404 F.Supp.3d 643
D. Conn.2019Background
- John Doe, a male Quinnipiac University (QU) student, was the subject of a Title IX investigation (INV1) based on complaints by two former partners ("Jane Roe" and "Jane Roe 2"); QU later investigated Doe's formal complaint against the Roes (INV2).
- Investigators interviewed ~21 people; Doe was interviewed multiple times, accepted responsibility for property damage but denied other charges; the Title IX Grievance Committee found him responsible for intimate partner violence (IPV), assault, breach/disturbing the peace, and property damage and imposed sanctions including a deferred suspension and restrictions on graduation participation.
- Doe alleges gender discrimination under Title IX (erroneous outcome, selective enforcement, deliberate indifference), breach of contract and covenant of good faith (based on QU Title IX policy/handbook), and multiple state tort claims (tortious interference, NIED, IIED, negligence, reckless and wanton misconduct).
- During discovery, QU employees (including the deputy coordinator and a public safety investigator) destroyed handwritten hearing/interview notes; Doe argues spoliation warrants an adverse inference. QU disputes intentional spoliation.
- The Court denied summary judgment on Title IX erroneous-outcome and selective-enforcement claims, and on breach of contract, covenant of good faith, and reckless/wanton misconduct; it granted summary judgment for defendants on Title IX deliberate indifference, tortious interference, NIED, IIED, and ordinary negligence.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Title IX erroneous‑outcome claim survives | Doe says gender bias motivated investigators/committee, pointing to disparate treatment of his and the complainants' claims, investigator statements, national/federal pressure, and statistical patterns | QU says no direct or indirect evidence of gender bias; procedures were neutral and outcomes based on merits | Denied summary judgment: triable issues exist (disparate standards for IPV, differential investigatory treatment, destroyed notes, credibility issues) |
| Whether Title IX selective‑enforcement claim survives | Doe contends similarly situated female complainants were treated more favorably (formal-complaint asymmetry, different IPV standards, credibility treatment) | QU contends comparators are not similarly situated and results reflect merits, not bias | Denied summary judgment: triable issues exist under McDonnell Douglas framework |
| Whether Title IX deliberate‑indifference claim survives | Doe argues QU was indifferent to harassment he reported and failed to protect him | QU argues it investigated allegations and did not act unreasonably; deliberate‑indifference requires sexual‑harassment (not merely biased process) | Granted for QU: record does not show clearly unreasonable response to sexual harassment; theory that biased disciplinary process alone supports Title IX deliberate indifference rejected |
| Whether QU breached contract / covenant of good faith by failing to follow its Title IX policy | Doe identifies multiple specific policy promises QU breached (notice, 24‑hour review, investigator procedures, timeliness, correct definitions, equitable treatment) | QU argues student handbook/disclaimer and educational‑malpractice principles bar contract claims or the breaches are insubstantial | Denied for summary judgment: triable factual disputes over existence/terms of contract, specific breaches, and bad faith for covenant claim |
| Whether individual defendants tortiously interfered with contract | Doe contends Johnson, Kalagher, Contrucci (individually) used their roles to deprive him of contractual benefits | Defendants argue they acted as QU agents within scope of authority, so no third‑party interference; no evidence of personal gain | Granted for defendants: no record of improper personal motive or action outside scope of employment |
| Whether negligence‑based torts (NIED, negligence) survive | Doe claims negligent investigation and failure to protect | QU invokes Gupta (educational malpractice bar) and argues discretionary academic/disciplinary decisions preclude negligence claims | Granted for QU: negligence and NIED dismissed under Gupta principles for disciplinary/academic decisions |
| Whether IIED and reckless/wanton misconduct survive | Doe asserts conduct was outrageous/reckless and caused severe distress; reckless/wanton as more than negligence | QU disputes conduct reaches the high IIED standard and denies recklessness | IIED: granted for QU (conduct not extreme/outrageous). Reckless/wanton: denied summary judgment (triable factual dispute remains) |
| Whether spoliation warrants adverse inference | Doe seeks adverse inference from destroyed hearing/interview notes | QU contends no intentional spoliation and questions existence/importance of notes | Court found evidence supports negligent destruction and relevance; spoliation issues create credibility questions that preclude summary judgment on certain claims |
Key Cases Cited
- Yusuf v. Vassar Coll., 35 F.3d 709 (2d Cir. 1994) (establishes erroneous‑outcome and selective‑enforcement frameworks in university discipline Title IX suits)
- Doe v. Columbia Univ., 831 F.3d 46 (2d Cir. 2016) (applies McDonnell Douglas analysis and identifies facts that can support inference of sex bias in campus proceedings)
- Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274 (U.S. 1998) (limits Title IX damages liability to deliberate indifference to known harassment)
- Davis v. Monroe Cty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629 (U.S. 1999) (deliberate indifference standard requires conduct that causes students to undergo harassment or be vulnerable to it)
- Gupta v. New Britain Gen. Hosp., 239 Conn. 574 (Conn. 1996) (limits tort/negligence educational malpractice claims; permits contract claims enforcing specific school promises)
- Biediger v. Quinnipiac Univ., 691 F.3d 85 (2d Cir. 2012) (contextual precedent regarding QU and Title IX/Title VII‑adjacent institutional obligations)
- Harris v. Bradley Mem'l Hosp. & Health Ctr., 296 Conn. 315 (Conn. 2010) (permits punitive/reckless‑conduct recovery where investigative process was contaminated by bias)
- Residential Funding Corp. v. DeGeorge Fin. Corp., 306 F.3d 99 (2d Cir. 2002) (spoliation elements and standards)
- Kronisch v. United States, 150 F.3d 112 (2d Cir. 1998) (allows less stringent proof to support adverse inference for spoliation)