828 F.Supp.2d 266
D.D.C.2011Background
- Doe, a DIA civilian employee, alleges Rehabilitation Act violations including discrimination, failure to accommodate, and improper handling of medical information relating to bipolar disorder.
- Gates was Secretary of Defense when the alleged discrimination occurred; CENTCOM deployment policies and DIA procedures govern her deployments.
- In 2009, DIA found Doe not deployable for a Dubai TDY due to bipolar disorder, despite prior deployments.
- Doe sought waivers and proposed accommodations to CENTCOM Mod 9; DIA denied the waiver and adhered to CENTCOM Mod 9.
- By 2010, CENTCOM Mod 9 was abandoned and replaced by DOD Instruction 6490.07, which allows individualized assessments and removes per se exclusions.
- Doe filed suit on December 10, 2009; the court granted Gates’ motion to dismiss or for summary judgment.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Disparate treatment: adverse action requirement | Doe argues denial of Dubai TDY based on disorder was adverse action. | Gates contends denial lacked material adverse employment consequences. | Claim dismissed for no cognizable adverse action. |
| Disparate impact viability | Doe claims a facially neutral policy disproportionately affects disabled individuals. | Policy is not facially neutral and plaintiff failed to exhaust; thus claim fails. | Disparate impact claim dismissed. |
| Reasonable accommodation mootness | DIA failed to provide reasonable accommodations; request ongoing. | Policy was changed; acts are unlikely to recur; claim moot. | Moot and dismissed. |
| Other Rehabilitation Act counts (V–VI) exhaustion and scope | Counts involving confidential medical information and impermissible inquiry have merit. | No exhaustion and improper basis; lacks jurisdiction. | Counts V and VI dismissed for lack of exhaustion; no jurisdiction. |
| Declaratory relief availability | Seeks declaratory relief on several challenged policies. | Discretionary: court should refrain. | Declined to exercise declaratory-judgment power; relief denied. |
Key Cases Cited
- Edwards v. U.S. EPA, 456 F. Supp. 2d 72 (D.D.C. 2006) (adverse-action analysis requires tangible harm)
- Nurriddin v. Bolden, 674 F. Supp. 2d 89 (D.D.C. 2009) (materially adverse consequences required; not just denial of opportunities)
- Nurriddin v. Goldin, 382 F. Supp. 2d 79 (D.D.C. 2005) (adverse action standard in discrimination cases)
- Spinelli v. Goss, 446 F.3d 159 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (exhaustion of administrative remedies is jurisdictional under the Rehabilitation Act)
- Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971) (disparate impact framework for neutral policies)
- Duncan v. WMATA, 240 F.3d 1110 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (discrimination standards under Rehabilitation Act similarities to Title VII)
- Duncan v. Harvey, 479 F. Supp. 2d 125 (D.D.C. 2007) (prima facie elements for discrimination under Rehabilitation Act)
- E.E.O.C. v. St. Francis Xavier Parochial Sch., 117 F.3d 621 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (standards for Rule 12(b)(6) review and judicial notice)