Doe v. Marysville Joint Unified School Dist., S283639

Doe plaintiffs twice voluntarily dismissed nearly identical actions in state court and then filed a nearly identical federal action before bringing this state-court suit. 1
The federal action included the same state-law claims plus federal Title IX, section 1983, and No Child Left Behind claims, and was dismissed under rule 41(a)(1)(A)(i). 2
The present state-court complaint asserts only state-law claims arising from alleged sexual abuse by school counselor William Babcock. 3
The School District demurred, arguing the federal voluntary dismissal triggered rule 41(a)(1)(B)'s two-dismissal rule and therefore claim preclusion barred this action. 4
The trial court sustained the demurrer, the Court of Appeal affirmed in a split decision, and the Supreme Court granted review. 5
The Supreme Court reversed, holding rule 41(a)(1)(B) is a federal procedural bar to refiling in federal court, not a claim-preclusion rule barring this state action. 6

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Does rule 41(a)(1)(B) make the federal dismissal claim-preclusive in state court? 7	Doe said rule 41 only bars refiling in federal court.	School District said the second dismissal is claim preclusive everywhere.	No; rule 41(a)(1)(B) is procedural, not claim preclusion. 8
Does Semtek control the meaning of 'adjudication on the merits' in rule 41? 9	Doe relied on Semtek to show rule 41 is not claim preclusion.	School District said Semtek was limited to diversity cases.	Yes; Semtek shows rule 41 does not itself determine claim preclusion. 10
Are the federal voluntary dismissals otherwise claim preclusive under res judicata? 11	Doe argued a without-prejudice voluntary dismissal is not a final merits judgment.	School District said repeated dismissals create finality.	No; a rule 41(a)(1)(A)(i) dismissal without prejudice is not claim preclusive here. 12
Must state law claims dismissed from supplemental federal jurisdiction be barred in state court? 13	Doe said state claim-preclusion law should govern supplemental claims.	School District said federal law should bar them too.	No; no federal interest justifies barring these state-law claims in state court. 14

Semtek Int'l Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497 (U.S. 2001) (rule 41 'adjudication on the merits' is not itself claim preclusion; federal common law governs federal judgments 15)
Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880 (U.S. 2008) (federal common law governs claim-preclusive effect of federal judgments 16)
Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322 (U.S. 1979) (judgment on the merits bars a second suit involving the same cause of action 17)
Goddard v. Security Title Ins. & Guar. Co., 14 Cal.2d 47 (Cal. 1939) (California statement of res judicata effect of a judgment on the merits 18)
Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (U.S. 1938) (federal rules should not create substantial state/federal outcome differences 19)
Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384 (U.S. 1990) (voluntary dismissal under rule 41(a)(1) is without prejudice and not itself a res judicata ruling 20)
DKN Holdings LLC v. Faerber, 61 Cal.4th 813 (Cal. 2015) (California claim preclusion requires a final judgment on the merits 21)
Wells v. Marina City Properties, Inc., 29 Cal.3d 781 (Cal. 1981) (voluntary dismissal without prejudice has no claim-preclusive effect under California law 22)