Doe v. District of Columbia
418 U.S. App. D.C. 96
| D.C. Cir. | 2015Background
- Adoptive parents Robert and Carla Doe discovered prolonged sexual abuse by twin adoptees Wayne and Sara against younger children in the household and sought agency help and funding for therapeutic placements and services in 2004.
- The D.C. Child and Family Services Agency investigated; some children were moved to out-of-home placements and monitoring measures were implemented while the Agency considered options.
- On October 20, 2004, Agency officials (not police) removed two children (Ann and Oliver) from the Doe home without prior court authorization; the Agency later declined to file neglect charges against the parents and some children returned home while the twins were prosecuted and eventually placed outside parental custody.
- The Does sued the District, Agency, and individual employees under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Fourth, Fifth, First Amendment claims), tort claims, and for alleged failures to provide post-adoption services under the LaShawn A. consent decree; the district court granted judgment for defendants.
- The D.C. Circuit vacated summary judgment as to Fourth and Fifth Amendment claims against the District (Monell municipal-liability question remanded), affirmed dismissal and qualified immunity for the individual defendants, and affirmed dismissal of First Amendment, tort, and LaShawn-based claims.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Fourth/Fifth Amendment: warrantless removal of children | Doe: removal without court order violated parents’ and children’s Fourth/Fifth Amendment rights because there was no exigency | District: exigent circumstances justified immediate, warrantless removal to protect children | Vacated summary judgment as to District; remanded to decide Monell municipal liability and whether Agency policy/custom permitted removal absent exigency |
| Qualified immunity for individual social workers | Doe: individual actors violated constitutional rights by seizing children without judicial authorization | Defendants: law on when exigency permits removal was not clearly established; thus qualified immunity applies | Affirmed: individual defendants entitled to qualified immunity because contours of exigency were unsettled |
| Municipal liability (Monell) | Doe: District policies/procedures allowed warrantless removals and agency practices caused constitutional violation | District: removals followed statute and procedures; no evidence of unconstitutional municipal policy/custom | Remanded: district court must determine whether District policy, Procedures U/V, or policymaker decisions establish Monell liability |
| First Amendment retaliation | Doe: Agency retaliated for their complaints/advocacy by threatening/removing children and initiating proceedings | District: action motivated by good-faith belief children were in imminent danger; substantial unrebutted evidence of subjective good faith | Affirmed summary judgment for defendants on First Amendment claim |
| Tort and intentional-infliction claims | Doe: removals and related conduct constituted assault/battery, invasion of privacy, IIED, abuse of process | District: actors acted with objectively reasonable, good-faith belief in lawfulness and were privileged; conduct did not rise to outrageousness | Affirmed summary judgment for defendants on tort claims |
| LaShawn A (post-adoption services) | Doe: District failed to provide required post-adoption services under LaShawn A. decree/implementation plan | District: Does are not intended beneficiaries with enforceable rights under the consent decree/MFO | Affirmed: Does lack standing as intended beneficiaries to enforce LaShawn A. remedies |
Key Cases Cited
- Monell v. Department of Social Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978) (municipal liability under § 1983 requires policy or custom)
- Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51 (2011) (limits on municipal liability; must be the municipality’s own illegal act)
- Pembaur v. Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469 (1986) (single decision by a policymaker can create municipal liability in appropriate circumstances)
- Tenenbaum v. Williams, 193 F.3d 581 (2d Cir. 1999) (holding removal without judicial authorization unconstitutional when there was time to seek judicial approval)
- Doe v. Kearney, 329 F.3d 1286 (11th Cir. 2003) (discussing exigency standards and applying probable-cause level review)
- Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2009) (qualified immunity framework allowing courts to decide prongs in either order)
- Reichle v. Howards, 132 S. Ct. 2088 (2012) (clarifying qualified-immunity standards)
- Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398 (2006) (warrantless home entries/seizures presumptively unreasonable; exigent circumstances exception)
- City of Okla. City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808 (1985) (single-incident proof generally insufficient for Monell liability)
- Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972) (parental custody as fundamental interest)