Dominique Zanders v. Greektown Casino LLC, 333101

Plaintiffs Dominique Zanders and Preston Johnson were security guards at Greektown Casino and were terminated on October 10, 2014 after supervisors reviewed surveillance showing they spent significant time in the lost‑and‑found area rather than patrolling.
Plaintiffs sued under the Whistleblowers’ Protection Act (WPA) (claiming they were about to report the casino’s fire‑alarm bypass to a public body) and the Elliot‑Larsen Civil Rights Act (CRA) (claiming race discrimination in their terminations).
At summary‑judgment stage defendant moved under MCR 2.116(C)(10); the trial court denied the motion stating factual questions existed; this Court granted leave to appeal that denial.
On appeal the Court reviewed whether plaintiffs produced sufficient evidence to establish prima facie WPA and CRA claims and whether defendant’s stated nondiscriminatory reasons were pretextual.
The appellate court concluded plaintiffs failed to show (a) by clear and convincing evidence they were "about to" report to a public body or that defendant had notice of any such imminent report, and (b) any direct or indirect evidence creating an inference that race motivated their terminations; the court reversed and directed summary disposition for defendant.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
WPA: Were plaintiffs "about to report" a suspected legal violation to a public body and thereby protected?	Plaintiffs assert they were preparing to report the casino’s fire‑alarm bypass to a public body.	Plaintiffs never identified a specific law or public body with clarity nor told supervisors they would report; thus no clear‑and‑convincing evidence they were "about to" report.	Court: No — plaintiffs failed to meet the clear‑and‑convincing "about to report" requirement and produced no evidence defendant had objective notice; summary disposition for defendant.
CRA: Did plaintiffs show race discrimination in termination (direct or indirect evidence)?	Plaintiffs point to supervisors’ racial remarks and other incidents involving disparate discipline to infer discriminatory animus.	Defendant contends remarks were stray, decisionmakers didn’t make those remarks, and termination was for documented misconduct (failure to patrol).	Court: No — remarks characterized as stray; plaintiffs didn’t identify similarly situated comparators treated differently for comparable conduct and did not show pretext; summary disposition for defendant.

Maiden v. Rozwood, 461 Mich 109 (summary‑judgment standard for (C)(10) motion)
Pace v. Edel‑Harrelson, 499 Mich 1 (WPA prima facie elements)
Shallal v. Catholic Social Servs. of Wayne Co., 455 Mich 604 (WPA "about to report" standard)
Sniecinski v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Michigan, 469 Mich 124 (CRA direct vs. indirect proof; burden‑shifting framework)
Lytle v. Malady, 458 Mich 153 (McDonnell Douglas burden allocation in CRA cases)
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (burden‑shifting framework for disparate treatment claims)
Town v. Michigan Bell Tel. Co., 455 Mich 688 (standard for identifying similarly situated comparators)
West v. General Motors Corp., 469 Mich 177 (temporal proximity alone insufficient to show causation)