Doe v. Louisiana Board of Ethics, 112 So. 3d 339

The Board of Ethics, as the Supervisory Committee on Campaign Finance Disclosure, conducted a confidential investigation into whether certain apparent contributors to a PAC were the true sources of funds used for campaign expenses.
The Board sought to depose and subpoena documents from Orleans Parish residents John Doe and Jane Doe based on a signed but unsworn complaint referencing a PAC's campaign finance report and publicly available Louisiana Secretary of State data.
The district court granted protective orders quashing the deposition notices and subpoenas after staying action pending a related record-production matter resolved by higher courts.
The district court held that the Board’s enforcement actions had prescribed, accepting prescriptive dates urged by the Board's counsel and concluding penalties could not be pursued.
The Does moved for protection under La. R.S. 18:1511.4 C(2); the district court’s ruling was reviewed under an abuse-of-discretion standard.
On appeal, the court held the prescriptive period is ambiguous and, applying lenity, that the one-year period applies because the alleged violations are contained in the PAC’s report, rendering the subpoenas oppressive and moot.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Which prescriptive period controls for enforcement actions?	Doe argues one year; Board argues three years.	Board contends three-year period applies since violation not contained in a report.	One-year period applies; ambiguity favors Doe; subpoenas quashed as moot.
Are the subpoenas oppressive or unduly burdensome under the statute?	Subpoenas are necessary to uncover true sources of PAC funds.	Subpoenas should be limited to relevant materials and not impose undue burden.	Subpoenas quashed under C(2) due to oppression and burdensomeness.
May the Board enforce civil penalties based on information contained in PAC reports?	Enforcement permitted where violations are contained in reports.	Ambiguity about whether contained-in-report language applies; penalties cannot be pursued.	Enforcement action framed as penal; ambiguity resolved in favor of the Does; subpoenas quashed.

Whitt v. McBride, 651 So.2d 427 (La. App. 3 Cir. 1995) (abuse-of-discretion standard for quashing subpoenas)
Mary Moe v. L.L.C. v. Louisiana Bd. of Ethics, 875 So.2d 22 (La. 2004) (de novo review for injunctions; public policy considerations)
Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384 (Supreme Court 1990) (discretionary decisions guided by sound legal principles)
United States v. Taylor, 487 U.S. 326 (Supreme Court 1988) (discretionary decisions require principled justification)
State v. Anders, 820 So.2d 513 (La. 2002) (penal statutes strictly construed; lenity applies for ambiguities)
Ourso, 842 So.2d 346 (La. 2003) (one-year prescriptive period discussed for campaign finance violations)
Sales 360, L.L.C. v. Louisiana Motor Vehicle Comm’n, 976 So.2d 188 (La. App. 5 Cir. 2007) (penal/statutory interpretation principles in administrative contexts)
White v. Haydel, 593 So.2d 421 (La. App. 1 Cir. 1991) (doctrine of contra non valentem and stays not suspending prescription)
Castaneda v. La. Ins. Guaranty Assoc., 657 So.2d 338 (La. App. 5 Cir. 1995) (prescription and related doctrinal principles)