Lead Opinion
The record reveals the following facts, as found by the trial court, and procedural history relevant to our resolution of this appeal. On March 19, 2013, the plaintiff, who was eleven years old, attended the Engineering Science University Magnet School (school) in New Haven. Upon his arrival at the school that day, the
The plaintiff's laceration began to bleed, so he went to the bathroom with his friend to tend to the injury. Other students advised another teacher, Karissa Stolzman, of the incident. Stolzman went to the bathroom and gave the plaintiff paper towels to care for the cut and then took him to the main office. Stolzman then reported the incident to the principal and filed an incident report. The school informed the plaintiff's parents of the incident and called an ambulance to transport him to a hospital emergency room for treatment.
The plaintiff subsequently commenced this action against the defendants, seeking
The matter was tried to the court, which found in favor of the plaintiff on counts one and two of the complaint. Specifically, the trial court concluded that the plaintiff satisfied the imminent harm to identifiable persons exception to governmental immunity under the standard articulated in Haynes v. Middletown , supra,
On appeal, the defendants claim, inter alia, that the trial court improperly concluded that the plaintiff was an identifiable person subject to imminent harm. The plaintiff disagrees and also posits, аs an alternative ground for affirmance, that the defendants failed to plead the special defense of governmental immunity in the operative answer.
We first address the question of whether the trial court properly determined that the plaintiff met his burden of proving the imminent harm to identifiable persons exception to governmental immunity. Specifically, the defendants contend that, because the trial court did not identify how the harm was imminent, the plaintiff could not be found to be an identifiable person. Additionally, the defendants argue that the trial court did not identify the dangerous condition or explain how that dangerous condition was apparent to Stewart. Finally, the defendants contend that the trial cоurt's reliance on whether the harm was foreseeable is improper because this court rejected that standard in
In response, the plaintiff contends that the trial court properly concluded that he was a member of an identifiable class of victims as a student at school during school hours. Moreover, the plaintiff further contends that the dangerous condition was students running with scissors and that it was, or should have been, apparent to Stewart that the plaintiff was in danger of imminent harm. To this end, the plaintiff argues that Haynes did not reject the foreseeability standard; rather, it rejected the notion that foreseeability was limited only to temporal and geographical considerations.
"This court has recognized an exception to discretionary act immunity that allows for liability when the circumstances make it apparent to the public officer that his or her failure to act would be likely to subject an identifiable person to imminent harm .... This identifiable person-imminent harm exception has three requirements: (1) an imminent harm; (2) an identifiable victim; and (3) a public official to whom it is apparent that his or her conduct is likely to subject that victim to that harm.... All three must be proven in order for the exception to apply." (Citations omitted; footnote omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., at 230-31,
We note at the outset that this court has held that public schoolchildren are "an identifiable class of beneficiaries"
Recently, in Haynes v. Middletown , supra,
Our next occasion to apply the imminence standard clarified in Haynes was in Strycharz v. Cady , supra,
II
We now turn to the plaintiff's alternative ground for affirmance, namely, that the defendants failed to plead governmental immunity as a special defense in their operative answer and, as such, this is simply a negligence
The record reveals the following additional relevant facts and procedural history. In response to the plaintiff's complaint, the defendants filed their first answer on July 29, 2015. That answer denied the рlaintiff's allegations of negligence but failed to raise any special defenses. Thereafter, on September 11, 2015, the defendants filed a request for leave to amend their answer to include certain special defenses. In the attached amended answer, the defendants asserted four special defenses, specifically, that (1) the plaintiff's claims were barred by the doctrine of governmental immunity pursuant to § 52-557n, (2) the plaintiff's claims for damages were barred by § 52-557n (b) (6),
Although the trial court never expressly exercised its discretion in ruling on the defendants' request to amend their answer or the plaintiff's objection to that motion, based on a thorough review of the record and the memorandum of decision, we conclude that it implicitly granted the defendants' request to amend their answer and overruled the plaintiff's objection. See Community Collaborative of Bridgeport, Inc. v. Ganim ,
The judgment is reversed as to counts one and two of the plaintiff's complaint and the case is remanded with direction to render judgment for the defendants on those counts; the judgment is affirmed in all other respects.
In this opinion ROGERS, C.J., and PALMER, McDONALD, D'AURIA and ESPINOSA, Js., concurred.
Notes
We note that the present action was commenced on behalf of Anthony Martinez by and through his mother, Luz Mercado, as next friend and parent, who was also listed as a plaintiff in her individual capacity. We further note that, during the pendency of the present appeal, the trial court granted a motion substituting Anthony Martinez' father, Jorge Martinez, as next friend. For the sake of simplicity, we hereinafter refer to Anthony Martinez as the plaintiff.
We note that, because the trial court rendered judgment in favor of Harries, he did not join the city and the board in filing the present appeal. See footnote 5 of this opinion. For the sake of simplicity, we hereinafter refer to the city and the board, collectively, as the defendants.
General Statutes § 52-557n (a) provides in relevant part: "(1) Except as otherwise provided by law, a political subdivision of the state shall be liable for damages to person or property caused by: (A) The negligent acts or omissions of such political subdivision or any employee, officer or agent thereof acting within the scope of his employment or оfficial duties; (B) negligence in the performance of functions from which the political subdivision derives a special corporate profit or pecuniary benefit .... (2) Except as otherwise provided by law, a political subdivision of the state shall not be liable for damages to person or property caused by: (A) Acts or omissions of any employee, officer or agent which constitute criminal conduct, fraud, actual malice or wilful misconduct; or (B) negligent acts or omissions which require the exercise of judgment or discretion as an official function of the authority expressly or impliedly granted by law...."
The defendants appealed from the judgment of the trial court to the Appellate Court, and we transferred the appeal to this court pursuant to General Statutes § 51-199 (c) and Practice Book § 65-1.
The plaintiff also filed a cross appeal, claiming that the trial court improperly (1) awarded him only $35,000 in noneconomic damages, which was inadequate to compensate him for his permanent scarring and pain and suffering, and (2) rendered judgment in favor of the defendants on counts three, four, and five of the complaint, which he contends asserted an official capacity claim against Harries and derivative claims against the city and the board pursuant to General Statutes §§ 7-465 (a) and 10-235 (a). Because we conclude that the plaintiff has failed to satisfy the imminent harm to identifiablе persons exception to governmental immunity, we need not address these claims. See Grady v. Somers ,
We note that the defendants also claim that the trial court's finding of fact that the students were still running when the plaintiff's injury occurred was clearly erroneous. Because we ultimately conclude that the plaintiff failed to satisfy the imminent harm to identifiable persons exception to governmental immunity, even under thе facts as the trial court found them, we need not address this claim.
We note that, to the extent that the defendants argue that the plaintiff was not, in fact, a member of an identifiable class of foreseeable victims, we need not reach this claim given our ultimate conclusion that the plaintiff has failed to establish that the defendants' acts or omissions subjected him to imminent harm.
In clarifying the imminent harm standard, we concluded in Haynes that Burns v. Board of Education , supra,
We note that the question of whether an imminent harm was apparent to a municipal defendant is an evolving area of the law. For example, we recently granted a petition for certification in Northrup v. Witkowski ,
We note that the parties disagree about what constituted the dangerous condition in this case. The plaintiff asserts that the dangerous condition was students running with scissors. The defendants, on the other hand, contend that the trial court did not "identify the dangerous condition that caused the plaintiff's harm ...." Specifically, the defendants seem to argue that the students had stopped running before the scissors fell, and, therefore, "the running and the scissors had no connection with the plaintiff's injury ...." For its part, the triаl court's memorandum of decision provides little insight into what it considered the dangerous condition. It noted: "[One of the female students] had safety scissors in her hand as she chased after [the plaintiff's friend]. As they approached the area where [the plaintiff] was in the auditorium, the scissors fell to the ground.... In picking up the scissors, [the other female student] cut the plaintiff ...." Regardless of whether the dangerous condition was students running with safety scissors or simply the presence of the safety scissors, however, the plaintiff has not identified any facts in the record that would have made it apparent to the defendants that this type of harm was imminent in the present case.
We emphasize that the plaintiff was not required to рrove actual knowledge on the part of the defendants. "[T]he applicable test for the apparentness prong of the identifiable person-imminent harm exception is an objective one, pursuant to which we consider the information available to the [school official] at the time of [his or] her discretionary act or omission.... Under that standard, [w]e do not ask whether the [school official] actually knew that harm was imminent but, rather, whether the circumstances would have made it apparent to a reasonable [school official] that harm was imminent." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Strycharz v. Cady , supra,
General Statutes § 52-557n (b) provides in relevant part: "Notwithstanding the provisions of subsectiоn (a) of this section, a political subdivision of the state or any employee, officer or agent acting within the scope of his employment or official duties shall not be liable for damages to person or property resulting from ... (6) the act or omission of someone other than an employee, officer or agent of the political subdivision ...."
We note, however, that it appears from the face of the record that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by granting the defendants' motion for permission to amend their answer. Whether to allow a party to amend the pleadings under Practice Book § 10-60 (a) rests within the discretion of the trial court. See, e.g., Motzer v. Haberli ,
Dissenting Opinion
I respectfully disagree with the majority opinion. In my view, the trial court properly applied the test from Haynes v. Middletown ,
The trial court found the following: "Based upon the [the imminent harm to identifiable persons exception to the defense of governmental immunity] as expressed [in Haynes ], this court finds that the plaintiff was [an]
Under our case law, the main purpose of charging school officials with a duty of care is to ensure that schoolchildren in their custody are protected from imminent harm. See generally Haynes v. Middletown , supra,
Regarding the issue of imminent harm, I respectfully disagree with the majority opinion. In my view, this incident cannot be regarded as an isolated event of two children going to pick up a pair of safety scissors and one accidently getting cut. Rather, I view the case as a failure to
In Strycharz , this сourt held that, "[b]ecause we are unable to conclude, on the basis of the record before us, that a reasonable juror could find that the circumstances were such that the defendants would have been aware of this problem, the defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law on this claim."
Moreover, I disagrеe, respectfully, with the majority when it downplays the nature of the harm that may be caused by safety scissors. For instance, the majority states that "there is no evidence that possessing safety scissors in the auditorium violated any school policy." While that fact may be true, it belies the real issue, which is whether there was a policy against either horseplay or children running after one another. Even if a specific policy does not exist, in my view, the situation presented an issue of fact that a risk of imminent harm existed. There was certainly a risk of imminent harm created by the horseplay. The child with the scissors
Second, the majority states that "[t]here is also no evidence that any similar incident had occurred in the past that would have alerted the defendants that additional safety procedures were needed in the auditorium. In fact, Stewart never previously had experienced problems caused by any dangerous student behavior in the auditorium, students running with scissors or otherwise." This was an incident of horseplay. The question of whether such conduct had occurred previously, while important from a notice standpoint fоr the defendant, does not change the fact that a fact finder could reasonably find that that conduct created a risk of imminent harm. There may not have been a need for additional safety procedures if the teacher had been attentive to his duties of supervision.
Third, the majority states that "[m]oreover, Stewart saw neither the students running nor the safety scissors." Respectfully, this is the central point of my disagreement with the majority. As we stated in Strycharz , the question is whether a reasonable fact finder could find that a teacher "would" have been aware of this problem if he had been executing his duties properly. Strycharz v. Cady , supra,
In my view, the present case is very similar to Haynes , in which this court held that "[t]he jury reasonably could
I note that the majority has criticized the clarity of the trial court's decision. However, "an opinion must be read as a whole, without particular portions read in isolation, to discern the parameters of its holding." Fisher v. Big Y Foods, Inc. ,
Therefore, I respectfully dissent.
I note that Luz Mercado is also named as a plaintiff in the present action. See footnote 1 of the majority opinion. For the sake of simplicity, I hereinafter refer to Anthony Martinez as the plaintiff.