Donahoe v. Arpaio
986 F. Supp. 2d 1091
D. Ariz.2013Background
- This is a summary-judgment order in Stapley v. Arpaio et al.; plaintiff Donald Stapley (former Maricopa County Supervisor) sued MCSO officials and county prosecutors for investigations, searches, arrests, prosecutions, and a civil RICO suit arising from multi-year anti‑corruption efforts.
- Key events: (1) Stapley I — 2008 state indictment for alleged disclosure violations (later reversed on appeal); (2) Feb. 2009 — search of Stapley’s office based on affidavit alleging bribery, fraud, misuse of public funds; (3) Sept. 2009 — warrantless arrest and later Stapley II indictment; (4) Dec. 2009 — federal RICO complaint filed by MCAO/MCSO attorneys; multiple prosecutions and investigations were later declined or dismissed.
- Plaintiff alleges Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment violations (judicial deception in warrant, false arrest, malicious prosecution), First Amendment retaliation, wrongful civil litigation, IIED, and seeks punitive damages; defendants raise probable cause, immunity (qualified and absolute), and lack of involvement.
- Court finds triable disputes on whether affidavits and arrest materials contained material misstatements/omissions, whether prosecutors/officers acted with malice/retaliatory intent, and whether defendants are entitled to immunity; accordingly, many defendant motions are denied in part and some claims against specific defendants are dismissed.
- Specific rulings: summary judgment granted for Arpaio and Hendershott on Monell/failure‑to‑train/supervision claims; Aubuchon granted summary judgment on certain malicious‑prosecution and false‑arrest claims; Thomas granted partial summary judgment (malicious prosecution and unlawful search claims). Other claims survive to trial.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Search warrant (judicial deception) — did affidavit contain material falsehoods/omissions? | Stapley: affidavit omitted/exaggerated facts (unreviewed bank records, misdated payments, misleading vote/disclosure statements), so warrant lacked probable cause. | Defendants: affidavit provided sufficient facts; judge’s finding deserves deference; prosecutorial officers acted reasonably. | Court: Material misrepresentations/omissions shown; triable issues exist as to deliberate/reckless falsity and materiality — Aubuchon and Hendershott not entitled to summary judgment; Thomas entitled to summary judgment on search because no evidence he knew affidavit flaws. |
| Malicious prosecution (Stapley I) — probable cause, malice, favorable termination? | Stapley: indictment rested on mistaken view of 1994 county resolution and statute‑of‑limitations issues; prosecutions were motivated by improper purpose. | Arpaio/Hendershott: probable cause existed; prosecutions were legitimate. | Court: factual disputes (origin/timing of beliefs about 1994 resolution, statute of limitations, and malice) — termination was favorable (appeal reversed); claims against Arpaio/Hendershott survive. |
| False arrest & Stapley II indictment — probable cause and procurement of arrest | Stapley: warrantless arrest ordered despite prosecutor advising case not ready; arrest and subsequent indictment lacked probable cause and were retaliatory. | Defendants: probable cause supported arrest/indictment; actions lawful. | Court: disputed probable cause (campaign reporting, perjury, theft theories weak); Hendershott ordered arrest; Aubuchon did not procure arrest — Aubuchon granted summary judgment on false arrest; other false‑arrest/malicious‑prosecution claims survive. |
| Federal RICO civil suit (wrongful litigation) — initiation/procurement, malice, advice of counsel | Stapley: RICO complaint was frivolous; initiation/procurement by MCSO/MCAO was malicious and without probable cause. | Arpaio/Hendershott: relied on counsel/advice; insufficient involvement to be liable. | Court: triable issues on involvement, malice, and reliance on counsel; dismissal/referral constituted favorable termination — defendants not entitled to summary judgment. |
| Absolute and qualified immunity (prosecutors & officers) | Stapley: prosecutorial/advisory actions crossed into investigative misconduct (no absolute immunity); officers not entitled to qualified immunity given clearly established law. | Defendants: prosecutorial acts (presentation to grand jury, legal advice) are absolutely immune; officers reasonably believed conduct lawful. | Court: Absolute immunity does not cover prosecutor’s investigative, collateral‑investigation work (search here arguably collateral) — Aubuchon not entitled to absolute immunity for the search; qualified immunity denied for Aubuchon/Hendershott re search and denied for Arpaio/Hendershott re retaliation/arrest given triable issues; Thomas entitled to summary judgment on some claims. |
| First Amendment retaliation — chilling and but‑for causation; requirement of lack of probable cause | Stapley: investigations, searches, arrest, and RICO suit were motivated by retaliation for his political speech; these actions would chill an ordinary person. | Defendants: investigations and prosecutions were lawful; Supreme Court precedent requires lack of probable cause for some retaliation claims. | Court: Sufficient evidence of retaliatory animus and chilling effect; because triable disputes remain on probable cause, retaliation claim survives in narrowed form (constrained by elements/immunities of underlying torts). |
Key Cases Cited
- Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (summary‑judgment burden on movant)
- Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242 (summary‑judgment standard; genuine dispute)
- Gates v. Illinois, 462 U.S. 213 (probable cause for search: totality of circumstances)
- United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (good‑faith exception and limits where affidavit contains deliberate falsehoods)
- KRL v. Moore, 384 F.3d 1105 (absolute vs. qualified immunity for prosecutors; investigative vs. prosecutorial acts)
- Chism v. Washington, 661 F.3d 380 (judicial deception in affidavit; materiality standard)
- Lacey v. Maricopa County, 693 F.3d 896 (procuring arrest/role of prosecutors in false‑arrest claims)
- Hartman v. Moore, 547 U.S. 250 (retaliatory‑prosecution causation rule)
- Skoog v. County of Clackamas, 469 F.3d 1221 (Ninth Circuit: retaliatory police action actionable even if probable cause exists)
- Ford v. City of Yakima, 706 F.3d 1188 (Ninth Circuit denial of qualified immunity for retaliatory arrest where law gave fair notice)