Doe v. Covington County School District
2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 16321
5th Cir.2011Background
- Nine-year-old Jane Doe attended Covington County Elementary School under a compulsory-attendance regime; guardians completed a check-out Form listing authorized adults but without verifying identity of those taking Jane off campus.
- School employees repeatedly released Jane to Tommy Keyes during the school day, with Keyes signing out as her father or mother on several occasions.
- Jane was sexually assaulted by Keyes during off-campus custody and subsequently returned to the School, where she was re-admitted; the alleged policy permitted release without identity verification.
- Plaintiffs alleged the School’s express check-out policy and its administration created a special relationship and a duty to protect Jane’s personal security, which the district court dismissed as no constitutional duty.
- The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court’s Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal, concluding the complaint plausibly alleged a special-relationship claim and deliberate indifference, and remanded for further proceedings; the court also upheld dismissal of some qualified-immunity claims.
- Dissenting opinion argues no DeShaney special relationship exists between public schools and students and would affirm dismissal.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Did the School have a DeShaney-based special relationship with Jane? | Magee claims a special relationship due to compulsory attendance and affirmative custody with Keyes. | Education Defendants argue no special relationship exists under Fifth Circuit precedent. | Yes; the court held the complaint plausibly alleged a special relationship. |
| Was the School's deliberate indifference to Jane’s safety facially plausible? | Magee argues deliberate indifference by enacting and maintaining a defective check-out policy. | Defendants contend policy flaws do not amount to a constitutional violation. | Yes; the court held the School’s deliberate indifference plausibly violated Jane’s due process rights. |
| Is there qualified immunity for individual defendants? | N/A | N/A | Partially; the court affirmed dismissal of special-relationship claims against individuals on qualified-immunity grounds but reversed as to the theory itself for the district court. |
| Are other theories (state-created danger, Monell) viable here? | Does argue alternative theories for liability. | Defendants contend those theories do not apply given lack of underlying constitutional violation. | No; the court declined to sustain those theories given the special-relationship ruling. |
Key Cases Cited
- DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189 (1989) (state-created danger exception limited; no general duty to protect from private harm)
- Walton v. Alexander, 44 F.3d 1297 (5th Cir. 1995) (en banc; no special relationship for residential school student)
- Hillsboro Indep. Sch. Dist., 113 F.3d 1412 (5th Cir. 1997) (en banc; compulsory attendance does not alone create special relationship; age/custody factors considered)
- Doe v. Hillsboro Indep. Sch. Dist., 113 F.3d 1412 (5th Cir. 1997) (en banc; reiterated no automatic special relationship for public schools)
- Horton v. Flenory, 889 F.2d 454 (3d Cir. 1989) (state may be liable when it places a private actor in custody under color of state law)
- Griffith v. Johnston, 899 F.2d 1427 (5th Cir. 1990) (recognizes state’s duty to care for children under supervision)