Doe v. George Wash. Univ.
369 F. Supp. 3d 49
D.C. Cir.2019Background
- Five female GW undergraduates working at the Institute for International Economic Policy (IIEP) sued GW and their supervisor Kyle Renner under the D.C. Human Rights Act and Title IX, alleging sexual harassment, assault by a coworker (Emerson Jones), retaliation, gender discrimination, aiding-and-abetting, negligent supervision, and Title IX claims.
- Plaintiffs allege Jones sexually assaulted several women, boasted and degraded victims at work, and that Renner ignored complaints, made derogatory remarks, touched employees, silenced complainants, and offered accommodations (e.g., working from home) instead of disciplining Jones.
- Several plaintiffs claim constructive discharge; some allege direct assaults, others harassment and retaliation after reporting.
- Defendants moved to dismiss; plaintiffs sought leave to proceed under pseudonyms Jane Does 1–5. Court addressed pseudonym motion, jurisdictional challenge, and Rule 12(b)(6) merits.
- Court granted pretrial anonymity, denied as moot motion to dismiss original complaint, and granted-in-part and denied-in-part the defendants’ motion to dismiss the Amended Complaint.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether plaintiffs may proceed pseudonymously | Sexual assaults/assault allegations are highly sensitive; disclosure would cause psychological harm and identifiers would be easily traced in a small office | Rule 10(a) requires names; plaintiffs lack affidavits and some did not allege assault | Court allowed pseudonymous pretrial participation (not at trial): sensitive nature, risk of psychological harm, minimal prejudice to defendants favored anonymity |
| Whether Jane Does 1 & 3 stated hostile work environment claims (D.C. HRA) | Allegations of persistent sexualized comments, unwanted touching, humiliation, and supervisory dismissiveness are severe/pervasive | Conduct insufficiently severe/pervasive; some cited dismissals involved summary judgment posture | Denied dismissal as to Jane Does 1 & 3: allegations plausibly support hostile work environment claims at motion-to-dismiss stage |
| Whether retaliation claims survive (D.C. HRA & Title IX) — categories: work-from-home requests, disciplinary statements, reduced hours, hostile-environment as retaliation, constructive discharge | Plaintiffs: complaints led to requests to work from home, disparaging/disciplinary conduct, reduction/isolation of duties, hostile environment, and constructive discharge | Defendants: requests to work from home and similar acts are not materially adverse; many plaintiffs lack factual allegations tying acts to retaliation | Mixed: dismissal granted for claims based solely on work-from-home requests; some plaintiffs’ claims dismissed for lack of factual support (e.g., reduced hours for several Does); retaliation claims based on disciplinary statements, retaliatory hostile work environment, and constructive discharge survived for certain plaintiffs (notably Jane Does 1 and 2) |
| Whether negligent supervision/training (Count V) and certain Title IX theories survive | Plaintiffs tie negligent supervision to common-law torts (battery, IIED) committed by Jones | Negligent supervision cannot be predicated solely on statutory HRA or Title IX claims absent an independent common-law tort pleaded | Count V dismissed: plaintiffs failed to plead independent common-law torts to support negligent supervision claim |
Key Cases Cited
- Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) (plaintiff must plead factual content permitting reasonable inference of liability)
- Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) (complaint must state plausible claim to survive dismissal)
- Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75 (1998) (hostile work environment standard: severe or pervasive conduct alters terms of employment)
- Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17 (1993) (totality-of-circumstances test for hostile work environment)
- Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53 (2006) (retaliation standard: materially adverse action that would dissuade reasonable worker)
- Davis v. Monroe Cty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629 (1999) (Title IX elements for school liability for student-on-student harassment)
- Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274 (1998) (Title IX damages require actual knowledge and deliberate indifference by an official with authority)
- Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 544 U.S. 167 (2005) (retaliation for complaining of sex discrimination falls within Title IX)
- Campbell-Crane & Assocs., Inc. v. Stamenkovic, 44 A.3d 924 (D.C. 2012) (elements of hostile work environment under D.C. Human Rights Act)
- Griffin v. Acacia Life Ins. Co., 925 A.2d 564 (D.C. 2007) (negligent supervision must rest on independent common-law torts)