Doe v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago
2017 IL App (1st) 162388
Ill. App. Ct.2017Background
- Plaintiff John Doe sued the Catholic Bishop of Chicago for negligent hiring, supervision, and retention after priest Daniel McCormack allegedly sexually molested him while Doe attended St. Agatha’s school.
- Doe sought punitive damages and presented evidence the Archdiocese knew of prior priest misconduct, failed to follow record-keeping and investigatory policies, knew of concerns about McCormack in seminary, and failed to report or investigate later suspicious incidents.
- The trial court granted leave to amend the complaint to add punitive damages, rejecting the defendant’s argument that punitive damages require proof of actual knowledge of the employee’s particular unfitness (i.e., a propensity to sexually abuse children).
- The trial court certified the question for permissive interlocutory review under Ill. S. Ct. R. 308: whether a punitive damages claim requires proof of an employer’s conscious disregard for an employee’s “particular unfitness” in negligent hiring/supervision/retention cases.
- The appellate court framed the issue as whether plaintiff must show the employer had actual knowledge of the employee’s propensity to sexually abuse children to obtain punitive damages, and answered the certified question in the negative.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether punitive damages in a negligent employment claim require proof that the employer had actual knowledge of the employee’s particular unfitness/propensity to abuse | Plaintiff argued the evidence of institutional knowledge, failures to investigate/report, and utter indifference supports submitting punitive damages to a jury | Defendant argued punitive damages require a higher showing: actual knowledge of the employee’s propensity to sexually assault children (particular unfitness) | Court held no — punitive damages need not be supported by proof of actual knowledge of a specific propensity; evidence that could show willful or wanton conduct or conscious disregard may suffice and is for the jury to decide |
Key Cases Cited
- Loitz v. Remington Arms Co., 138 Ill. 2d 404 (1990) (punitive damages punish and deter; not for ordinary negligence)
- Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc., 74 Ill. 2d 172 (1978) (punitive damages appropriate for willful, wanton, or grossly negligent conduct)
- Cirrincione v. Johnson, 184 Ill. 2d 109 (1998) (question of punitive damages is legal; whether conduct is willful and wanton is generally for jury)
- Van Horne v. Muller, 185 Ill. 2d 299 (1998) (elements of negligent hiring/retention require employer knowledge of employee’s particular unfitness)
- Ziarko v. Soo Line R.R. Co., 161 Ill. 2d 267 (1994) (willful and wanton conduct is a hybrid between negligence and intentional tort; degree matters)
- Oelze v. Score Sports Venture, LLC, 401 Ill. App. 3d 110 (2010) (surrounding knowledge and utter indifference are factors in willful and wanton analysis)
- Bryant v. Livigni, 250 Ill. App. 3d 303 (1993) (plaintiff may plead negligence and willful/wanton misconduct in the alternative)