Doe v. Hartford Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp.
119 A.3d 462
Conn.2015Background
- From 1979–1983 Father Ivan Ferguson, known to church officials to have molested multiple boys and to have an alcohol problem, was assigned by the Hartford Roman Catholic Diocesan Corporation to positions putting him in contact with minors, culminating in sexual abuse of the plaintiff at Saint Mary’s School.
- Archbishop Whealon and aides knew of prior molestations and arranged discreet inpatient alcohol treatment for Ferguson in 1979, directed secrecy about the incidents, and later approved reassignment without informing parish staff or parents of Ferguson’s sexual history.
- The plaintiff (abused as a minor) sued the diocese for negligent and reckless supervision, failure to remove, and failure to warn; a jury returned verdicts for negligence and recklessness, awarding $1 million and punitive damages in the form of fees and costs.
- The diocese challenged (inter alia) evidentiary rulings, the striking of its laches defense, sufficiency of evidence (including need for expert historical testimony), and the retroactive revival of the claim under Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-577d as violating state substantive due process.
- The trial court excluded a historian’s expert testimony about 1970s public perceptions of child sexual abuse, admitted portions of Ferguson’s 1997 deposition under the hearsay residual exception, struck laches, and denied summary judgment on statute-of-limitations grounds; the Supreme Court affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether expert historical testimony about 1970s understanding of pedophilia was required | Historical context not needed; ordinary jurors can assess reasonableness given known facts about alcoholism and relapse | Jenkins’ historical testimony was necessary to avoid hindsight bias and to show prevailing practices then | Exclusion proper: jury could decide reasonableness without historian because relapse risk from alcoholism was within common knowledge; the proffered history was irrelevant or impermissible ultimate-issue opinion |
| Sufficiency of evidence for negligent supervision and recklessness | Evidence (secretive directives, failure to warn staff/parents, unmonitored sleepovers) supports negligent supervision and recklessness | Insufficient proof of supervisory failures; reliance on clinical advice and monitoring shows care, not recklessness | Affirmed: reasonable inferences supported negligent supervision; secrecy and continued placement supported recklessness finding |
| Admissibility of hearsay (Ferguson deposition; Peterson statements to Gianelli) | Ferguson’s 1997 deposition admissible under residual exception and corroborated by records; Peterson-to-Gianelli testimony cumulative/uncertain | Deposition unreliable and self-serving; Peterson statements admissible to show defendant’s belief about treatment | DeFrancisional: court did not abuse discretion admitting Ferguson’s deposition under residual exception; exclusion of Gianelli’s testimony was harmless even if erroneous |
| Whether laches available to shorten or bar statutory claim revived by § 52-577d | Laches should be available to prevent unfair prejudice from very long delay | Laches not available where plaintiff sues within statute-expanded period; legislative determinations govern repose | Court reaffirmed that laches is an equitable doctrine not to cut short a statutory limitations period for legal claims; striking laches was proper |
| Whether retroactive revival under § 52-577d violates Connecticut substantive due process | Defendant: vested right in lapsed limitations defense; state constitution affords greater protection than federal precedents | Plaintiff: revival is procedural, rationally related to legitimate legislative purpose (assist delayed child-abuse victims); Roberts v. Caton controls | Affirmed: Geisler analysis finds no greater state protection; retroactive revival passes rational-basis review and does not violate state substantive due process |
Key Cases Cited
- Campbell v. Holt, 115 U.S. 620 (U.S. 1885) (statutes of limitations affect remedy and do not create vested right preventing legislative revival)
- Chase Securities Corp. v. Donaldson, 325 U.S. 304 (U.S. 1945) (unanimous reaffirmation that retroactive lifting of a limitations bar does not per se violate federal due process)
- Roberts v. Caton, 224 Conn. 483 (Conn. 1993) (Conn. Supreme Court construed § 52-577d as procedural and applicable retroactively)
- LePage v. Horne, 262 Conn. 116 (Conn. 2002) (expert testimony required when issue goes beyond common knowledge; used to define limits of expert necessity)
- Goshen v. Stonington, 4 Conn. 209 (Conn. 1822) (Connecticut precedent permitting some retrospective statutes when they are just and promote public good)