340 Conn. 1
Conn.2021Background
- Allison Marchese was an English teacher, yearbook advisor, and conditioning coach who secretly exchanged sexual messages with three male students and summoned them to her classroom multiple times; she sexually assaulted one student and committed oral sex with another.
- Allison had an otherwise unblemished personnel record and strong evaluations; colleagues and students generally regarded her highly, and no staff testified to having witnessed her flirt with the plaintiffs.
- At summer football practices Allison sometimes wore tight shorts and a sports bra; some coaches noticed and made comments, but most staff considered the attire acceptable for exercise and no nudity was reported.
- Allison’s husband, also a teacher, confronted her about social media contacts and observed conduct at a football game that made him uneasy; he did not know the content of private messages.
- Plaintiffs sued the town, board of education, and principal for negligence (failure to supervise, report, train, monitor social media, and monitor security cameras); the trial court granted summary judgment for defendants on governmental immunity and lack of reasonable suspicion; plaintiffs appealed.
- The Connecticut Supreme Court affirmed: no genuine issue that staff had reasonable cause to suspect abuse, no ministerial dress-code duty established, identifiable-victim/imminent-harm exception did not apply, and no ministerial duty to monitor security cameras existed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Ministerial duty to report under §17a-101a / board policy | Staff had "reasonable cause" to suspect abuse based on aggregate facts (classroom summonses, social media, attire, husband’s concerns) | No individual staff member had specific, articulable facts giving reasonable cause; aggregate hindsight doesn't create duty | Affirmed: no reasonable cause to suspect or imminent risk; ministerial reporting duty not breached |
| Ministerial duty of professionalism (dress) from Semple’s testimony | Athletic director’s testimony created a clear duty to require coaches/ staff to enforce professional dress; failure to enforce was breach | No written dress code or directive; Semple’s expectations were general and discretionary | Affirmed: Semple’s testimony insufficiently specific to create a ministerial duty |
| Identifiable person–imminent harm exception to discretionary immunity | Plaintiffs (Doe II & III) were identifiable and facts made harm imminent and apparent to officials | Even assuming identifiability, facts were clandestine/attenuated; attire or classroom visits did not make sexual assault imminently apparent | Affirmed: exception does not apply—harm was not apparent or imminent to reasonable officials |
| Duty to monitor security cameras / school resource officer | Police/school had access to footage and should have monitored it; monitoring would have shown entries to Allison’s classroom | No policy or practice required routine live monitoring; footage reviewed only after incidents—monitoring was discretionary | Affirmed: no ministerial duty to monitor footage; act was discretionary and immune |
Key Cases Cited
- Cole v. New Haven, 337 Conn. 326 (Conn. 2020) (distinguishes ministerial vs discretionary duties)
- Martinez v. New Haven, 328 Conn. 1 (Conn. 2018) (standard for imminence/apparentness in identifiable-victim exception)
- Haynes v. Middletown, 314 Conn. 303 (Conn. 2014) (identifiable person–imminent harm exception described)
- Doe v. Petersen, 279 Conn. 607 (Conn. 2006) (application of imminent-harm exception in school context)
- Ventura v. East Haven, 330 Conn. 613 (Conn. 2019) (when oral directives can create ministerial duties)
- Brooks v. Powers, 328 Conn. 256 (Conn. 2018) (attenuation between observed condition and imminent harm)
- Edgerton v. Clinton, 311 Conn. 217 (Conn. 2014) (no duty to inquire; apparentness is objective)
- Strycharz v. Cady, 323 Conn. 548 (Conn. 2016) (specificity required to show ministerial duty)