544 F.Supp.3d 563
D. Maryland2021Background
- Jane Doe, a scholarship Morgan State track athlete, was sexually assaulted by a teammate in August 2017; she stopped competing and experienced academic and psychological harm.
- Doe’s mother reported the assault to Morgan State athletics officials; Morgan State’s Title IX coordinator and other administrators were notified in early December 2017.
- Morgan State issued a boilerplate no-contact order to the assailant but did not issue a more specific tailored order; administrators discussed, drafted, and circulated proposed protective measures but did not formalize them; Doe did not return to the team in January 2018.
- An internal investigation found the assailant responsible; a hearing panel suspended him for one year, but Vice President Kevin Banks later placed the sanction on hold after meeting the assailant’s parents and revisited the decision, allowing continued campus presence.
- Doe alleges Title IX hostile-environment discrimination and retaliation. At summary judgment the court granted Doe partial summary judgment on the elements that the assault was sufficiently severe/pervasive and that Morgan State had actual notice, but found triable issues on deliberate indifference and retaliation and denied Morgan State’s summary judgment.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the sexual harassment/assault was so severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive as to deny access to educational benefits | The assault and its concrete harms (ended athletic career, failing grade, panic attacks) meet the severe/pervasive hostile‑environment standard | Argued the relevant harassment must occur after the school had notice to count toward the hostile‑environment element | Court: Granted Doe summary judgment on this element; single severe pre‑notice assault can satisfy the standard and no genuine dispute exists here |
| Whether Morgan State had actual knowledge of the harassment | Multiple administrators received notice (mother’s report, Title IX coordinator contact) | Morgan State did not meaningfully contest notice | Court: Granted Doe summary judgment on actual‑knowledge element |
| Whether Morgan State’s response was deliberately indifferent (imputing liability) | Failure to implement tailored no‑contact measures, Banks’ partial reversal/abeyance of sanction, and coach hostility created a reasonable jury question of clearly unreasonable response | Morgan State contends it communicated interim measures, was prepared to implement protections, Doe voluntarily left team, and any lapse was negligence, not deliberate indifference | Court: Denied Morgan State summary judgment; triable issues exist on deliberate indifference |
| Whether Doe established Title IX retaliation (adverse action, causal motive) | Same inactions/actions (failure to protect, sanction reversal, hostile treatment) were materially adverse and motivated by retaliatory animus | Morgan State argues no materially adverse action and no causal, retaliatory motive | Court: Denied both motions on retaliation; factual disputes remain about adverse action and causation/pretext |
Key Cases Cited
- Davis v. Monroe Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629 (1999) (Title IX deliberate‑indifference standard where recipient’s response is clearly unreasonable)
- Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274 (1998) (imputing liability to an institution requires actual notice and deliberate indifference)
- Feminist Majority Found. v. Hurley, 911 F.3d 674 (4th Cir. 2018) (Title IX hostile‑environment elements and severe/pervasive standard)
- Jennings v. Univ. of N.C., 482 F.3d 686 (4th Cir. 2007) (tests for when peer‑on‑peer harassment denies equal access)
- S.B. ex rel. A.L. v. Bd. of Educ. of Harford Cnty., 819 F.3d 69 (4th Cir. 2016) (schools entitled to deference in disciplinary responses but deliberate indifference not limited to total inaction)
- Zeno v. Pine Plains Cent. Sch. Dist., 702 F.3d 655 (2d Cir. 2012) (recipient must engage in measures reasonably calculated to end harassment)
- Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. v. White, 548 U.S. 53 (2006) (retaliation requires materially adverse action that would dissuade a reasonable person)
- McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973) (burden‑shifting framework for discrimination/retaliation claims)