Doe v. Pawtucket School Department, 969 F.3d 1

Background

Jane Doe, a 13-year-old student at the six-room Pawtucket Learning Academy (PLA), alleged multiple incidents of sexual assault and harassment between 2016 and 2017 while at PLA.
April 2016: a male student simulated sexual contact with Doe in gym class; police were contacted.
May 2016: Doe alleges she was raped by 17-year-old student Adriel in a classroom/bathroom; she says the principal asked whether she had sex with Adriel and Doe said yes, but the school took no protective steps.
April and June 2017: a PLA teacher, David Morton, allegedly groped Doe after a pattern of misconduct known to administrators; in June 2017 adult student Ivander DeBurgo raped Doe in the school after repeatedly entering her classroom and ignoring staff instructions. DeBurgo was later convicted.
Doe sued under Title IX, 42 U.S.C. 1983, and state law against PLA, the City, and multiple individuals; the district court dismissed all claims. On appeal the First Circuit vacated dismissal in part, allowing a narrowed Title IX claim to proceed against the school entities and affirmed dismissal of other claims and all individual-defendant claims.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Doe plausibly pleaded a Title IX deliberate-indifference claim for harassment occurring before the Adriel incident	PLA had notice or should have had notice of earlier assaults (gym incident and other misconduct) and did not protect Doe	Defendants say there was no actual notice to appropriate officials and that police presence after the gym incident shows an adequate response	Pre-Adriel allegations that rest on constructive notice were insufficient; dismissal as to those earlier incidents was affirmed
Whether the complaint plausibly alleges actual notice to the principal of the Adriel rape and subsequent deliberate indifference causing vulnerability to later assaults	Doe alleges she told the principal she had sex with Adriel and the school took no action, showing deliberate indifference from that point forward	Defendants rely on medical and police reports they say show Doe denied sexual contact and that the principal would have acted if she knew	Court held that at pleading stage Doe may plausibly have alleged actual notice and deliberate indifference beginning with the Adriel incident; dismissal vacated in part to permit a narrowed Title IX claim to proceed
Whether teacher-on-student assault by Morton supports a Title IX claim	Morton repeatedly groped students; high-level administrators allegedly knew for some time and did nothing, contributing to a hostile environment and Doe's cumulative harm	Defendants contend isolated touching is not sufficiently severe or pervasive for Title IX liability	Court found it plausible that teacher misconduct known to administrators in a very small school could be severe and pervasive or contribute to cumulative harm; this aspect may proceed as part of the Title IX claim
Whether state-law claims, 42 U.S.C. 1983 claims, and claims against individuals survive appellate review	Doe sought relief under state law and Section 1983 and named individual defendants	Defendants argued for dismissal; they also emphasized Title IX damages are against funding recipients, not individuals	Doe waived appellate challenge to state-law and Section 1983 dismissals by not briefing them; claims against individuals and non-Title IX claims were affirmed dismissed; Title IX damages limited to recipient entities

Key Cases Cited

Franklin v. Gwinnett Cnty. Pub. Schs., 503 U.S. 60 (1992) (recognizing implied private right of action for money damages under Title IX)
Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677 (1979) (establishing private cause of action under Title IX)
Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274 (1998) (Title IX requires actual notice to an appropriate person and deliberate indifference for teacher-on-student claims)
Davis ex rel. LaShonda D. v. Monroe Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629 (1999) (Title IX liability for deliberate indifference to student-on-student harassment that is severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) (plausibility standard for pleadings)
Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) (pleading must state a claim that is plausible on its face)
Hamann v. Carpenter, 937 F.3d 86 (1st Cir. 2019) (on Rule 12(b)(6) take nonconclusory facts as true and draw inferences for plaintiff)
Fitzgerald v. Barnstable Sch. Comm., 504 F.3d 165 (1st Cir. 2007) (discussion of causation and Title IX scope in student-on-student contexts)
Porto v. Town of Tewksbury, 488 F.3d 67 (1st Cir. 2007) (deliberate indifference requires disregarding known or obvious consequences)
Morgan v. Town of Lexington, 823 F.3d 737 (1st Cir. 2016) (distinguishing teasing/bullying from conduct sufficiently severe for civil liability)