479 F.Supp.3d 151
E.D. Pa.2020Background
- Jane Doe, a residential student at Manor College, reported a September 2016 sexual assault by three male students and filed an incident report and police complaints.
- Manor College held Code of Conduct hearings on September 26, 2016, found the men not responsible for sexual assault but sanctioned them for a guest-policy violation; the men were allowed to return to campus and class.
- After reporting and appealing the outcome, Doe received multiple campus disciplinary actions (including fines, community service, probation) and was evicted from campus housing on November 18, 2016; she subsequently withdrew and retained counsel.
- Doe sued under Title IX for sex-based discrimination (deliberate indifference) and retaliation; the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment and Doe moved to exclude defendant's psychiatric expert.
- The Court granted Doe summary judgment on the notice element of the discrimination claim and on two prima facie retaliation elements (protected activity and adverse action), denied Manor’s motion on deliberate indifference and causation issues, denied Manor’s summary judgment on retaliation (leaving causation and pretext for the jury), and denied Doe’s motion in limine without prejudice.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Doe) | Defendant's Argument (Manor) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Deliberate indifference (Title IX) | Manor's response was clearly unreasonable: failed to separate Doe from alleged assailants, hostile treatment, flawed investigation/hearings, inadequate training | College promptly investigated, imposed interim sanctions, held hearings, provided victim services—process was reasonable | Triable issue exists; summary judgment denied to Manor on deliberate indifference |
| Causation for discrimination | Hostility and incidents after complaint were sex-based and flowed from College’s indifference | Post-complaint incidents are not necessarily sex-based harassment; no causal link to College’s conduct | Triable issues; summary judgment denied to Manor on causation |
| Retaliation—protected activity | Doe’s initial report and subsequent complaints about the College’s response are protected opposition activity | Only the initial assault report is protected; later complaints were mere grievances | Court found as a matter of law Doe engaged in protected activity beyond the initial report (Doe summary judgment granted on this element) |
| Retaliation—adverse action | Eviction, sanctions, fines, required counseling, threats of civil action are adverse actions | Some disciplinary actions were legitimate sanctions, not retaliation; fairness of hearings not an adverse-action theory here | Court found no triable dispute that these were adverse actions (Doe summary judgment granted on this element) |
| Retaliation—causation & pretext | Temporal proximity, pattern of hostility, inconsistent explanations and threats show circumstantial causation and pretext | College points to legitimate non-retaliatory reasons and comparator discipline of others | Direct evidence not shown; circumstantial evidence creates triable issues on causation and pretext—case must go to jury |
| Motion in limine re: psychiatric expert | Doe sought to exclude defendant's psychiatrist under FRE 403/702 | Manor relied on expert to assess Doe's psychiatric condition after a Rule 35 exam | Motion denied without prejudice; expert testimony conditionally permitted |
Key Cases Cited
- Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629 (1999) (establishes Title IX private-right-of-action framework for student-on-student sexual harassment)
- Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274 (1998) (defines deliberate indifference and school liability under Title IX)
- Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53 (2006) (standard for what constitutes an adverse action in retaliation cases)
- Conoshenti v. Pub. Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 364 F.3d 135 (3d Cir. 2004) (defines direct evidence in retaliation/causation context)
- Curay-Cramer v. Ursuline Acad., 450 F.3d 130 (3d Cir. 2006) (protected activity includes informal protests and complaints; focus on conveyed message)
- Doe v. Mercy Catholic Med. Ctr., 850 F.3d 545 (3d Cir. 2017) (applies Title VII/Title IX burden-shifting and retaliation framework)
- Fuentes v. Perskie, 32 F.3d 759 (3d Cir. 1994) (explains burden-shifting and pretext analysis in discrimination cases)
- Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986) (summary judgment standard regarding genuine disputes of material fact)
- Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986) (summary judgment burdens of movant and nonmovant)
- Kaucher v. County of Bucks, 455 F.3d 418 (3d Cir. 2006) (application of materiality and genuine-dispute standards on summary judgment)