	Austen alleges MCH contracted with County and coordinated with City/County, acting as a state actor and accepting external representations without its own assessment	MCH argues allegations of “collusion/conspiracy” exceed Monell scope and are unnecessary	Court permitted allegations relevant to state‑actor status and coordination with public agencies; declined to strike them because they bear on Monell liability

Key Cases Cited

Whittlestone, Inc. v. Handi‑Craft Co., 618 F.3d 970 (9th Cir. 2010) (standard for Rule 12(f) motions; immaterial/impertinent matter)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (U.S. 2009) (pleading standard; conclusory allegations not entitled to assumption of truth)
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (U.S. 2007) (plausibility standard for pleadings)
Monell v. Dept. of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (U.S. 1978) (municipal liability under § 1983 requires policy, practice, or custom)
Tsao v. Desert Palace, Inc., 698 F.3d 1128 (9th Cir. 2012) (Monell principles extend to private entities acting under color of state law)
Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443 (9th Cir. 2000) (accept factual allegations as true on 12(b)(6))
Barry v. Fowler, 902 F.2d 770 (9th Cir. 1990) (elements of a § 1983 claim)
Branch v. Tunnell, 14 F.3d 449 (9th Cir. 1994) (when courts may consider documents outside the pleadings on a 12(b)(6) motion)
Dougherty v. City of Covina, 654 F.3d 892 (9th Cir. 2011) (Monell liability requires that municipality's policy or practice caused constitutional violation)