Doe v. St. Francis School District
2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 18954
7th Cir.2012Background
- Plaintiff, a 14-year-old eighth-grader, seeks damages from the school district for sexual abuse by a 26-year-old teacher, proceeding pseudonymously.
- Plaintiff asserts Title IX discrimination and negligent infliction of emotional distress under Wisconsin law due to district failure to prevent abuse.
- District court granted summary judgment for the district; case dismissed with immediate appellate review under Rule 54(b).
- Sweet was the abusive teacher; she was fired, prosecuted, and pled guilty to fourth-degree sexual assault in Wisconsin.
- Superintendent Topinka and principal faced complaints from teachers about Sweet’s conduct but did not discover the romantic relationship until after mother’s disclosure.
- The court analyzes the standard for district liability under Title IX and Wisconsin tort law, focusing on actual notice, deliberate indifference, and whether liability is personal rather than vicarious.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| What standard governs school-district liability under Title IX? | NR Doe argues district aware of misconduct and deliberately indifferent. | District contends knowledge alone does not equal recklessness; actions were reasonable. | Personal liability requires actual notice and deliberate indifference; not met here. |
| Was there actual notice or inquiry notice of misconduct by district officials? | Knowledge of teacher-student relationship signals risk and warrants action. | Knowledge by a few teachers does not amount to actual knowledge by officials to trigger liability. | Insufficient actual or inquiry notice; no deliberate indifference. |
| Does Title IX impose vicarious liability on a school district for a teacher's sexual misconduct? | District should be liable for supervisory failures under Title IX. | Cannot rely on respondeat superior for Title IX actions; must show official action with notice and indifference. | Liability must be personal; no vicarious liability established here. |
| Should the Wisconsin negligent infliction of emotional distress claim survive? | District’s discretion failure caused emotional distress to plaintiff. | Discretionary-immunity carve-out requires known danger; not satisfied here. | NIED claim dismissed due to lack of proof of known danger to officials. |
Key Cases Cited
- Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (U.S. 1979) (private Title IX damages implied right)
- Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public Schools, 503 U.S. 60 (U.S. 1992) (damages available under Title IX)
- Gebser v. Lago Vista Independent School District, 524 U.S. 274 (U.S. 1998) (no vicarious liability for teacher misconduct without official knowledge and deliberate indifference)
- Delgado v. Stegall, 367 F.3d 668 (7th Cir. 2004) (actual knowledge vs. knowledge of risk; standard for notice)
- Hansen v. Board of Trustees, 551 F.3d 599 (7th Cir. 2008) (clarifies notice/knowledge standards in Title IX context)
- J.F.K. v. Troup County School District, 678 F.3d 1254 (11th Cir. 2012) (notice/indifference framework in Title IX claims)
- Escue v. Northern Oklahoma College, 450 F.3d 1146 (10th Cir. 2006) (uses a consequential formula related to deliberate indifference)
- Board of County Commissioners v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397 (U.S. 1997) (discusses standards similar to deliberate indifference in constitutional context)
- Merck & Co. v. Reynolds, 131 S. Ct. 1768 (S. Ct. 2010) (distinction between knowledge and inquiry; standard for notice)